FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC. (FCX)
Hold

The Restart Finally Works, But the EPS Growth Belongs to the Minority Partners

Published: By A.N. Burrows FCX | 2026_Q2 Earnings Analysis

Key Takeaways

  • The pattern broke: guidance was held, not cut. After two consecutive quarters of Grasberg guide-downs, full-year copper (3.1B lbs) and gold (650k oz) were reaffirmed and the unit-cost guide was lowered to $1.90/lb from $1.95. Block-cave throughput doubled inside the quarter, from an April average of 34,000 t/d to 69,000 t/d in June, and the wet-ore problem that broke the stock in April got better rather than worse.
  • The 28% EPS growth is an ownership artifact, not an operating one. Pre-tax income fell 19.3% year over year and consolidated net income fell 10.1%. Net income to common rose 27.5% purely because the minority interests' share collapsed from $775M to $407M and the effective tax rate fell 7.3 points. Grasberg is the asset FCX owns least of (48.76%), so its absence flatters per-share results. That reverses mechanically as the mine ramps back.
  • Cost execution was the genuine beat. Unit net cash costs of $1.97/lb came in $0.27 below the company's own April estimate of $2.24, on higher molybdenum by-product credits and copper volumes, and copper sales of 710M lbs beat the 690M lb guide. The Americas carried it: U.S. and South American segment operating income each more than doubled, to $834M and $840M.
  • The market repriced the cost of growth, not the quarter. Bagdad 2X preliminary capital is now roughly $4.5B, about 30% above the 2023 study, 2027 capex went up $300M to $4.8B, and the U.S. $2.50/lb 2027 cost target was explicitly disowned for 2027. The stock fell 2.3% against an S&P 500 down 1.2%.
  • Rating: Maintaining Hold. The execution bear case is genuinely de-risking and we raise conviction, but the fourth quarter must deliver roughly 983M lbs of copper to make the year, the license that carries the terminal value is filed and not yet granted, and the stock is up 43% over twelve months with copper near records. We want the license, not another good quarter, to move to Outperform.

Results vs. Consensus

For three quarters running, the story at Freeport has been that record metal prices were papering over a mine that would not run. This quarter is the first where that framing is wrong. Copper sales beat the company's own April estimate, unit costs beat it by a wide margin, and the full-year guide survived a quarter intact for the first time since the September 2025 mud rush. The market's reaction had almost nothing to do with any of that.

Note that consensus dispersion was unusually wide going into the print, spanning $0.59 to $0.62 on adjusted EPS and $6.47B to $6.83B on revenue. The spread reflects genuine disagreement over how to treat the $284M of PTFI idle-facility charges, plus real uncertainty about Indonesian sales timing. Under every compiled set, this was a double-digit percentage EPS beat.

MetricActual (Q2 2026)ConsensusBeat/MissMagnitude
Revenue$7,029M$6,470MBeat+8.6%
Adjusted EPS$0.74$0.62Beat+19.4%
GAAP EPS (diluted)$0.68n/an/a+28.3% YoY
Unit net cash cost$1.97/lb$2.12/lbBeat$0.15 favorable
Copper sales710M lbs690M lbs (Apr. company guide)Beat+2.9%
Gold sales123k oz140k oz (Apr. company guide)Miss-12.1%
Operating income$2,003Mn/an/a-17.6% YoY
Operating cash flow$2,048Mn/an/a-6.7% YoY

Year-over-year

MetricQ2 2026Q2 2025Change
Revenue$7,029M$7,582M-7.3%
Total cost of sales$4,843M$4,950M-2.2%
Operating income$2,003M$2,432M-17.6%
Pre-tax income$1,930M$2,391M-19.3%
Effective tax rate28.2%35.5%-7.3 pts
Consolidated net income$1,391M$1,547M-10.1%
Less: noncontrolling interests($407M)($775M)-47.5%
Net income to common$984M$772M+27.5%
GAAP EPS (diluted)$0.68$0.53+28.3%
Adjusted EPS$0.74$0.54+37.0%
Operating cash flow$2,048M$2,195M-6.7%
Capital expenditures$1,104M$1,261M-12.5%
The single most important line in this table is the minority-interest row. Walk the bridge from $772M to $984M: pre-tax income was down $461M, tax was $306M lower, minority interests took $368M less, and equity earnings were flat. Every dollar of the $212M increase in net income to common came from the tax line and the minority-interest line. Freeport owns 48.76% of PTFI, so when Grasberg is idle, roughly half the lost profit is lost by the Indonesian government rather than by FCX shareholders. The corollary is uncomfortable: as the block cave ramps back toward capacity, the minority share and the higher Indonesian tax rate come back with it, and a meaningful share of the recovery in operating profit will not reach the per-share line.

Sequential

MetricQ2 2026Q1 2026Change
Revenue$7,029M$6,234M+12.8%
Operating income$2,003M$2,137M-6.3%
Net income to common$984M$881M+11.7%
GAAP EPS (diluted)$0.68$0.61+11.5%
Adjusted EPS$0.74$0.57+29.8%
Copper sales (M lbs)710657+8.1%
Copper realized ($/lb)$6.17$5.78+6.7%
Gold sales (k oz)123121+1.7%
Unit net cash cost ($/lb)$1.97$1.91+3.1%
Operating cash flow$2,048M$1,495M+37.0%

Sequential operating income fell 6.3% despite a 12.8% revenue gain, which looks wrong until you remember that the first quarter carried the $699M insurance settlement gain as a credit inside operating costs. Strip that and the underlying trend is the right way up.

Volumes and realizations

MetricQ2 2026Q2 2025Change
Copper production (M lbs)786963-18.4%
Copper sales (M lbs)7101,016-30.1%
Copper realized ($/lb)$6.17$4.54+35.9%
Gold production (k oz)192317-39.4%
Gold sales (k oz)123522-76.4%
Gold realized ($/oz)$4,520$3,291+37.3%
Molybdenum production (M lbs)2322+4.5%
Molybdenum sales (M lbs)2522+13.6%
Molybdenum realized ($/lb)$28.75$21.10+36.3%
Unit net cash cost ($/lb)$1.97$1.13+74.3%

Quality of Beat

Revenue. Price again did the heavy lifting, but with a genuine volume improvement underneath it that was absent in the prior two quarters. Revenue fell 7.3% year over year because copper sales dropped 30.1% and gold sales fell 76.4%, offset by realizations up 35.9% and 37.3%. What is new is the sequential picture: copper sales rose 8.1% and revenue 12.8% against the first quarter, and the 710M lbs sold exceeded the company's own 690M lb April estimate on shipment timing and better operating performance. One quality caveat worth pricing: the quarter carried $98M of favorable adjustments to prior-period provisionally priced copper sales, worth $35M after tax or roughly $0.02 per share, against an unfavorable $(35)M in the year-ago quarter. That is a mark-to-market on open positions in a rising copper tape, not underlying performance. Offsetting it slightly, deferred intercompany profits swung to a $(18)M reduction in operating income from a $34M addition a year ago.

Margins. This is where the quarter is unambiguously good. Consolidated unit net cash costs of $1.97/lb landed $0.27 below the April estimate of $2.24, driven by higher molybdenum by-product credits (moly realized $28.75/lb, up 36.3%) and better copper volumes. The Americas delivered the operating leverage: U.S. Copper Mines operating income of $834M against $368M, and South America $840M against $374M, each more than double the year-ago level. Against that, the headline cost is still up 74.3% year over year, because Grasberg's gold and copper by-product credits, which historically carry the consolidated cost number, are only partially back. The $284M of idle-facility and restoration costs sit outside the unit-cost calculation entirely, which is defensible under the non-inventoriable treatment but does mean the reported $1.97 understates the cash cost of running the company this quarter.

EPS. Adjusted EPS of $0.74 excludes $96M of after-tax net charges ($0.06 per share), of which the PTFI idle-facility production and delivery costs are $84M and the associated depreciation $23M, partly offset by a $16M gain on asset sales and $20M of PTFI historical tax credits. That is a clean and conventional add-back set. The problem with the headline is not the adjustment, it is the composition described above: with pre-tax income down 19.3%, the entire per-share advance came from a lower tax rate and a smaller minority-interest deduction. Operating cash flow tells a similar story. The reported $2,048M included $0.7B of pre-tax insurance proceeds collected by PTFI, so underlying cash generation was closer to $1.35B.

Segment Performance

Segment (operating income)Q2 2026Q2 2025ChangeNotable
U.S. Copper Mines$834M$368M+126.6%Morenci mining rates 30% above 5-yr average
South America Operations$840M$374M+124.6%Cerro Verde $736M of the total; ownership to 55.66%
Indonesia (PTFI)$499M$1,868M-73.3%$284M idle-facility costs; block cave still ramping
Molybdenum Mines$31M$25M+24.0%Moly realized $28.75/lb, up 36.3%
U.S. Rod & Refining$22M$7M+214.3%$73M Miami smelter turnaround absorbed
Atlantic Copper$26M$13M+100.0%Acid credits offsetting input inflation
Corporate, other & eliminations($249M)($223M)n/aIncludes environmental and exploration
FCX total$2,003M$2,432M-17.6%Americas offset roughly two-thirds of the Indonesia decline
Operating metrics by geographyU.S.South AmericaIndonesia
Copper production (M lbs)332249205
Copper production, YoY-1.2%-7.1%-42.9%
Copper sales (M lbs)312245153
Copper realized ($/lb)$6.25$6.11$6.12
Unit net cash cost ($/lb)$2.94$2.48($0.81) credit
Unit cost, prior year$3.04$2.46($0.99) credit
Mill throughput (t/d)336,700416,400131,100

Indonesia: the recovery quarter

Grasberg produced 205M lbs of copper and 184k oz of gold against 359M lbs and 311k oz a year ago, and sold materially less than it produced (153M lbs of copper, 118k oz of gold) as concentrate accumulated ahead of the new smelter. The number that matters is throughput at the block cave itself, which averaged 53,000 t/d for the quarter but exited June at 69,000 t/d, against an April average of 34,000. Total district throughput of 131,100 t/d is still well below the 182,500 of a year ago, with the Deep Mill Level Zone actually running above prior year at 69,900 t/d and the block cave carrying the shortfall.

"As you will see from the chart, production rates at the Grasberg Block Cave doubled during the quarter from an April average of 34 thousand tons per day to an average of 69 thousand tons per day in June."
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Grades remain diluted by the ramp: copper ore grade of 0.91% against 1.15%, gold at 0.62 g/t against 0.77. Recoveries went the other way, with copper recovery at 89.8% against 88.1% and gold at 80.0% against 74.8%, which is a small but real signal that the mill is running well on the material it is getting. The segment carried $284M of idle-facility costs and $79M of associated depreciation, both excluded from adjusted earnings.

Assessment: Indonesia is no longer the source of negative surprise, which after three quarters is itself the news. But it remains the source of the greatest forward variance: the segment holds $27.9B of the group's $59.7B in assets and absorbed $516M of the quarter's $1,104M capital spend, while contributing only 22.2% of segment operating income before corporate items.

U.S. Copper Mines: the quarter's actual engine

U.S. operating income of $834M more than doubled on copper production that was essentially flat (332M lbs against 336M). That is almost entirely price and cost: realizations of $6.25/lb against $4.81 and unit costs of $2.94/lb against $3.04. Underneath, the operating story is Morenci, where mining rates ran 30% above the trailing five-year average at roughly 900,000 tons per day of material moved. Leach production of 219M lbs was up 7.9%, with ore placed on stockpiles up 42.5% to 885,400 t/d, though mill copper production fell to 158M lbs from 183M on a lower grade (0.29% against 0.32%) and softer recovery (82.6% against 85.4%).

"Sustaining the higher mining rates will translate into improved copper production over time and we expect copper production to grow in the coming quarters."
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Assessment: Management called the U.S. its highest earnings contributor across the portfolio year to date, and the segment data support it. This is the part of the story that is fully owned, fully permitted, in a low-tax jurisdiction, and improving for reasons within the company's control. It is also the part the market pays least attention to, which is where the medium-term upside in the name most plausibly sits.

South America: quietly excellent

South American operating income of $840M against $374M came on 249M lbs of copper production, down 7.1%. Cerro Verde delivered $736M of that on 202M lbs, and FCX used the quarter to lift its stake from 55.08% to 55.66% via $107M of open-market purchases, bringing cumulative purchases over roughly two years past $300M. Unit costs of $2.48/lb were flat year over year at $2.46 but beat the Street's $2.66 estimate. Mill throughput rose to 416,400 t/d from 404,800, offsetting a grade decline to 0.29% from 0.31%. Leach production of 58M lbs fell from 69M on materially lower ore placement.

Assessment: A clean quarter that nobody asked about. The strategic tell is the stake creep: buying more of an asset you already operate at a time when you are also defending a $4.5B greenfield-scale capital number is a statement about relative returns. We read it as management quietly signalling that incremental ownership of proven tonnes is cheaper than new tonnes.

Downstream: Atlantic Copper, Rod & Refining, Molybdenum

The three smaller segments contributed $79M of combined operating income against $45M, and their significance is strategic rather than financial. Atlantic Copper and the Miami smelter give Freeport an internal hedge against the sulfuric acid inflation that has been pressuring leach costs across the industry, because the same smelters that consume sulfur produce saleable acid. Rod & Refining absorbed $73M of planned Miami turnaround costs and still tripled operating income. Molybdenum Mines earned $31M with realizations up 36.3%, and management flagged latent capacity at Climax that is not currently being pushed.

Assessment: The integrated footprint is doing quiet work. It is also the basis for the 45X production tax credit claim discussed below, which is worth roughly $500M a year if copper is written into the Treasury regulations.

Key Topics & Management Commentary

Overall Management Tone: Confident and, for the first time in three quarters, not explaining a setback. Prepared remarks led with execution rather than remediation, and the operating detail offered on the block cave was specific and volunteered rather than extracted. Where the call turned defensive was capital: the Bagdad cost revision and the 2027 unit-cost target both drew answers that were qualitative and forward-leaning where the questions asked for numbers, and that gap is what the stock traded on.

1. The block-cave ramp actually accelerated

The April guide assumed roughly 60,000 t/d at the block cave in the second half. The mine exited June at 69,000. That is the first time since the September 2025 incident that an operating datapoint has come in ahead of the plan rather than behind it, and it directly addresses the wet-ore diagnosis that drove the April guide-down.

"Upgrades to the material handling system for our automated rail system are progressing on schedule. And we continue to advance work for a restart of production Block 1 South in 2027."
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Assessment: The April thesis was that this was a timing and material-handling problem rather than a resource problem. One quarter of evidence now supports that reading. Credibility on near-term Grasberg forecasting, which we marked down twice, is partially restored.

2. Why the second-half guide was not raised

The obvious question is why a mine exiting June at 69,000 t/d is guided to 60,000 to 65,000 for the second half. The answer is planned downtime: the chute-gallery upgrades that fix the wet-ore constraint require taking production areas offline in sequence. The largest, CG44, carries 25,000 to 30,000 t/d and is expected complete by year end.

"there is about 25 thousand to 30 thousand tons a day that come out of the C G 44 area. So that will be a step change once that is complete"
— A. Cory Stevens, President and Chief Operating Officer, Americas

Assessment: This is conservatism of a kind we will take: the company is absorbing known downtime into guidance rather than assuming it away. It also means the second half is not a smooth ramp but a sawtooth, with the step change landing at the turn of the year. That raises execution risk on the fourth quarter specifically, which is already the quarter carrying the volume burden.

3. The wet-ore ratio improved

In April, the share of wet draw points had risen from 30% to 45% during the six-month suspension, and 10 of 23 panels failed the dry-to-wet blend ratio the existing chutes require. Management reported that draw points wet in April converted to dry as cave movement resumed, helped by unusually dry weather in Papua. The company was careful not to bank on the weather holding.

"In terms of the conditions, they are good at Grasberg."
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Assessment: This is the specific bear point that cost shareholders 12.6% in a single session three months ago, and it moved in the right direction. We downgrade the Grasberg execution risk from emerging to contained, while noting that the durable fix is engineering, not weather, and does not complete until 2027.

4. Pit-bottom water: the mitigation programme

Beyond the chutes, the company detailed a parallel set of water-management initiatives: the old pit bottom is currently dry, a new large-diameter drill capable of well over 100 metres a day (against 5 to 10 metres with core drilling) is being commissioned with a second arriving in August, a new drainage gallery has been started along the north side of the pit bottom, and a surface slurry pump is under evaluation for late 2027.

"We have started a new drainage gallery that will be along the north side of the pit bottom."
— A. Cory Stevens, President and Chief Operating Officer, Americas

Assessment: Management is treating the mud-rush risk as a permanent engineering obligation rather than a cleared event, which is the correct posture after seven fatalities. The candour that "the rain's gonna come back at some point" is more reassuring than a claim of resolution would have been.

5. The 2041 extension moved from MOU to formal application

PTFI submitted its formal licence-extension application in June, consistent with the February memorandum of understanding witnessed by the Indonesian president. Under those terms Freeport retains 48.76% of PTFI through 2041 and approximately 37% from 2042. Management is targeting completion this year but conceded there is no prescribed statutory timetable.

"And so we will work through the regulatory process as quickly as we can, but there is no prescribed time frame to getting it done"
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

The chairman's read-out from June meetings in Jakarta was notably warm, describing the president as "very positive and encouraging" and closing with the observation that "in Indonesia, sometimes that takes time."

Assessment: Filed is meaningfully better than agreed, and the integrated-producer status conferred by the completed smelter is the regulatory hook that makes a life-of-resource extension grantable. But this remains the single largest unpriced binary in the name, and a dilution of ownership to roughly 37% after 2041 is the price of it. We will not upgrade on this until the licence is issued.

6. Bagdad 2X: the capital number moved 30%

The headline that moved the stock. Preliminary capital for the Bagdad expansion is now around $4.5B, roughly 30% above the 2023 study estimate, on commodity and labour escalation, scope revisions and further engineering. Management insists the project still clears at $4/lb copper, well below spot, because the operating model has been redesigned: a fully autonomous mine, off-site prefabrication, and a re-optimised concentrator throughput plan.

"With enhancements to the operating model, the project still remains supported at a $4 per pound price of copper."
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Worth noting what sits inside that incentive price: the $4 case assumes $20/lb molybdenum against a spot price of $28.75, and management confirmed the economics are evaluated after tax excluding the roughly $6B of remaining U.S. net operating losses. Both are conservative.

Assessment: A 30% capital increase with an unchanged incentive price requires believing a large operating-model improvement, and management did not quantify the offset. That said, the assumption set behind the $4 threshold is genuinely conservative, and there are no major permitting hurdles on a three-to-four year build. The market marked the capital and ignored the conservatism, which we think is roughly the right instinct but the wrong magnitude.

7. Leach: the cheapest pounds in the portfolio

The leach initiative is running at roughly a 200M lb annualised rate, targeting 300M lbs by year end and 800M lbs longer term. The first internally developed additive is deployed with early results ahead of expectation, a second generation believed to be several times more effective has sourcing in place and four demonstration piles committed, heated-solution pilots are running at Morenci with a commercial-scale demonstration unit starting at El Abra in the second half, and geothermal drilling is underway at Morenci.

"So our Gen-1 additives are in deployment. The early results are better than we had expected."
— A. Cory Stevens, President and Chief Operating Officer, Americas

Assessment: This is the highest-return, lowest-capital-intensity growth in the company and it is progressing on schedule. At roughly $3/lb average U.S. cost today, incremental leach pounds at a materially lower cost are the most credible path to the U.S. cost target the company just conceded it will miss in 2027.

8. The 2027 U.S. cost target slipped

Freeport has guided for some time to $2.50/lb U.S. unit costs in 2027. Management now says that is not achievable in 2027 at current input prices, while maintaining it as a target. Diesel assumptions were rolled forward at roughly second-quarter levels, and sulfuric acid exposure is limited in 2026 because little is bought on the spot market.

"The current market conditions with energy prices and sulfur and acid prices are taking that opportunity a little bit away from us in 2027, but we are continuing to work on that"
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Assessment: A target retained in name and abandoned in timeline. The honest framing is that the input-cost shock we flagged last quarter has proven more persistent than the company hoped, and the offsetting levers (leach scale, automation) are real but slower than the headwind. This is the one place the quarter got worse rather than better.

9. Consolidated costs came down anyway

Against that 2027 slippage, the near-term cost picture improved. Full-year 2026 unit net cash costs are now guided to $1.90/lb from $1.95 in April, with the third quarter at $2.00, on higher by-product credits more than offsetting other increases. Second-half sensitivity runs about $0.02/lb for each $100/oz move in gold and $0.03/lb for each $2/lb move in molybdenum.

Assessment: The cost guide came down because gold and molybdenum are strong, not because mining got cheaper. That is a perfectly good reason for the guide to fall, but it is a price-dependent improvement and should be read as such.

10. Capital allocation: buying what you already own

The quarter returned $110M via repurchase of 1.7M FCX shares and declared $0.15 per share in dividends, roughly $600M returned in the first half including about $200M of buybacks, against $6.3B distributed since the 2021 policy was adopted. Separately, $107M went to buying 2.0M more Cerro Verde shares. Capital expenditure guidance for 2026 held at roughly $4.3B, while 2027 rose $300M to $4.8B on upgraded mining equipment and revised estimates, with discretionary spend of $1.6B in 2026 and $1.9B in 2027, about half of it Kucing Liar and the Grasberg LNG project.

Assessment: The balance sheet supports all of it: $4.1B cash against $9.4B debt, net debt of $2.1B excluding the $3.2B of Indonesian downstream facilities, no significant 2026 maturities, and $4.85B of undrawn revolver capacity across FCX, PTFI and Cerro Verde. The tension is not solvency, it is that the 50% of free cash earmarked for growth is now buying fewer tonnes per dollar than it did in 2023.

11. Section 232 and the 45X credit remain free options

No decision has been made on extending Section 232 to refined copper cathode, with the phased approach previously floated for 2027 still unresolved. COMEX trades at roughly a 2% premium to LME. Separately, copper has been designated a critical mineral but not yet written into the Treasury regulations that would qualify Freeport's integrated U.S. smelting for the 45X production tax credit.

"And be part of this 45 x credit, which equates to about $500 million a year."
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Assessment: Two unpriced policy options, both asymmetric to the upside, both outside management's control. We deliberately retired the tariff-premium bull pillar in October 2025 after the July 2025 cathode exemption collapsed the COMEX premium, and we are not reinstating it on an undecided review. The 45X credit at roughly $500M a year is the larger and more probable of the two.

Guidance & Outlook

Metric (FY 2026)Prior (April)New (July)Change
Copper sales3.1B lbs3.1B lbsMaintained
Gold sales650k oz650k ozMaintained
Molybdenum sales93M lbs93M lbsMaintained
Unit net cash cost$1.95/lb$1.90/lbLowered
Operating cash flown/a~$8.3BAt $6.00 Cu, $4,000 Au, $30 Mo (H2)
Capital expenditures~$4.3B~$4.3BMaintained
2027 capital expenditures~$4.5B$4.8BRaised ~$300M
Bagdad 2X preliminary capital2023 study basis~$4.5B~30% above 2023 estimate
Third-quarter 2026 guidanceGuidevs. Q2 2026 actual
Copper sales750M lbs+5.6%
Gold sales160k oz+30.1%
Molybdenum sales22M lbs-12.0%
Unit net cash cost$2.00/lb+1.5%

Implied second-half ramp. Full-year copper sales of 3.1B lbs against 1,367M lbs in the first half require 1,733M lbs in the second, a 26.8% step-up. With the third quarter guided at 750M lbs, the fourth quarter must deliver roughly 983M lbs, about 31% above the third-quarter guide and 38% above the second quarter's 710M lbs. Gold is steeper still: 650k oz for the year against 244k in the first half implies 406k oz in the second, up 66.4%, with roughly 246k oz needed in the fourth quarter against a 160k oz third-quarter guide.

The cost path is equally back-loaded. With the first half at $1.94/lb and the third quarter guided to $2.00, the full-year $1.90 guide implies roughly $1.77/lb in the fourth quarter, a step down that depends on Grasberg gold volumes arriving to generate the by-product credits. Operating cash flow follows the same shape: $8.3B for the year against $3,543M booked in the first half implies roughly $4.76B in the second.

The fourth quarter now carries the year. Roughly 32% of full-year copper sales, 38% of gold sales, and the entire step down in unit costs land in a single quarter that also depends on the new Indonesian smelter drawing down concentrate inventory built in the third. Management was explicit that production, not sales, is the stable variable and that the third-to-fourth quarter shift is a refined-sales timing question. That is the right characterisation, and it is also exactly the kind of timing assumption that has slipped twice before at this asset.

Street at: The full-year volume guide is unchanged, so the reaffirmation was not the surprise. Consensus had been modelling a smoother second-half distribution, and the reallocation of roughly 100M lbs of copper and 50k oz of gold into inventory at PTFI's smelting operations pushed near-term modelled sales down even as the annual figure held.

Guidance style: Freeport has now guided volumes down twice and held once. This quarter's posture was the most conservative of the three: absorbing known chute-gallery downtime into the second-half rate rather than extrapolating the 69,000 t/d June exit, and lowering the cost guide only to the extent by-product prices justified it. That is the behaviour of a management team that has been burned by its own optimism and is correcting for it.

Longer-dated framing. Management reiterated 2027 copper sales more than 20% above 2026 and gold more than 50% higher, with further growth in 2028, and district rates at roughly 65% of full capacity in the second half of 2026, 80% by mid-2027, and approaching full capacity by end-2027. Modelled on the 2027 to 2028 average at $4,000 gold and $30 molybdenum, EBITDA spans roughly $13B at $5 copper to $20B at $7, with operating cash flow of $9.5B to $15.5B. Each $0.10/lb of copper is worth about $390M of annual EBITDA, each $100/oz of gold about $105M, and each $1/lb of molybdenum about $85M.

Analyst Q&A Highlights

Capital inflation against an unchanged incentive price

The opening question went straight to the tension the market ultimately traded on: how a project can absorb a 30% capital increase and keep the same incentive price. Management's answer was entirely about the operating model rather than the capital number, describing autonomy, off-site prefabrication and concentrator optimisation, without quantifying how much of the capital increase those offsets recover.

Q: "You have noted an upfront CapEx expected to be somewhat higher than the 2023 estimate, yet you are still looking at an incentive price of around $4 per pound. Are you seeing some offsetting operating level benefits that would offset that higher CapEx?"
— Lawson Winder, Bank of America Securities

A: "We have already, you know, put in the autonomous trucks there. This mine will be completely autonomous. We are looking at other areas of the operating model to be more efficient."
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Assessment: Directionally credible, quantitatively unsupported. A fully autonomous operation is a genuine structural cost advantage, but the answer never bridged the gap between a 30% higher capital number and an unchanged threshold price. Expect this to be the central question at the board approval in the second half.

Reconciling the June exit rate with the second-half guide

The most useful exchange on the call. A mine exiting June at 69,000 t/d against a second-half plan of 60,000 to 65,000 invites the obvious question of conservatism, and the answer supplied the operational reason: sequenced chute-gallery downtime through the second half, with the completed work arriving as a step change into 2027.

Q: "the 1Q guidance, I think, estimated an average of 60 thousand per day in the second half of 26 and you guys are exiting June at, you know, about 69 thousand tons per day in June. Just wondering what is driving that as the ratio of wet to dry draw points improved and could there be potential upside to that? 60 thousand average in the back half of this year?"
— Nicklaus Cash, Goldman Sachs

A: "And then as we get into 2027, that work is completed earlier in the year, and then we bring on production Block 1 South, which will add production in 2027."
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Assessment: Management left the upside on the table rather than banking it, which is the right call after two guide-downs. The exchange also clarified that the second half is deliberately flat, not ramping, and the acceleration is a 2027 event.

Third-quarter sales sequencing and the inventory build

A recurring line of questioning probed why near-term sales guidance fell while the annual figure held. The answer was consistent across two separate exchanges: production is unchanged, the new smelter needs a concentrate inventory to run consistently, and refined sales therefore shift from the third quarter into the fourth.

Q: "It looks like there is some reorganization and sequencing, maybe at some of the mines because, yeah, sales down versus the prior expectations for the third quarter."
— Orest Wowkodaw, Scotiabank

A: "So for the third quarter, our production is expected to be significantly higher than sales." … "But we do expect to build some inventory in the third quarter and make up some of that in the fourth quarter."
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Assessment: A benign explanation that is almost certainly true and still increases risk. Working capital absorbing roughly 100M lbs of copper and 50k oz of gold is a timing item, but it concentrates the year's delivery into a single quarter and leaves no buffer if the smelter ramp is anything less than clean.

Confidence in the leach run-rate target

Questioning on the leach initiative focused on whether the 300M lb year-end run-rate is genuinely incremental or partly cannibalises production elsewhere. The response separated the tactical work already delivering pounds from the additive and heat programmes that underpin the longer-dated 800M lb ambition.

Q: "just on your leaching operations, what is the level of confidence in reaching this 300 million-pound run rate at the end of this year? And should we view this as incremental volumes? Or will there be some offsets from lower productions elsewhere in the in the asset base?"
— Liam Fitzpatrick, Deutsche Bank

A: "we have already got sourcing in place and 4 targeted demonstration piles across the portfolio, a couple at Morenci, 1 in New Mexico, and then El Abra, an additional pile there."
— A. Cory Stevens, President and Chief Operating Officer, Americas

Assessment: The specificity is the signal. Named piles across three sites with sourcing secured is a materially different disclosure from the directional language of prior quarters, and it is the strongest evidence yet that the low-capital growth leg is real.

The 2027 U.S. unit-cost target

The bluntest question of the call, and the one that produced the quarter's only genuine walk-back. A previously firm 2027 target was reframed as an aspiration without a date.

Q: "You previously guided to a target of $2.50 per pound operating costs in 2027. That still a valid estimate?"
— Daniel Major, UBS

A: "The current market conditions with energy prices and sulfur and acid prices are taking that opportunity a little bit away from us in 2027, but we are continuing to work on that"
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Assessment: Management answered honestly rather than defending an indefensible number, which is worth something. But a cost target that survives only as an ambition is not a modelling input, and we remove it from ours.

Licence timing and whether terms can still move

Questioning on the extension sought both a timetable and reassurance that the February terms are final. Management was firm on the terms and deliberately vague on timing, which is the correct posture when the counterparty is a sovereign.

Q: "Can you maybe, Kathleen or Richard, give us an update as to what the timing and the next steps would be for, you know, hopefully reach a final agreement. And any color on potential terms, that you have been, discussing?"
— Carlos de Alba, Morgan Stanley

A: "So what we have filed in June is the formal application consistent with the terms that were agreed to in February."
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Assessment: The terms are settled and the process is not. For a thesis where the terminal value hangs on a licence, the distinction matters: filed on agreed terms materially narrows the range of outcomes without closing it.

Whether production forecasts moved, or only sales

The closing exchange isolated the question that determines whether the guidance reshuffle is benign. If production forecasts were unchanged and only refined sales timing moved, the annual guide is intact; if production had slipped, the reaffirmation would be hollow.

Q: "I am wondering if your internal projections on copper production rather than sales on a quarter by quarter basis have changed since the end of last quarter."
— Christopher LaFemina, Jefferies

A: "So what you are seeing on sales is actual refined copper sales and our production is very similar to what we talked about in April."
— Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Assessment: The most important sentence in the Q&A. It converts the near-term sales cut from a downgrade into a working-capital timing item, and it is consistent with the reported production of 786M lbs against sales of 710M. We take it at face value while noting it is unverifiable until the fourth quarter delivers.

What They're NOT Saying

  1. No quantification of the Bagdad operating-model offset. Capital rose roughly 30% and the incentive price stayed at $4/lb. Management named the levers (autonomy, prefabrication, concentrator optimisation) without sizing any of them. Until the board decision, the $4 threshold is an assertion rather than a disclosed calculation.
  2. No 2027 unit-cost guide to replace the abandoned target. The $2.50/lb U.S. figure was retained as an aspiration and removed as a 2027 expectation, with nothing put in its place. That leaves a hole in the forward cost model at exactly the point where volumes step up.
  3. Silence on what the minority-interest and tax mix does to per-share recovery. Management celebrated the 65% first-half increase in consolidated net income without addressing that a large share of the Grasberg recovery accrues to the 51.24% PTFI minority and to a 33% Indonesian tax rate rather than to FCX holders. This is the least-discussed and most consequential feature of the earnings bridge.
  4. No stated contingency if the licence slips past year end. Management is "working very hard to get it done this year" but confirmed there is no prescribed timetable. Nothing was said about what changes in capital planning, exploration or the Kucing Liar schedule if approval runs into 2027.
  5. The fourth-quarter concentration went unchallenged. Nobody asked what happens to the full-year guide if the smelter inventory drawdown slips, and management did not volunteer a sensitivity. Roughly 32% of annual copper sales sitting in one quarter deserved a question.
  6. No update on the 2028 Grasberg reduction beyond "sequencing." The five-year plan shows lower 2028 copper and gold than the April version, attributed to lower grades and timing changes. The magnitude was not disclosed and the question was not pressed.

Market Reaction

  • Pre-print setup: FCX closed at $65.00 on July 22, up 28.0% year to date against the S&P 500's 9.5%, up 45.0% over twelve months and 0.9% over the trailing thirty days. The 52-week closing range entering the print was $35.34 to $71.72, so the stock came in about 9.4% below its high.
  • Reaction session (July 23, before-open reporter): Opened at $62.64, a 3.6% downward gap, traded a $61.97 to $65.43 range, and closed at $63.50, down 2.3% or $1.50.
  • Volume: 18.9M shares against a 15.3M thirty-day average, 1.2 times normal. Elevated but not capitulatory.
  • Relative: The S&P 500 fell 1.2% the same session, so FCX underperformed by roughly 1.1 points. Copper itself was firm, with LME at $6.30/lb the prior day, up about 12% year to date.
  • Since: The stock closed at $62.72 on July 27, giving back a further 1.2% and leaving it 3.5% below the pre-print level.

The gap-down and partial recovery describe the day accurately: an opening reaction to the capital headlines, then buyers stepping in once the operating detail was digested. A 2.3% decline on a 19% EPS beat is not a rejection of the quarter, it is a repricing of what comes after it.

The specific triggers are identifiable and all forward-looking: 2027 capital up $300M, Bagdad preliminary capital roughly 30% above the 2023 study, and third-quarter sales guided below prior expectations with the volume pushed into the fourth. None of those touch the reported quarter. What they collectively say is that the market has finished paying for the Grasberg recovery narrative and started underwriting the next capital cycle, and the opening terms of that underwriting are worse than the 2023 version.

Set against the pre-print position, the reaction is mild rather than punitive. The stock entered the print having already round-tripped from $61.48 immediately after the April guide-down to a $71.72 high and back, so positioning was neither euphoric nor washed out. That the quarter's clearest operational win in a year produced a 2.3% decline is the most useful piece of information in the section: the marginal buyer is no longer trading the restart.

Street Perspective

Debate: Is the Grasberg recovery now de-risked enough to re-rate?

Bull view: The bull case being made on the Street is that this quarter closed the credibility gap. Throughput doubled inside the quarter, the wet-ore ratio improved, guidance held for the first time since the incident, and second-quarter EBITDA came in comfortably above consensus on better volumes and lower costs. With the ramp validated and 2027 volumes guided more than 20% higher, the multiple should expand toward where it sat before September 2025.

Bear view: The bear camp contends that one quarter does not undo two guide-downs at an asset that has surprised negatively three times in twelve months, that the second-half plan is deliberately flat rather than ramping, and that the engineering fix does not complete until 2027 with Block 1 South restart and further chute work still ahead. The pit-bottom water risk is being managed, not eliminated.

Our take: The bulls have the better of this one, but the re-rate is smaller than they think because of the ownership arithmetic. The operating recovery is real and we have downgraded the execution risk accordingly. The per-share recovery is materially smaller than the operating recovery, because roughly half of Grasberg's incremental profit belongs to the Indonesian minority and a third of what remains goes to Indonesian tax. Anyone modelling consolidated EBITDA recovery straight through to FCX equity value is overstating it.

Debate: Does the growth pipeline create or destroy value at these capital costs?

Bull view: Some desks argue that a 30% capital increase on Bagdad is unremarkable against three years of mining-sector inflation, that the project still clears at $4/lb copper with a conservative $20/lb molybdenum assumption and no reliance on the NOL shield, and that a brownfield expansion in Arizona with no major permitting hurdles and a three-to-four year build is among the lowest-risk large copper projects available anywhere.

Bear view: The skeptics note that management did not quantify the operating-model offsets that supposedly preserve the incentive price, that 2027 capex also rose, that the U.S. cost target was abandoned in the same call, and that a company spending $4.3B this year and $4.8B next while returning only about $600M per half is asking shareholders to fund an increasingly expensive pipeline on faith.

Our take: The bear framing is the better description of what happened this quarter and the bull framing is the better description of the asset. Both can hold. Our concern is narrower: the disclosure quality on Bagdad has not kept pace with the capital number, and a board approval expected within months should be accompanied by a quantified bridge from the 2023 economics to the current ones. Until we see that bridge, we treat the $4/lb incentive price as directional.

Debate: Is copper at $6.30 a floor or a peak?

Bull view: A growing consensus view holds that the copper market has structurally repriced: visible Chinese inventories at multi-year lows, exchange inventories outside the United States exceptionally tight, AI data-centre and grid demand more than offsetting weak private construction, and a global supply pipeline that cannot respond inside a decade. On this reading $6 is the new base, not the top.

Bear view: The bear camp points out that a large volume of copper has already been pulled into the United States in anticipation of a Section 232 cathode decision that has not come, that this positioning unwinds if no tariff arrives, and that Freeport's leverage cuts both ways at roughly $390M of annual EBITDA per $0.10/lb.

Our take: We are constructive on the structural demand case and unwilling to underwrite the stock on it at this price. The company's own sensitivity table is the honest frame: at $5 copper, EBITDA is roughly $13B against roughly $20B at $7. That is a 35% swing in earnings power driven by a variable nobody controls, in a stock that has already appreciated 43% over twelve months. Owning FCX here is a copper price view first and a company view second, and we would rather express the company view at a wider margin of safety.

Model Update Needed

ItemPrior assumptionRevised assumptionReason
2026 copper sales3.1B lbs3.1B lbsReaffirmed; risk now concentrated in Q4 at ~983M lbs implied
2026 gold sales650k oz650k ozReaffirmed; Q2 missed its own 140k oz guide on refined shipment timing
2026 unit net cash cost$1.95/lb$1.90/lbCompany guide lowered on higher by-product credits
Q4 2026 unit costn/a~$1.77/lb impliedDerived from FY $1.90 with H1 at $1.94 and Q3 guided $2.00
2027 U.S. unit cost$2.50/lb targetRemove from modelManagement conceded not achievable in 2027 at current input prices
2027 capital expenditure~$4.5B$4.8BUpgraded mining equipment, revised cost estimates
Bagdad 2X capital2023 study basis~$4.5B, decision H2 2026~30% escalation; not yet in company capex forecast
Grasberg block-cave rate~60,000 t/d H2 202660,000–65,000 t/d H2 2026June exit 69,000 t/d, offset by sequenced chute-gallery downtime
Minority-interest shareModelled flatRises with Indonesian volumeNCI fell 47.5% YoY on Grasberg downtime; reverses on the ramp
Effective tax rate28.2% (Q2 actual)Drifts toward 32–35%Mix shifts back to Indonesia (33%) and South America (40%) as volumes recover
Leach run-rate~200M lbs annualised300M lbs by year-end 2026Gen-1 additives ahead of plan; Gen-2 in four demonstration piles
45X production tax creditNot modelledNot modelled~$500M/yr option value; pending Treasury regulations, not yet probable

Valuation impact: Modest and offsetting. Lower 2026 unit costs and the reaffirmed volume guide are worth more than the incremental 2027 capital is worth against, but the removal of the 2027 U.S. cost target and the upward drift in the minority-interest and tax lines reduce the per-share conversion of the 2027 to 2028 volume ramp. Against the July 27 close of $62.72, the company's own modelled framework implies roughly $16.5B to $17B of EBITDA on the 2027 to 2028 average at $6 copper. We would caution that this is a consolidated figure, and the appropriate haircut for the PTFI minority and Indonesian tax leakage is larger than the market appears to apply. Our fair-value range is broadly unchanged and sits close to spot, which is what a Hold looks like.

Thesis Scorecard Post-Earnings

Thesis PointStatusNotes
Bull #1: Secular copper demand vs. constrained supplyConfirmedLME $6.30/lb, up ~12% YTD. Visible Chinese inventories at multi-year lows; ex-U.S. exchange inventories exceptionally tight. AI data-centre and grid demand offsetting weak private construction. Real, and still largely priced.
Bull #2: Low-cost base (leach + Grasberg by-product credits)ConfirmedQ2 unit cost $1.97/lb beat the company's $2.24 April estimate by $0.27; FY guide lowered to $1.90. Leach at ~200M lbs heading to 300M by year-end with Gen-1 additives ahead of plan. Status tag moves AT RISK to ON TRACK.
Bull #3: Organic pipeline + 2041 extensionNeutralFormal extension application filed in June on agreed MOU terms, and El Abra EIS progressing with an engaged Chilean government. Offset by Bagdad capital ~30% above the 2023 study and 2027 capex up $300M. The pipeline advanced and got more expensive in the same quarter.
Bear #1: Grasberg execution / geologic variabilityChallengedThe clearest improvement of the quarter. Block cave doubled to a 69,000 t/d June exit; wet draw points converted to dry; guidance held rather than cut. Status tag moves EMERGING to CONTAINED. Not resolved: chute work runs through 2027, Block 1 South restarts 2027, pit-bottom water is managed rather than eliminated.
Bear #2: Cyclical peak / full valuationNeutralStock up 45.0% over twelve months into the print with copper and gold near records, but 9.4% below the 52-week high and roughly flat over thirty days. Company sensitivity shows EBITDA of ~$13B at $5 copper against ~$20B at $7. Contained, not resolved.
Bear #3: Input-cost inflation (diesel, sulfuric acid)ChallengedFY26 cost guide came down, not up. Diesel assumed at roughly Q2 levels; limited 2026 spot acid exposure, partly hedged by smelter acid sales. Status tag moves EMERGING to CONTAINED, with the 2027 U.S. target slippage carried under Bear #4.
Bear #4 (new): Growth-capital inflationConfirmedBagdad 2X preliminary capital ~$4.5B, ~30% above the 2023 study; 2027 capex raised $300M to $4.8B; U.S. $2.50/lb 2027 cost target conceded as unachievable in 2027. Opens at EMERGING. This is the quarter's new risk and the reason the stock fell.

Grading last quarter's commitments

Commitment made in AprilOutcome
Wet-to-dry draw-point ratio normalisesDelivered. Draw points wet in April converted to dry; dry conditions in Papua helped.
Chute flow-regulator installation on track for mid-2027On track. CG44 (25,000–30,000 t/d) expected complete by year-end; CG21 serving Block 1 South being reinstalled.
Q2 guide of 690M lbs Cu and 140k oz AuMixed. Copper beat at 710M lbs; gold missed at 123k oz on refined shipment timing.
$700M insurance recovery collected in Q2Delivered. $0.7B of pre-tax proceeds collected by PTFI in the quarter.
2041 MOU converts to a signed licencePartial. Formal application filed in June on agreed terms; approval pending, targeted this year.
Copper and gold hold against mean reversionHeld. Copper realised $6.17/lb, gold $4,520/oz; LME $6.30/lb into the call.
Bagdad 2X investment decision in H2 2026On track, but capital up ~30% to roughly $4.5B.
Diesel/acid trajectory and the 2027 U.S. cost targetFailed on the target. FY26 costs improved, but the $2.50/lb 2027 U.S. goal was conceded as unachievable in 2027.

Overall: Thesis strengthened on execution, weakened on capital. Seven of eight commitments were met or partially met, with only the 2027 U.S. cost target failing outright, and the two bear points we were most worried about entering the quarter (Grasberg execution and input-cost inflation) both improved enough to move from emerging to contained. Against that, a new and legitimate risk opened around the cost of the growth pipeline, and the single largest value lever remains a pending government approval rather than a signed document. Conviction rises from 5 to 6; the rating does not change.

Action: Hold. We are being paid to wait rather than to act. The stock at $62.72 sits roughly where it did after the April guide-down despite a materially better operating position, which means the improvement has not been priced and the risk/reward has quietly improved. But we want one of three things before upgrading: the Indonesian licence issued, a quantified capital bridge on Bagdad at the board decision, or a pullback that widens the margin of safety against a copper price doing most of the work. A third consecutive guide-down, a licence slipping into 2027, or copper breaking back toward $5 would take us the other way.

Independence Disclosure As of the publication date, the author holds no position in FCX and has no plans to initiate any position in FCX within the next 72 hours. Aardvark Labs Capital Research maintains a firm-wide policy of not trading any security we cover. No compensation has been received from Freeport-McMoRan Inc. or any affiliated party for this research.