The Reprice Finally Reached the Revenue Line: Centrus Realized 52% More Per SWU and Raised Its Guide
Key Takeaways
- The average price of SWU sold rose 52% year over year. For two consecutive quarters we wrote that the published enrichment price curve and the realized price were disconnected. This quarter the connection appeared. Volume fell 47% and average price rose 52%, and the LEU segment still earned a 62.6% gross margin against 60.8% a year ago.
- Revenue of $76.7M grew 5% and landed between two consensus estimates of $74M and $78.33M. GAAP diluted EPS was $0.45 against GAAP-basis estimates of $0.27 and $0.41. The widely reported "289% EPS beat" compares a new non-GAAP figure of $1.05 against the $0.27 GAAP-basis estimate, and is a basis mismatch rather than a result.
- Guidance was raised twelve weeks after it was first given: 2026 revenue to $450M to $500M from $425M to $475M, on commercial progress and offtake conversations. Piketon hiring went to at least 100 from at least 50. Capital deployment of $350M to $500M was reaffirmed.
- The last contingent-backlog gap closed. All $2.4B of contingent LEU sales commitments are now under definitive agreement, against $2.1B of $2.3B a quarter ago. Total backlog rose to $3.9B from $3.8B, with the LEU segment split disclosed for the first time as $700M of broker-dealer and $2.4B of contingent enrichment.
- Three partners are signed, and one has already put a number on potential savings. Palantir's platform has identified approximately $300M of potential cost savings since late January, alongside Fluor as primary EPC and Geiger Brothers for Ohio construction. A $560M investment in the Oak Ridge centrifuge plant was launched in January.
- The cost of the build-out is now visible in the income statement. Advanced technology costs rose to $18.9M from $3.0M, of which $17.0M is the new "Growth Costs" adjustment, and GAAP operating income fell to $0.8M from $20.5M. Operating cash flow was negative $35.1M against positive $36.5M.
- No equity was issued. The at-the-market program was open and untouched, and management said plainly it did not offer the right shareholder value. Cash of $1.87B plus the $900M award gives what the CFO called roughly $2.8B of deployable capital.
- Rating: Maintaining Outperform, raising fair value to $280 to $340 from $260 to $320. Two of the six items we set out to grade this quarter were met outright, two progressed, the DOE contract is still in negotiation, and one cannot be graded from the disclosure. The stock rose 12.3% and remains below our range.
Results vs. Consensus
Centrus reported after the close on May 5 and held its call the following morning, May 6, at 8:30 a.m. ET. This is our third note on the company. We initiated at Hold in November on the view that the enrichment option was real and the price already owned it, upgraded to Outperform in February after the DOE selected the company for a $900M HALEU task order, and set out six items to grade this quarter. Four of the six moved in the right direction, the DOE contract is pending, one cannot be graded, and the stock rose 12.3%, its first positive reaction session in our coverage.
Reading this quarter requires care on two points. First, the company introduced non-GAAP measures with this release, so the headline EPS comparison circulating in trade coverage is not a like-for-like one. Second, the quarter is the first in which the build-out's cost appears in the income statement in size, which makes GAAP operating income near-useless as a measure of the underlying business and makes the segment figures the place to look.
| Metric | Actual | Consensus / prior year | Beat/Miss | Magnitude |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total revenue | $76.7M | $74M to $78.33M consensus | Between the estimates | +5% YoY |
| EPS (diluted, GAAP) | $0.45 | $0.27 to $0.41 GAAP-basis estimates | Beat | +9.8% to +66.7% |
| EPS (diluted, adjusted) | $1.05 | No pre-print adjusted consensus existed | Not comparable | Measure introduced with this release |
| Average price of SWU sold | +52% YoY | (1)% for FY2025 | Reprice arrived | Volume (47)% |
| Average unit cost of SWU sold | +45% YoY | (13)% for FY2025 | Also up | Price rose faster than cost |
| Gross profit | $31.5M | $32.9M prior year | Down | (4)% |
| Operating income (GAAP) | $0.8M | $20.5M prior year | Down | Build-out cost in the P&L |
| Operating income (adjusted) | $18.2M | $22.3M prior year | Down | (18)% |
| Net income (GAAP) | $10.0M | $27.2M prior year | Down | (63)% |
| Net income (adjusted) | $23.5M | $28.6M prior year | Down | (18)% |
| LEU segment gross margin | 62.6% | 60.8% prior year | Expanded | +180 bps |
| Technical Solutions gross profit | $3.6M | $1.7M prior year | Up | +112% |
| Total backlog | $3.9B | $3.8B at Dec 31, 2025 | Up | +$0.1B |
| Contingent LEU under definitive agreement | $2.4B of $2.4B | $2.1B of $2.3B a quarter ago | Gap closed | 100% |
| 2026 revenue guide | $450M to $500M | $425M to $475M prior | Raised | +$25M at both ends |
| 2026 capital deployment guide | $350M to $500M | $350M to $500M prior | Reaffirmed | Unchanged |
| Piketon hiring guide | At least 100 | At least 50 prior | Raised | Doubled |
| Equity issued in the quarter | Nil | $25.2M in Q1 2025 | No dilution | ATM open and unused |
Year-over-Year Comparison
| Metric | Q1 2025 | Q1 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Separative work units revenue | $51.3M | $41.6M | (19)% |
| Uranium revenue | n/a | $3.0M | New |
| Technical solutions revenue | $21.8M | $32.1M | +47% |
| Total revenue | $73.1M | $76.7M | +5% |
| Cost of sales, SWU and uranium | $20.1M | $16.7M | (17)% |
| Cost of sales, technical solutions | $20.1M | $28.5M | +42% |
| Total cost of sales | $40.2M | $45.2M | +12% |
| Gross profit | $32.9M | $31.5M | (4)% |
| Gross margin | 45.0% | 41.1% | (390) bps |
| Advanced technology costs | $3.0M | $18.9M | +530% |
| Selling, general and administrative | $8.3M | $10.0M | +20% |
| Amortization of intangible assets | $1.1M | $1.8M | +64% |
| Total operating expense | $12.4M | $30.7M | +148% |
| Operating income (GAAP) | $20.5M | $0.8M | (96)% |
| Nonoperating net periodic benefit loss | $0.9M | $1.0M | +$0.1M |
| Interest expense | $3.4M | $4.0M | +$0.6M |
| Investment income | $(7.3)M | $(17.0)M | +$9.7M of income |
| Extinguishment of long-term debt | $(11.8)M | n/a | $(11.8)M of gain not repeated |
| Income before income taxes | $35.2M | $12.5M | (64)% |
| Income tax expense | $8.0M | $2.5M | $(5.5)M |
| Net income (GAAP) | $27.2M | $10.0M | (63)% |
| Basic EPS (GAAP) | $1.60 | $0.51 | (68)% |
| Diluted EPS (GAAP) | $1.60 | $0.45 | (72)% |
| Basic average shares | 16,982k | 19,773k | +16.4% |
| Diluted average shares | 17,048k | 22,446k | +31.7% |
| Cash (used in) provided by operating activities | $36.5M | $(35.1)M | $(71.6)M swing |
| Capital expenditures | $(2.1)M | $(23.2)M | +$21.1M |
GAAP to Adjusted Reconciliation
The company introduced Adjusted Operating Income, Adjusted Net Income and Adjusted EPS with this release. Two items are excluded: Growth Costs, being short-term non-capitalizable Piketon and Oak Ridge expansion costs that sit inside advanced technology costs, and stock-based compensation, which sits inside SG&A. Management expects to stop expensing Growth Costs once expansion costs become capitalizable.
| Line | Q1 2026 GAAP | Growth Costs | Stock comp | Q1 2026 Adjusted | Q1 2025 Adjusted |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross profit | $31.5M | n/a | n/a | $31.5M | $32.9M |
| Advanced technology costs | $18.9M | $(17.0)M | n/a | $1.9M | $1.7M |
| Selling, general and administrative | $10.0M | n/a | $(0.4)M | $9.6M | $7.8M |
| Amortization of intangible assets | $1.8M | n/a | n/a | $1.8M | $1.1M |
| Operating income | $0.8M | $17.0M | $0.4M | $18.2M | $22.3M |
| Income before income taxes | $12.5M | $17.0M | $0.4M | $29.9M | $37.0M |
| Income tax expense | $2.5M | $3.8M | $0.1M | $6.4M | $8.4M |
| Net income | $10.0M | $13.2M | $0.3M | $23.5M | $28.6M |
| Basic EPS | $0.51 | $0.67 | $0.01 | $1.19 | $1.68 |
| Diluted EPS | $0.45 | $0.59 | $0.01 | $1.05 | $1.68 |
Trailing-Twelve-Month Presentation (first time)
| TTM metric | Value | Comparison point |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $452.3M | $448.7M for FY2025 |
| Gross profit | $116.1M | $117.5M for FY2025 |
| Net income (GAAP) | $60.6M | $77.8M for FY2025 |
| Net income (adjusted) | $87.8M | No FY2025 adjusted figure was published |
Segment Performance
| Segment | Q1 2025 revenue | Q1 2026 revenue | Change | Q1 2025 gross profit | Q1 2026 gross profit | Q1 2026 margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LEU | $51.3M | $44.6M | (13)% | $31.2M | $27.9M | 62.6% |
| Technical Solutions | $21.8M | $32.1M | +47% | $1.7M | $3.6M | 11.2% |
| Total | $73.1M | $76.7M | +5% | $32.9M | $31.5M | 41.1% |
LEU segment, and the reprice
Segment revenue of $44.6M fell 13%. Inside that, SWU revenue fell $9.7M on a 47% decrease in volume sold, partially offset by a 52% increase in the average price of SWU sold, plus $3.0M of uranium revenue against nothing a year ago. Cost of sales fell 17% to $16.7M, with SWU costs down on the same volume decline and partly offset by a 45% increase in average unit cost. Segment gross profit of $27.9M was down 11%, on a gross margin of 62.6% against 60.8%.
Asked directly about pricing in the backlog, management declined to give contract detail and confirmed the direction.
"I will say to you that the trend is continuing to look like it has in the last few years, where you have constricted supply, you have increasing demand, both from the existing fleet and from the new reactors... So what you're seeing overall from a macro level, you're seeing pressure on the price through the demand side of it. And so we're seeing a lot of favorability there." — Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Assessment: This is the quarter to record against two previous ones. At initiation we wrote that the resale business earns yesterday's contracted prices and that a shareholder buying LEU for the enrichment price chart was buying an exposure the business did not have. On the FY2025 figures the realized price fell 1%. This quarter it rose 52%. Contract vintages are rolling, and the roll is now visible.
Two qualifications keep this from being a clean win. The average unit cost rose 45% alongside it, so the company is buying dearer as well as selling dearer and the net gain is the 7-point spread, which is what produced 180 basis points of segment margin rather than a step change. And the price and cost figures are both year-over-year percentages on a quarter whose volume fell 47%, so mix is doing part of the work. The direction is unambiguous. The magnitude at the margin line is modest.
Technical Solutions segment
Revenue rose 47% to $32.1M on a $9.8M increase from the HALEU Operation Contract, cost of sales rose 42% to $28.5M on an $8.2M increase under the same contract, and gross profit more than doubled to $3.6M from $1.7M for an 11.2% segment margin. Cumulatively, the company has now contractually produced over 1.6 metric tons of HALEU UF6 for the government since the contract began, against over 1 metric ton at the end of 2025.
Assessment: The first quarter in our coverage in which this segment grew revenue and grew gross profit at the same time, which is a change from the prior two quarters when growing scope produced flat or lower profit. The Phase 2 fee remains undefinitized. Note a source defect worth flagging: this release states the Phase 2 period of performance was extended "through October 31, 2025," while February's release put the extension at January 31, 2026. The February date is the later of the two and is the one to carry.
Backlog, and the closed gap
| Component | Dec 31, 2025 | Mar 31, 2026 | Character |
|---|---|---|---|
| LEU segment backlog | ~$2.9B | ~$3.1B | Split disclosed for the first time |
| broker-dealer backlog | Not separately disclosed | ~$0.7B | The current resale business |
| contingent LEU enrichment sales | ~$2.3B | ~$2.4B | Still depends on securing substantial public and private investment |
| under definitive agreements | $2.1B of $2.3B | $2.4B of $2.4B | All of it, up from 91% |
| Technical Solutions backlog | ~$0.9B | ~$0.8B | Funded, unfunded and unexercised options |
| Total backlog | $3.8B | $3.9B | Extends to 2040 |
Assessment: Two real improvements and one clarification that cuts the other way. The $0.2B of commitments awaiting a definitive agreement is now signed, so all $2.4B of the contingent book is contractual and the only remaining condition is funding. The contingent total also grew $0.1B. The clarification is the one that matters most for anyone valuing the current business: the LEU segment's broker-dealer backlog, meaning the resale operation that generates most of today's revenue and roughly nine-tenths of its gross profit, is roughly $0.7B. Against the LEU segment's trailing-twelve-month revenue, that is about two years of visibility on the part of the company that actually earns money. The rest is the plant.
Key Topics & Management Commentary
Overall Management Tone: Execution-focused and specific, with the most concrete cost commentary of the three calls we have covered. Management delivered on the reporting change it promised in February, introduced non-GAAP measures with a full reconciliation, disclosed the split of capital spend between capitalized and non-capitalized, and quantified a cost-savings figure. It remained silent on the two things it has always been silent on: total project cost and the hurdle price. It was also explicitly limited on the national security opportunity by being inside a procurement cycle.
1. Palantir, and $300M of identified cost savings since late January
The most concrete new economic fact on the call is a savings number attached to a named partnership.
"Since late January, we have identified approximately $300 million in potential cost savings and additional improvements expected to reduce manufacturing lead times and accelerate our timetable. This is just the beginning of our continuous improvement efforts." — Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Asked what drives the savings, the CEO described information management rather than component substitution.
"What really holds everything together and lines up the efficiencies is the informational system and our ability to make decisions quickly and with high fidelity. What Palantir does and what their AI platform allows us to do is it actually provides us with real-time data, which is critically important for a company like ours that is standing up a manufacturing facility and handles hundreds of suppliers... And we're seeing huge and meaningful reduction in cost in project management." — Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Assessment: A $300M savings figure identified since late January arrives in a company that still will not disclose the build-out's cost. That combination is frustrating and it is also informative: a project that can shed $300M is a project of multi-billion-dollar scale, which is consistent with the "multi-billion-dollar" language the company has used and inconsistent with anything smaller. Two cautions. The savings are described as "potential" and "identified," not realized, and the attribution to project-management efficiency rather than to design or supply-chain changes makes them harder to verify from outside. The company paid $5M of prepayments on the Palantir agreement in the quarter, so the stated return on that specific spend is large and unaudited.
2. A $560M investment in Oak Ridge
The manufacturing side of the build-out got its own capital number, which is the first component cost the company has disclosed.
"In late January, we launched a $560 million investment in our Oak Ridge centrifuge manufacturing plant, an investment aimed at expanding and accelerating our historic centrifuge manufacturing program." — Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Assessment: This is a partial answer to the question we have asked in every note. It is not the Piketon enrichment plant cost, which remains undisclosed, but it is a named dollar figure for the centrifuge manufacturing facility that feeds it, and it is the first piece of the capital stack that can be modelled. Set against a 2026 capital deployment guide of $350M to $500M, a $560M multi-year commitment on manufacturing alone tells you how much of the near-term spend is upstream of any enrichment capacity, and it explains why the first new cascade is not until 2029.
3. The partnership structure, and what Centrus keeps
Three partners are now signed, and management was precise about the division of labour.
"Centrus Energy will maintain control over design, engineering and manufacturing know-how of our centrifuges, while partners bring operational excellence and best-in-class capabilities." — Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Fluor performs design, engineering, procurement, construction and commissioning. Palantir supplies the Foundry and artificial intelligence platform across classified and unclassified environments. Geiger Brothers leads on-the-ground construction in Ohio, and previously served as a key construction partner on both the existing HALEU cascade and the 2013 LEU demonstration cascade.
Assessment: The structure is well chosen and the Geiger Brothers detail is the underrated one. A contractor that built both of the company's prior cascades is the closest thing available to institutional memory of how this specific technology gets installed, which is exactly the knowledge that first-of-a-kind projects usually lack. Retaining centrifuge design and manufacturing know-how in-house while outsourcing execution is also the right boundary: the proprietary asset stays proprietary and the execution risk goes to firms that do execution for a living.
4. Guidance raised on offtake conversations, not on a signed contract
Twelve weeks after issuing its first-ever guidance, the company raised the revenue range by $25M at both ends.
"Given the strength of our first quarter and commercial progress, including conversations around potential new enrichment offtake contracts, we are raising our 2026 annual guidance for revenue to a range of $450 million to $500 million from $425 million to $475 million." — Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Asked what drives the increase, the CFO pointed to market activity across both horizons.
"We see -- continue to be active in the market, and we've seen both near-term and line of sight to long-term offtake, and that has allowed us to increase our guidance marginally to what we believe will potentially be the outcome of the year and move us up about $25 million within the range." — Todd Tinelli, Chief Financial Officer
Assessment: A raise in the first quarter of a company's first-ever guidance year is a credibility event, and it is worth more than its $25M size because it establishes that the guide is live rather than a set-and-forget number. The basis is softer than the raise: conversations around potential contracts, not executed ones. The honest read is that management is more confident than it was in February and has not yet signed the thing that would justify a larger move. Note also that the capital deployment range was reaffirmed rather than raised, so the financial guidance change is pure revenue and pure upside.
5. Capital spend, now split between capitalized and not
The CFO delivered the disclosure that February's guide most needed, which is how much of "capital deployment" actually appears as capital expenditure.
"In the first quarter, we had a total of capital spend of $45.2 million with $23.2 million coming from CapEx and $22 million classified as non-CapEx. That $22 million is comprised of the aforementioned $17 million of growth costs and $5 million related to prepayments for the Palantir agreement. Going forward, we can expect the pace of our CapEx and non-CapEx spend to accelerate throughout the year." — Todd Tinelli, Chief Financial Officer
Assessment: Roughly half of the company's capital deployment is not capital expenditure, which is precisely the distinction that makes the headline guide hard to model, and management has now made it explicit and quantified it in the first quarter it applied. That is good disclosure. The consequence for a modeller is that reported capex will run at roughly half of the guided capital number, and the other half lands in the income statement as Growth Costs or in the balance sheet as prepayments. The acceleration warning matters too: $45.2M in the first quarter against a $350M to $500M annual guide implies the remaining three quarters run at roughly two to three and a half times the first-quarter pace.
6. The at-the-market program was open and deliberately unused
The single most shareholder-relevant statement on the call concerned a raise that did not happen.
"We did not participate in the ATM program in the first quarter, even though we have one that is open. And that was that we just didn't feel it provided the right shareholder value, and we believe there are better low cost of capital options out there, which we're continuing to explore to fund the full build-out." — Todd Tinelli, Chief Financial Officer
He also framed the total capital available including the DOE award: "we have $1.9 billion on the balance sheet that we can deploy. But we also have the $900 million HALEU award that will be ratably -- come into us on based on milestones payments. So essentially, the way we look at is we have about $2.8 billion currently."
Assessment: This is the specific behaviour we said in February we would watch for, and it went the shareholder's way. The company sold stock at an average $269.21 under the November program and declined to sell any in a quarter that opened at $242.76, saying it did not provide the right shareholder value. Price discipline on an open at-the-market program is worth more than any statement of intent, because it is observable. The $2.8B framing is a fair aggregation with one caveat management stated: the award is milestone-paid, so it is a reimbursement stream rather than cash in hand.
7. LEU is the volume and HALEU is the margin
Asked where the value sits between the two products, the CEO gave the clearest strategic decomposition of the three calls.
"Just from a physics perspective, there is a significant amount of LEU feed that would be required to create a single unit of HALEU. So from a volume perspective, the value comes from LEU because LEU drives a lot of the volume. I believe from just generally margin and market being ahead of everybody else, HALEU has a lot of the advantages for us." — Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
He added that the advanced-reactor market has changed character: "If you and I had this conversation a couple of years ago or even, I don't know, 8 months ago, I would have said that a lot of the advanced reactors are not fully thinking or focused on fuel just yet... we're now seeing a lot of the reactors get to a phase where they are starting to seriously procure and commit to fuel."
Assessment: The physics point resolves an ambiguity we have carried since initiation. HALEU and LEU are not competing uses of the same capacity; HALEU demand pulls LEU capacity through as feed, so the two are complementary and a HALEU order is also an LEU order. That makes the 12-metric-ton HALEU target more consequential than its tonnage suggests. The observation that reactor developers have moved from licensing focus to fuel procurement within the last two years, and perhaps the last eight months, is a leading indicator worth tracking, and it is consistent with the guidance raise being driven by offtake conversations.
8. Hyperscalers are moving faster than utilities
Asked to compare counterparty types, the CEO drew a sharp distinction.
"I would give the upper hand to hyperscalers when it comes to trying to go faster and stronger just because fuel represents, in my view, a fairly significant question mark and uncertainty about their reactors. They want to cover that risk as early and as thoroughly as possible, especially as they progress through funding and capital raising for their projects. This is not a risk they should have on their books, and they don't want to have it on their books..." — Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Of utilities he said their behaviour is strategic rather than aggressive, with price important but "secondary to security of supply."
Assessment: The reasoning is specific and commercially useful. A hyperscaler raising project capital has a strong incentive to remove fuel-supply uncertainty from its own financing documents, which converts fuel procurement from a cost decision into a financing prerequisite. That is a materially better buyer than a utility optimizing price. The observation that hyperscalers are becoming "more able to commit" is the closest thing to a forward indicator on the prepayment funding avenue, which remains without a named counterparty two quarters after it was first raised.
9. An Oklo joint venture in deconversion, exploring a gap in the fuel cycle
The company announced it is exploring a joint venture with Oklo focused on HALEU deconversion, and the CEO explained the industrial logic at length.
"There is a hole in the fuel cycle right now when it comes to advanced reactors and particularly sort of HALEU-type fuels. Deconversion of uranium hexafluoride or UF6 to whether it's an oxide form or metal form, more predominantly metal form, that process does not exist commercially... if you were to have a blank sheet of paper type design and you were to ask yourself, where and how does it make most sense for me to construct my deconversion facility, you will automatically arrive at a conclusion... that it makes the most sense to put my deconversion together with enrichment." — Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
He noted Oklo is both a potential participant and a large prospective offtaker of exactly that fuel form.
Assessment: Strategically well-placed and financially immaterial for now. Co-locating deconversion with enrichment is the obviously right configuration, and a partner who is also the customer is the right first counterparty. It is also a second capital-consuming project being explored by a company that has not disclosed the cost of its first one, and it is explicitly at the exploration stage with no structure, size or date. Treat it as evidence of vertical-integration ambition, not as a funded initiative.
10. Hiring accelerated because sourcing was easier than expected
The Piketon hiring target doubled, and the reason given was labour-market supply rather than a schedule change.
"The rate at which we were able to source employees in both Oak Ridge and in Piketon in the local communities was actually stronger than we anticipated, which allowed us to accelerate our hiring curve, and that allows us to move quicker than we anticipated. If we have a strong workforce, then we're able to not have any delays." — Todd Tinelli, Chief Financial Officer
He also flagged that every hire must be security-cleared and trained on one-of-a-kind work, and that clearance costs sit in the non-capitalizable bucket.
Assessment: A raised hiring target on stronger-than-expected local sourcing is a genuinely good operational signal, because skilled-labour availability is the constraint that most often slows first-of-a-kind industrial projects in the United States. The cost link is worth noting: more hires sooner means more clearance and training expense flowing through Growth Costs, so the same fact that improves the schedule worsens near-term GAAP earnings. That is the right trade and it should be read as such rather than as cost inflation.
11. The national security opportunity is now inside a procurement
Management confirmed it has responded to the NNSA and then declined to say anything else.
"We are in a procurement cycle, and therefore, we're very limited by what we can say... We can confirm that we have submitted our response to the NNSA's request. And again, as a general statement, we stand ready to support our national security mission in any way required... To your question about quantities and things of that sort, again, this is not something that we have disclosed." — Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Assessment: Procedural progress with continued silence on size, which is the correct posture inside a live procurement and the third consecutive quarter with no number attached to this opportunity. A submitted response converts a notice of intent into an active bid, which is a real step. It remains unvaluable, and management has now explicitly deferred all disclosure to the government, which means shareholders should not expect a Centrus press release to be the first news.
Guidance & Outlook
| Item | February 2026 guide | May 2026 status | Direction |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 total revenue | $425M to $475M | $450M to $500M | Raised $25M at both ends |
| 2026 total capital deployment | $350M to $500M | Reaffirmed | Unchanged |
| Oak Ridge net new hires | At least 100 | Reaffirmed | Unchanged |
| Piketon net new hires | At least 50 | At least 100 | Doubled |
| Critical partner contracts | Finalize 100% | ~1/3 finalized in Q1; full-year target reaffirmed | On track |
| Certified for Construction package | Release one in 2026 | Conceptual engineering design phase entered | On track |
| Reporting format | TTM presentation promised | Delivered; non-GAAP measures added with reconciliation | Delivered |
| DOE $900M task order | Selected, subject to negotiation | Still being finalized; remains a stated guidance assumption | Pending |
| NNSA sole-source | Notified of intent | Response submitted; inside a procurement cycle | Advanced, unquantified |
| Oak Ridge manufacturing investment | Not sized | $560M investment launched in late January | First component cost disclosed |
| Partners signed | Fluor named as primary EPC | Fluor plus Palantir plus Geiger Brothers | Expanded |
| Cost savings identified | None quantified | ~$300M since late January | New |
| Adjacent fuel-cycle expansion | Not raised | Exploring a HALEU deconversion joint venture with Oklo | Exploratory |
| Contingent LEU under definitive agreement | $2.1B of $2.3B | $2.4B of $2.4B | Gap closed |
| Piketon capital cost | Not disclosed | Still not disclosed | Third consecutive quarter |
| Hurdle SWU price | Declined as proprietary | Not addressed on the call | Unchanged |
| Equity issuance | $390.4M drawn in Q4 at an average $269.21 | Nil in Q1; program open and unused by choice | Price discipline shown |
Implied 2026 shape: the raised revenue guide of $450M to $500M against $76.7M delivered in the first quarter leaves $373M to $423M for the remaining three quarters, or roughly $124M to $141M a quarter against a first quarter of $76.7M. The company does not guide quarterly and told analysts the year should be read on a trailing-twelve-month basis rather than by quarter, but the arithmetic means the back three quarters must run at roughly 1.6x to 1.8x the first quarter's run rate. That is consistent with the 2025 pattern, when the second and fourth quarters produced $154.5M and $146.2M against $73.1M and $74.9M in the first and third, and it is the single biggest execution risk in the guide.
On capital: $45.2M of total capital spend in the first quarter against a $350M to $500M annual guide implies the remaining three quarters average $102M to $152M each, which management explicitly said would accelerate. Roughly half will not appear as capital expenditure. Against $1,868.2M of cash plus a milestone-paid $900M award, the programme remains funded on the company's own arithmetic.
Street at: the pre-print revenue estimates we could source were $74M and $78.33M against $76.7M delivered. On EPS the comparison requires care: GAAP-basis estimates of $0.27 and $0.41 against $0.45 of GAAP diluted EPS put the beat at 9.8% to 66.7%, and the widely reported "289% beat" compares the newly introduced $1.05 adjusted figure against the $0.27 GAAP-basis estimate. There was no pre-print adjusted consensus, because the measure did not exist until this release. The $0.41 estimate had also been cut 24.1% in the sixty days into the print, so the bar had already come down.
Analyst Q&A Highlights
What drives the raised revenue guide
The first question went straight to the guidance change.
Q: "On guidance, you touched on it a bit in the prepared remarks, but could you give more detail on what's driving the increase in expected revenue for this year?"
— Ryan Pfingst, B. Riley Securities
A: "We see -- continue to be active in the market, and we've seen both near-term and line of sight to long-term offtake, and that has allowed us to increase our guidance marginally to what we believe will potentially be the outcome of the year and move us up about $25 million within the range."
— Todd Tinelli, Chief Financial Officer
Assessment: The answer credits both near-term activity and long-term line of sight without separating them, which leaves open whether the $25M is contracted or expected. Given the company reaffirmed capital deployment and raised only revenue, the raise reads as commercially sourced rather than as an accounting or timing effect. It is a small number and an important signal: management chose to move a guide it had held for twelve weeks.
Pricing and margin trends in the backlog
An analyst noticed the SWU price move and asked what the backlog now carries.
Q: "Could you give us a sense of the pricing and margin trends in the backlog? It seems like things on the SWU side, it's -- things are moving up. Just what's the sort of average pricing trend in the backlog?"
— Robert Brown, Lake Street Capital Markets
A: "Although I can't specifically address contractual pricing... I will say to you that the trend is continuing to look like it has in the last few years, where you have constricted supply, you have increasing demand... So once again, I cannot comment specifically about prices, but we certainly are seeing favorability in the short, midterm and the long run in terms of contractual activity."
— Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Assessment: The most important word is "short." This answer includes the short term alongside the midterm and the long run, and the 52% increase in realized price is the evidence behind it. The refusal to give contract detail is unchanged and consistent. What a shareholder can now take is that the reprice has begun rather than remaining prospective.
Where in the year the extra $25M sits
An analyst tried to date the guidance raise.
Q: "The additional $25 million that you guys have added, was any of that in Q1? Or is it all future-looking? Just so we can understand kind of the cadence of how things kind of come to be."
— Joseph Reagor, ROTH Capital Partners
A: "It's wise to look at our business on a TTM basis as shipments and deliveries can move from quarter-to-quarter. It's difficult to comment to say exactly which quarter it took place... What I would say is we're in line with our expectations for the first quarter. And the future quarters, I would say, would be ratable to comparable periods in the past..."
— Todd Tinelli, Chief Financial Officer
Assessment: The useful phrase is "ratable to comparable periods in the past," which is the closest thing to quarterly guidance this company gives. Read literally it means the remaining three quarters should resemble the prior year's second, third and fourth quarters, which produced $154.5M, $74.9M and $146.2M against a raised full-year guide. That shape is achievable and it is weighted to the second and fourth quarters, which is where the risk concentrates.
Palantir, and when project financing becomes possible
A two-part question asked about lead-time compression and the future financing path.
Q: "I just wanted to kind of dig into the Palantir partnership a little bit... Should we be thinking about that in the realm of the first cascade on the 42-month timeframe or kind of across the board? And then as we think about just the cost for the full build-out, right, $1.9 billion worth of cash on the balance sheet, you're in a strong position now. But... at what point do you get to, I guess, for lack of a better term, proof of concept where then you can entertain other financing options like maybe project financing, the cascade or something to that nature?"
— Nicholas Amicucci, Evercore ISI
A: "The relationship here and the value that we're seeing lasts much, much longer than the first cascade, the first centrifuge. I mean, we're viewing this as sort of a business-altering type structure in terms of our unit cost and our ability to meet our lead times to market and beyond."
— Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Assessment: The CFO's half of the answer was the more valuable one and it did not address project financing either. Instead he framed the available capital at roughly $2.8B including the milestone-paid award, listed the avenues under exploration, and said the company feels no pressure to raise in a down market. Project financing against a first-of-a-kind cascade remains unaddressed after three calls, which is fair: it is not financeable until it operates. The practical implication is that everything before 2029 is funded by balance sheet, procurement and prepayment, or not at all.
Where the value sits between LEU and HALEU
The best strategic question of the call asked management to rank its two products.
Q: "What we're seeing is advanced reactor companies are pushing through the markets also with the DOE and NRC licensing. And a lot of them are using HALEU and TRISO. So I'm just wondering if you could update us on where you see the most SWU value in LEU or HALEU? And has anything changed how you're looking at that strategically?"
— Mark Shooter, William Blair
A: "Just from a physics perspective, there is a significant amount of LEU feed that would be required to create a single unit of HALEU. So from a volume perspective, the value comes from LEU because LEU drives a lot of the volume. I believe from just generally margin and market being ahead of everybody else, HALEU has a lot of the advantages for us... the good news is we're seeing almost across the board, all the reactors that were in different states of development are now actually moving towards significant and serious committed fuel procurements."
— Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Assessment: Volume from LEU, margin from HALEU, and the two are physically coupled rather than competing. That is the cleanest framing management has given of what the plant is for, and it means a modeller should treat HALEU orders as pulling LEU volume through rather than displacing it. The closing observation, that reactor developers across development stages are moving to committed procurement, is the demand-side leading indicator to watch, and it is qualitative.
Hyperscalers versus utilities as buyers
A follow-up asked which counterparty class is moving faster.
Q: "Talking about your ongoing conversations with SWU offtakes, I'm wondering if you can give us an update on the engagement with hyperscalers or traditional utilities and IPPs. Has one been more aggressive recently than the other?"
— Mark Shooter, William Blair
A: "I would give the upper hand to hyperscalers when it comes to trying to go faster and stronger just because fuel represents, in my view, a fairly significant question mark and uncertainty about their reactors... This is not a risk they should have on their books, and they don't want to have it on their books, and we fully understand it and work very closely with them to make sure it is not. So we're seeing them becoming more interested and more importantly, more able to commit."
— Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Assessment: "More able to commit" is the phrase to hold, because inability to commit was the reason the prepayment avenue produced nothing in two prior quarters. The financing-prerequisite logic is sound: a data-centre developer raising capital against nuclear generation has to remove fuel uncertainty from its own documents, which makes it a structurally more motivated buyer than a utility optimizing price. Still no named counterparty and no amount, three quarters in.
Next steps on the NNSA opportunity
An analyst asked for the process and the size, and got the process.
Q: "We know the NNSA had notified you of intent to award and you responded to it. So I'm just curious, I mean, now what would next steps be? I mean, maybe it's something that's very difficult to answer, but expectations on kind of how that plays out? And then can you just remind me what the potential amount of that funding source would be?"
— Eric Stine, Craig-Hallum
A: "We are in a procurement cycle, and therefore, we're very limited by what we can say as I mentioned on the call. We can confirm that we have submitted our response to the NNSA's request... To your question about quantities and things of that sort, again, this is not something that we have disclosed. I'm going to let the NNSA and the government drive that information to the public."
— Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Assessment: The right answer inside a live procurement and an unsatisfying one for a shareholder. The substantive content is that a response has been submitted, which moves this from notice to bid. Management has now put disclosure control in the government's hands, so this opportunity will arrive as news rather than as guidance, and it should be valued at zero until it does.
The deconversion strategy
An analyst asked why the company is entering an adjacent business.
Q: "You mentioned in the prepared remarks and there was a press release in March about a JV or potential JV with Oklo for deconversion. Can you discuss your strategy around deconversion more broadly? Are you looking for additional kind of commercial partnerships or arrangements? What does the market look like for that today for you?"
— William Peterson, JPMorgan
A: "There is a hole in the fuel cycle right now when it comes to advanced reactors and particularly sort of HALEU-type fuels. Deconversion of uranium hexafluoride or UF6 to whether it's an oxide form or metal form, more predominantly metal form, that process does not exist commercially... From our perspective, it allows us for potential vertical integration and further differentiation of our enrichment of HALEU."
— Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Assessment: A genuine gap in the domestic fuel cycle, a partner who is also the offtaker, and a co-location argument that is hard to dispute. The strategic case is strong. The financial case is unmade: no size, no structure, no capital estimate, and it sits alongside a primary project whose own cost is undisclosed. The risk worth naming is attention rather than money at this stage.
Why hiring accelerated, and what 2027 looks like
An analyst probed whether the doubled Piketon target means more work or faster work.
Q: "Would you describe the additional hiring more as a need for greater resources than previously anticipated to do the same work? Or is this a need stemming from the required work just going faster than expected? And then... taking an early look at 2027, do you foresee hiring needs being similar, lesser or greater than 2026?"
— Lawson Winder, Bank of America Securities
A: "The rate at which we were able to source employees in both Oak Ridge and in Piketon in the local communities was actually stronger than we anticipated, which allowed us to accelerate our hiring curve, and that allows us to move quicker than we anticipated... what I would say going forward is, look, where we are finding people now is unions, local shops, where we're going down to universities, all different areas to build up our workforce..."
— Todd Tinelli, Chief Financial Officer
Assessment: Faster work rather than more work, which is the better of the two answers, and it is attributed to labour supply being better than modelled. The CEO's addition is the one to note for the years ahead: project pace is "always driven by the need to meet this demand that we're seeing," with some of it contracted and some in discussion. That means 2027 headcount is a demand-driven variable rather than a plan, which is honest and unhelpful for modelling.
Where the $300M of savings comes from
An analyst pushed for the composition of the savings figure.
Q: "Circling back on the Palantir partnership. I was curious, Amir, if the $300 million in savings that you guys have identified thus far, can you give us a sense for what are the main factors driving those cost savings? Is it particular components or just any other commentary you can provide to give us a sense for where those are coming from specifically?"
— Jeffrey Grampp, Northland Capital Markets
A: "What really holds everything together and lines up the efficiencies is the informational system and our ability to make decisions quickly and with high fidelity... And we're seeing huge and meaningful reduction in cost in project management. It allows us to shorten our lead times and cycle times. I mean, so far, we've already declared $300 million in cost savings. And as I said on previous calls, I mean, we're not stopping there."
— Amir Vexler, President and Chief Executive Officer
Assessment: The question asked whether the savings are component-level or process-level and the answer is unambiguously process-level: information management, decision speed, supplier coordination across hundreds of suppliers. That is more credible for a first-of-a-kind project than a component-cost claim would be, because coordination failure is the usual source of overruns. It is also less verifiable from outside, since there is no bill of materials to check it against, and no baseline cost has been disclosed for the $300M to be a percentage of.
Whether SWU gross margins keep improving
The sharpest numerical question of the call did the price-versus-cost arithmetic out loud.
Q: "In the prepared remarks, I think I heard that the SWU prices were up around 52%. At the same time, SWU costs were also up around 45%. So that clearly gives you a gross margin boost a little bit year-over-year. Should we expect gross margins from SWU increasingly positive going forward?"
— Sameer Joshi, H.C. Wainwright
A: "The rate at which SWU prices move, obviously, it has to do with our contractual mix... So what I would always point to is look at this on an average basis over several quarters. That's why we continue to emphasize that we want to talk about this on a TTM. We have seen positive movement in SWU prices... And also, it allows us to have better line of sight for additional offtake with SWU pricing in the outer years."
— Todd Tinelli, Chief Financial Officer
Assessment: The analyst framed it correctly and got a directional confirmation rather than a forecast. The important admission is the last clause: rising SWU pricing improves line of sight on outer-year offtake, which links current market prices to the contingent backlog's eventual economics rather than only to current revenue. That is the mechanism by which a rising price curve becomes shareholder value in this name.
Whether uranium sales repeat in the second quarter
A follow-up asked about the lumpiest line in the income statement.
Q: "Should we expect uranium sales in the second quarter? In the recent history, at least, they have tended to concentrate in the second and fourth quarter. So given that you're providing TTM -- highlighting TTM metrics, should we expect 2Q to have uranium sales?"
— Sameer Joshi, H.C. Wainwright
A: "We can't provide any guidance on specific sales. What I would say is uranium sales are opportunistic in the market. They can be -- happen occasionally throughout the year. But right now, we can't make any comment as to when those sales are going to take place or if they are going to take place in any future periods."
— Todd Tinelli, Chief Financial Officer
Assessment: A clean, useful non-answer. The word that matters is "opportunistic": uranium sales are inventory monetization decisions taken against market conditions, not contracted deliveries, which is why they appeared at $34.1M in the third quarter of 2025, $13.4M in the fourth and $3.0M here. Anyone modelling a uranium line for the rest of 2026 is guessing, and the company has now said so directly.
What They're NOT Saying
- The capital cost of the Piketon enrichment plant. Third consecutive quarter with no figure. The $560M Oak Ridge manufacturing investment is now disclosed, which makes the omission of the larger number more conspicuous rather than less.
- What the $300M of savings is a percentage of. A savings figure without a baseline cannot be assessed. Management has quantified the saving and not the project, so nobody outside can tell whether $300M is 5% or 25% of the programme.
- Whether the $300M is realized or identified. The release and the call both say "identified" and "potential." No portion has been described as booked, and no mechanism was given for how the market will learn when it converts.
- The absolute realized SWU price. A 52% increase and a 45% cost increase are both disclosed only as percentages, as in every quarter we have covered. Without a level, the realized price still cannot be compared with the published curve or with a competitor.
- Whether the deferred fourth-quarter Russian shipment landed. Management said in February that the delayed shipment would lower average cost per SWU when it arrived in the first quarter. The average unit cost of SWU sold rose 45%. Neither document addresses the shipment, so the February claim cannot be graded, and no analyst asked.
- Any milestone schedule for the $900M award. Second consecutive quarter. The CFO now includes it in a $2.8B capital figure while describing it as arriving ratably on milestones, with no first-payment date or annual profile.
- The Phase 2 fee, still. Third consecutive quarter in which post-November-2024 costs carry no fee. The amount at issue has never been quantified and no analyst has asked in three calls.
- How much of the remaining 2026 capital deployment is non-capex. The first-quarter split was disclosed at roughly half and half. No full-year split was given, so guided capex remains unknowable.
- Anything about the Oklo joint venture's economics. No structure, ownership split, capital requirement, or timeline for a decision on a second capital project.
- Remaining at-the-market capacity. The program is described as open and unused this quarter, with no remaining authorization disclosed and no stated price discipline beyond the judgement that using it did not provide the right shareholder value.
- Why the broker-dealer backlog is only $700M. Disclosed for the first time, it covers about two years of the LEU segment's trailing-twelve-month revenue, on the business that generates roughly nine-tenths of current gross profit. Neither document comments on it and no analyst asked.
- The 2028 supply cliff. For the first time in three calls no analyst asked about the January 1, 2028 Russian import prohibition, and management did not raise it. Waivers cover committed 2026 and 2027 deliveries; the first new cascade is 2029. The silence is not the same as resolution.
Market Reaction
- Pre-print setup: LEU closed at $206.04 on May 5, down 15.1% year to date from $242.76 against the S&P 500's +6.0%, and up 187.5% over the trailing twelve months from $71.66. The stock had rallied into the print, up 12.5% over the trailing thirty days from $183.21. The 52-week closing range entering the print was $71.66 to $436.00.
- Reaction session: the stock opened at $206.00 on May 6, flat to the prior close, traded a range of $198.30 to $231.37, and closed at $231.32, up 12.3% or $25.28.
- Intraday pattern: the low of $198.30 marked a 3.8% decline and the high of $231.37 a 12.3% gain. The stock closed within $0.05 of its session high, at the very top of a 16.7% intraday range.
- Volume: 1.3M shares against a 30-day average of 0.8M, or 1.6x normal.
- Market context: the S&P 500 rose 1.5% on the session, so roughly 10.8 points of the 12.3% advance was idiosyncratic.
This is the first positive reaction session in our coverage. The release came out the prior evening and the call began an hour before the open, so the session traded on the full disclosure. The stock opened flat, traded between $198.30 and $231.37, and closed within $0.05 of the high, which fits a release whose good news was in the segment detail and the guidance rather than in the reported EPS line.
The volume multiple of 1.6x matches November's and is below February's 2.5x. A 12.3% advance on modest volume that closes at the high describes demand meeting little supply, which is the opposite of the February session's all-day deterioration on 2.5x volume.
Attribution is straightforward. Three things in the release deserved the move: a raised revenue guide twelve weeks after the first one was issued, a 52% increase in realized SWU pricing, and $300M of identified cost savings. A fourth deserved credit and got less attention, which is that the company declined to use an open at-the-market program because it did not provide the right shareholder value. Against those, the GAAP lines were poor and the trade coverage led with a mis-based "289% EPS beat," so some of the buying may have been on a number that does not mean what it appeared to.
Some perspective on the base. At $231.32 the stock is down 4.7% year to date from $242.76, in a market up 6.0% entering the print, and 16.7% below the $277.78 reaction close that followed our November initiation. Over three prints it has fallen 14.7%, fallen 20.7% and risen 12.3%. Across the same three quarters the company has gone from an unfunded plan with a $1B equity shelf to a $900M public award, three named partners, a dated first cascade, a $560M manufacturing investment, a fully-signed $2.4B contingent book and a raised guide. The share price is down 16.7% from our initiation close and the asset behind it has changed a great deal.
Street Perspective
Debate: Is a 52% realized price increase the reprice or a mix artefact?
Bull view: The bull case holds that this is the event the whole thesis waited for. The published enrichment price curve has compounded at 24% a year since 2019, contracts roll on multi-year cycles, and the first quarter where realized pricing jumps 52% is the first quarter of that roll reaching revenue. Management described "favorability in the short, midterm and the long run" and linked rising prices to better line of sight on outer-year offtake.
Bear view: The bear response is that volume fell 47% in the same quarter, so both the price and cost percentages are computed on a small and unrepresentative delivery set, and that the average unit cost rose 45% alongside, leaving only 180 basis points of segment margin improvement. Management itself said to look at this on a trailing-twelve-month basis rather than by quarter, which is an argument against reading one quarter as a trend.
Our take: The bulls have the direction and the bears have the magnitude. A 47% volume decline does make the sample thin, and the company's own caution about quarterly reads applies here as it applied when the same figure was negative. But the cost side rose too, which is what a genuinely repricing market looks like from the middle of a supply chain, and the FY2025 comparison of a 1% price decline makes this quarter a break rather than noise. We treat it as the reprice starting, not as a new run rate.
Debate: Do the new non-GAAP measures clarify or flatter?
Bull view: The optimistic reading is that they clarify. GAAP operating income of $0.8M tells a reader nothing about a resale business that earned $31.5M of gross profit, because $17.0M of build-out preparation costs sit above the line and will stop being expensed once they become capitalizable. Separating the cost of becoming a producer from the results of being a reseller is exactly what an investor needs, the reconciliation is full, and the definitions are narrow: expansion costs and stock compensation, nothing else.
Bear view: The skeptical reading is that a company introduces adjusted earnings in the quarter GAAP earnings collapse, that these costs are cash and, by management's own account, will keep flowing through the income statement during the build-out preparation, and that the immediate result was trade coverage reporting a 289% EPS beat by comparing the new measure against a GAAP-basis estimate. The measure's first effect on the market was to mislead it.
Our take: The measure is legitimate and its debut was mishandled by others rather than by the company. Growth Costs are genuinely non-recurring at the project level even though they recur for several years, and the reconciliation table is complete and specific. But the CFO said plainly that "we can expect to have a certain level of these types of expenses flow through our income statement as we prepare for our build-out," which means adjusted earnings will exclude real cash costs for as long as that preparation lasts. Use both: adjusted for the business, GAAP for the cash.
Debate: Is declining to use the at-the-market program discipline or delay?
Bull view: The bull argument is that this is the most shareholder-friendly action management has taken. Having sold $390.4M of stock at an average $269.21 under the November program, it declined to sell any in a quarter that opened at $242.76, saying it did not provide the right shareholder value. That is price discipline demonstrated rather than promised, it is consistent with the CFO's stated policy of never being forced to raise into weakness, and it is affordable because $1.87B of cash plus a milestone-paid award covers the near-term programme.
Bear view: The bear response is that not raising when you need multi-billion-dollar capital is a decision to raise later, at a price nobody knows, and that the company burned roughly $58M of cash in the quarter between negative operating cash flow of $35.1M and $23.2M of capital expenditure while spending is guided to accelerate. Discipline now can become necessity later.
Our take: Discipline, clearly, and the bear point is the right thing to monitor rather than a counterargument. The February note said we would downgrade if issuance resumed materially below $210; instead the company issued nothing at all near that level. A management team that leaves an open shelf untouched on price grounds has told shareholders something durable about how it will behave. What remains true is that the full build-out is not funded and the gap will eventually be closed by someone's capital.
Model Update Needed
| Item | Prior model (Feb 2026 note) | Suggested change | Reason |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2026 revenue | $425M to $475M | $450M to $500M | Company raised the guide on commercial progress |
| Implied Q2 to Q4 2026 revenue | n/a | $373M to $423M | Guide range less the $76.7M first quarter |
| FY2026 capital deployment | $350M to $500M | Reaffirmed; assume ~half is not capex | Q1 split was $23.2M capex and $22.0M non-capex |
| Q1 total capital spend | Not split | $45.2M: $23.2M capex, $17.0M growth costs, $5.0M Palantir prepayments | CFO disclosure |
| Realized SWU price | (1)% for FY2025 | +52% YoY in Q1 2026, level undisclosed | Release; volume (47)% |
| Realized SWU unit cost | (13)% for FY2025 | +45% YoY in Q1 2026 | Release; net spread ~7 points |
| LEU segment gross margin | 32.2% for FY2025 | 62.6% in Q1 2026 against 60.8% in Q1 2025 | $27.9M on $44.6M |
| Technical Solutions gross margin | 5.9% for FY2025 | 11.2% in Q1 2026 | $3.6M on $32.1M; Phase 2 fee still undefinitized |
| Uranium revenue | Non-recurring | $3.0M in Q1; treat as opportunistic and unforecastable | CFO: opportunistic, no guidance possible |
| Advanced technology costs | $8.9M in Q4 2025 | $18.9M in Q1 2026, of which $17.0M is Growth Costs | Reported; expect a continuing level per the CFO |
| Adjusted operating income | Measure did not exist | $18.2M in Q1 2026 against $22.3M in Q1 2025 | New non-GAAP reconciliation |
| Adjusted net income | Measure did not exist | $23.5M in Q1 2026; $87.8M TTM | New non-GAAP reconciliation |
| TTM revenue / gross profit / net income | Not presented | $452.3M / $116.1M / $60.6M | First TTM presentation, as promised in February |
| Interest expense | $4.1M in Q4 | $4.0M in Q1 | Stable at the enlarged debt level |
| Investment income | $16.5M in Q4 | $17.0M in Q1 | On a $1.87B cash balance |
| Effective tax rate | 9.4% for FY2025 | 20.0% in Q1 2026 GAAP; 21.4% adjusted | $2.5M on $12.5M; $6.4M on $29.9M |
| Diluted average shares | 22,527k in Q4 | 22,446k in Q1 | Roughly flat; no equity issued |
| Shares outstanding | 19,664,565 at Dec 31 | 19,671,587 at Mar 31 | 18,952,387 Class A plus 719,200 Class B |
| Cash | $1,957.2M | $1,868.2M | Balance sheet at Mar 31, 2026 |
| Long-term debt | $1,174.8M | $1,176.1M | Balance sheet at Mar 31, 2026 |
| Net cash | ~$782M | ~$692M | $1,868.2M less $1,176.1M |
| Operating cash flow | $51.0M FY2025 | $(35.1)M in Q1 2026 | Against $36.5M in Q1 2025 |
| Property, plant and equipment, net | $29.5M | $59.5M | Doubled in one quarter |
| Deposits for financial assurance | $2.7M | $32.8M | Rose $30.1M |
| Oak Ridge manufacturing investment | Not sized | $560M, launched late January | First disclosed component cost |
| Identified cost savings | None | ~$300M potential, via the Palantir platform | Identified, not stated as realized |
| Contingent LEU backlog | $2.3B, $2.1B under definitive agreement | $2.4B, all under definitive agreement | Gap closed |
| Broker-dealer backlog | Not disclosed | ~$0.7B | First separate disclosure; the current business's book |
| Deployable capital | ~$2.0B cash | ~$2.8B including the milestone-paid DOE award | CFO framing |
| HALEU produced to date | Over 1 metric ton at year-end 2025 | Over 1.6 metric tons contractually produced | Cumulative under the HALEU Operation Contract |
| Piketon capital cost | Not modellable | Still not modellable | Undisclosed for a third quarter |
Valuation: At the $231.32 reaction close on 19,671,587 shares of Class A and Class B common stock outstanding at March 31, the equity is worth roughly $4.55B. Netting approximately $692M of net cash gives an enterprise value near $3.86B. That is 8.5x trailing-twelve-month revenue of $452.3M, 8.1x the midpoint of the raised 2026 guide, 33.2x trailing-twelve-month gross profit, 0.99x the $3.9B headline backlog and roughly 2.6x the non-contingent portion. On the newly available adjusted basis, the equity trades at 51.8x trailing-twelve-month adjusted net income of $87.8M.
We maintain Outperform and raise the fair value range to $280 to $340 from $260 to $320. The midpoint of $310 implies +34.0% from the $231.32 reaction close; the $280 low end implies +21.0% and the $340 high end +47.0% against the same close. The raise reflects four things the February range did not contain: a raised revenue guide, the first evidence of realized-price repricing, $300M of identified cost savings against a $560M disclosed manufacturing investment, and the closing of the contingent backlog's definitive-agreement gap. It does not credit the NNSA opportunity, the Oklo joint venture, any hyperscaler prepayment, or expansion beyond the base-case build-out. A disclosed Piketon capital cost remains the one event that would let us narrow the range rather than move it.
Thesis Scorecard Post-Earnings
Six items were set out in February to be graded this quarter. The scorecard below opens with them.
| February commitment | Grade | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Deferred Q4 Russian shipment to show up as a lower average cost per SWU | Not gradeable | Average unit cost of SWU sold rose 45% YoY. The disclosure is a year-over-year per-unit percentage on 47% lower volume, so the shipment's effect cannot be isolated. Neither document mentions it and no analyst asked. |
| First trailing-twelve-month presentation | Delivered | TTM revenue $452.3M, gross profit $116.1M, net income $60.6M, adjusted net income $87.8M. Non-GAAP measures added with a full reconciliation. |
| DOE $900M contract finalized through negotiation | Pending | Still being finalized and still listed as a stated 2026 guidance assumption. |
| First Certified for Construction package released | On track | Conceptual engineering design phase entered; full-year target reaffirmed. |
| At least 150 net new hires | Raised | Piketon target doubled to at least 100, Oak Ridge reaffirmed at at least 100, on stronger-than-expected local sourcing. |
| Progress removing contingency from the contingent LEU backlog | Delivered in part | All $2.4B now under definitive agreement against $2.1B of $2.3B. Funding remains the outstanding condition, with no stated conversion trigger. |
| Thesis Point | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Bull #1: Only US-owned enricher with proven technology into a structural Western shortage | Confirmed | Over 1.6 metric tons of HALEU UF6 contractually produced to date; NNSA bid submitted; three partners signed including a contractor that built both prior cascades. ON TRACK. |
| Bull #2: Demand arrives faster than capacity, and customers will pre-commit | Confirmed | Contingent book now $2.4B and fully under definitive agreement; guide raised on offtake conversations; management reports reactor developers moving from licensing to committed fuel procurement within the last two years, and perhaps the last eight months. ON TRACK. |
| Bull #3: Public-private funding can be assembled without ruinous dilution | Materializing | No equity issued in the quarter despite an open program, on the judgement that using it did not provide the right shareholder value. ~$2.8B of deployable capital including the milestone-paid award. Moves from EMERGING to MATERIALIZING. |
| Bull #4 (new): The contract book reprices as vintages roll | First evidence | Average realized SWU price +52% YoY after -1% for FY2025; management described pricing favorability in the short, midterm and the long run. NEW, on one quarter of data. |
| Bear #1: The current business is a low-margin reseller priced off old contracts | Refuted in part | LEU segment gross margin 62.6%, up 180 bps, on a 52% realized price increase. The counterweight is a newly disclosed broker-dealer backlog of only ~$0.7B, about two years of the LEU segment's TTM revenue. Softens further, but the book is short. |
| Bear #2: Funding, timing and cost of Piketon are all undisclosed and outside management's control | Narrowing | $560M Oak Ridge investment sized, ~$300M of savings identified, capital-spend split disclosed, hiring accelerated. The Piketon capital cost and hurdle price are withheld for a third quarter. LIVE. |
| Bear #3: A 2028 statutory supply cliff sits inside the valuation horizon | Materializing, and now unexamined | Unchanged, one quarter closer, and for the first time in three calls neither management nor any analyst raised it. First new cascade 2029. LIVE. |
| Bear #4: Valuation already capitalizes a plant that does not exist | Contained | Enterprise value ~$3.86B, up from ~$3.35B in February and down from ~$4.60B at initiation. Now 0.99x headline backlog and 8.1x the raised guide midpoint. CONTAINED. |
Overall: The best quarter of our coverage on the fundamentals, and the first in which the company did something for shareholders by declining to act. Four of the six February items moved the right way, the DOE contract is pending, and the sixth is not gradeable from the disclosure given. The genuinely new thesis element is the reprice: after two quarters of writing that the enrichment price curve and the realized price were disconnected, we can record a 52% increase in the average price of SWU sold and a segment gross margin of 62.6%. That is a new bull pillar and it rests on one quarter, which is why it is graded as first evidence rather than confirmed.
Two things did not improve. The Piketon capital cost is undisclosed for a third consecutive quarter, now conspicuously alongside a $560M figure for the smaller of the two facilities and a $300M savings claim with no baseline. And the 2028 supply cliff went entirely unmentioned by management and unasked by ten analysts, which is a lapse in the coverage rather than a change in the risk. Waivers cover committed 2026 and 2027 deliveries; the first new cascade is 2029; the newly disclosed broker-dealer backlog is roughly $0.7B.
Action: Maintaining Outperform; raising fair value to $280 to $340 from $260 to $320. The February downgrade trigger, equity issuance materially below $210, was not merely avoided but inverted: management left an open program untouched on price grounds. What we will grade next quarter: whether the raised guide's implied back-half run rate of roughly $124M to $141M a quarter materializes, whether the DOE contract closes, whether the realized SWU price increase repeats on a second quarter of data, whether any portion of the $300M of savings is described as realized, and whether the accelerating capital spend arrives at the guided pace. We revert to Hold if the DOE contract fails to close or if the back-half revenue ramp misses badly enough to pull the full year below the original $425M to $475M range.