The Post-CMD De-Rate Overshot — Q3 Print Confirms the New Framework Is the Floor, Not the Ceiling
Key Takeaways
- Q3 was a clean operational quarter — €1,766M revenue (+7.4% / +9.3% constant currency), 28.4% EBIT margin (flat YoY despite a fully tariff-burdened US quarter), €670M EBITDA, and €365M industrial FCF — but the print's importance is in what it didn't break: every line item is consistent with the post-CMD FY25 guidance lift (revenue ≥€7.1B, EBIT ≥€2.06B, EPS ≥€8.80, FCF ≥€1.30B), all reaffirmed.
- The headline EPS of €2.14 "missed" the stale Reuters/FactSet consensus of €2.41 by 11%, but that consensus was frozen from before the October 9 Capital Markets Day reset; against the post-CMD framework, the print is on-track and the FCF (€365M) is running ahead of pace. Net profit (€382M) actually BEAT the StreetInsider consensus of €367M.
- Order book "extends well into 2027" was reaffirmed verbatim from Q2 — visibility is holding through the largest model changeover in Ferrari's history (35% of the lineup in ramp-up phase by year-end vs. 15% in January). Amalfi early order intake skews 40% new-to-brand, an unusually strong client-acquisition signal for the entry-V8 platform. The Testarossa family has been received "better than the previous model" globally.
- The deliberate powertrain-mix recalibration to 40/40/20 (ICE/hybrid/BEV) from the original 2022 plan of 20/40/40 is the bear case in numerical form, but it was the right strategic call. Management's framing — "electrification as an addition, not a transition" — is the most consistent strategic-positioning statement the company has made on EVs, and the visible market evidence (luxury BEV underperformance across Porsche, Audi, Bentley) confirms it.
- Rating: Upgrading to Outperform from Hold. The October 9 CMD selloff (-15% intraday, -20% from the pre-CMD high) destroyed roughly $20B of market cap and reset the multiple from ~50x to ~37-40x forward EPS. Q3 confirms the new framework is a conservative floor; the November 4 +2-3% rally on a "headline miss" demonstrates the buy-side has finished re-rating. At the post-CMD valuation, a category-of-one luxury franchise with order-book-confirmed multi-year visibility, structurally rising margins, and an aggressive capital-return program is finally cheap enough to own.
Results vs. Consensus
Ferrari reported Q3 2025 results on the morning of November 4, 2025 (Maranello), with a 3:00 PM CET (9:00 AM ET) conference call. The print landed against an unusual consensus backdrop: the headline sell-side EPS number of ~€2.41 was stale, anchored from before the October 9 Capital Markets Day that had reset the company's own 2025 guidance upward and lowered the 2030 financial framework relative to prior buy-side modeling. As a result, two different "consensus" reads circulated — the pre-CMD framework (which Ferrari "missed") and the post-CMD framework (which Ferrari met or exceeded). The print itself is straightforward; the framing question dominates the interpretation.
| Metric (€M unless noted) | Q3 2025 Actual | Consensus (pre-CMD) | Beat/Miss | Magnitude |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shipments (units) | 3,401 | ~3,420 | In Line | -0.6% |
| Net revenues | 1,766 | ~1,978 | Miss | -10.7% |
| EBITDA | 670 | ~688 | Miss | -2.6% |
| EBITDA margin | 37.9% | ~34.8% | Beat | +310bps |
| EBIT | 503 | ~535 | Miss | -6.0% |
| EBIT margin | 28.4% | ~27.0% | Beat | +140bps |
| Net profit | 382 | ~367 | Beat | +4.1% |
| Diluted EPS (€) | 2.14 | ~2.41 | Miss | -11.2% |
| Industrial FCF | 365 | ~285 | Beat | +28% |
Year-over-Year Comparison
| Metric (€M unless noted) | Q3 2025 | Q3 2024 | YoY Change | Constant-FX Growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shipments (units) | 3,401 | 3,383 | +18 / +0.5% | — |
| Net revenues | 1,766 | 1,644 | +€122 / +7.4% | +9.3% |
| Cars & spare parts | 1,479 | 1,400 | +€79 / +5.6% | +7.6% |
| Sponsorship, commercial & brand | 211 | 174 | +€37 / +21.3% | +22.0% |
| Other | 76 | 70 | +€6 / +8.6% | +13.0% |
| EBITDA | 670 | 638 | +€32 / +5.0% | +8% |
| EBITDA margin | 37.9% | 38.8% | -90bps | — |
| EBIT | 503 | 467 | +€36 / +7.6% | +12% |
| EBIT margin | 28.4% | 28.4% | 0bps | — |
| Net profit | 382 | 375 | +€7 / +1.8% | — |
| Diluted EPS (€) | 2.14 | 2.08 | +€0.06 / +2.9% | — |
| Industrial FCF | 365 | 364 | +€1 / +0.3% | — |
9M YTD Context
| Metric (€M unless noted) | 9M 2025 | 9M 2024 | YoY Change | Implied Q4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shipments (units) | 10,488 | 10,427 | +61 / +0.6% | ~3,200-3,300 (down YoY by mgmt) |
| Net revenues | 5,344 | 4,941 | +€403 / +8.2% | ≥€1,756M to hit FY ≥€7.1B |
| EBITDA | 2,072 | 1,912 | +€160 / +8.4% | ≥€648M to hit FY ≥€2.72B |
| EBIT | 1,597 | 1,420 | +€177 / +12.5% | ≥€463M to hit FY ≥€2.06B |
| EBIT margin | 29.9% | 28.7% | +120bps | ~26-27% implied |
| Net profit | 1,219 | 1,140 | +€79 / +6.9% | — |
| Diluted EPS (€) | 6.82 | 6.31 | +€0.51 / +8.1% | ≥€1.98 to hit FY ≥€8.80 |
| Industrial FCF | 1,217 | 806 | +€411 / +51% | ~€85M+ for FY ≥€1.30B (easily clears) |
The 9M view shows a company tracking comfortably ahead of every line of the post-CMD FY guide except the implied Q4 step-down — which management has now telegraphed three times (Q1 call, Q2 call, Q3 call) as the deliberate consequence of the Daytona phase-out, F80 launch in only "a few units," and elevated SG&A and R&D for new-model start-ups. The implied Q4 EBIT margin of 26-27% would be the lowest single quarter in 2025 — yet still well above the 28.3% delivered FY2024. That juxtaposition is the cleanest expression of the operational trajectory.
Quality of Beat/Miss
Revenue Assessment
Revenue of €1,766M grew 7.4% as-reported and 9.3% at constant currency — a meaningful acceleration from Q2's +4.4% as-reported / +5.1% constant-currency. The acceleration came from two places: (1) the sponsorship-commercial-brand line +21% YoY (vs. +22% in Q2), continuing to do the heavy lifting; (2) personalization holding at ~20% of cars-and-spare-parts revenue, sustained by the SF90 XX family and Purosangue. Importantly, the cars-and-spare-parts line itself accelerated to +5.6% (from +2.3% in Q2), reversing what had been the most-pressed buy-side concern from the prior call.
Unit volume flat at 3,401 (+0.5%) means once again all of the growth came from mix, pricing, and personalization. But Q3 demonstrated the algorithm working at meaningfully higher growth rates than Q2 — even with the Daytona SP3 phase-out (a high-ASP, high-personalization vehicle that had been an outsized contributor) winding to its final units. The composition of the growth — SF90 XX family ramp, 12Cilindri family ramp, Purosangue and 296 GTS sustaining — represents the new-model cohort doing the work the old cohort used to. That handoff was the central operational question entering 2025; Q3 confirms it.
Margins Assessment
The 28.4% EBIT margin — flat year-over-year — is the most consequential metric on the page given the tariff context. Q3 was the first quarter where essentially all US-bound deliveries were invoiced under the 27.5% tariff regime (after pre-tariff inventory drew down through Q2). The mix-and-price variance of +€25M (vs. +€47M in Q2, where pre-tariff inventory was still being delivered) captures the partial pass-through; the new US commercial policy of "up to 5% price increase" (down from "up to 10% under 25% tariff") absorbed the rest. Management explicitly attributed margin dilution to the mix variance, with the tariff "particularly visible in the third quarter."
The EBITDA margin of 37.9% (-90bps YoY) is the only metric where the tariff dilution surfaced in the percentage; the EBIT line absorbed the mix-headwind cleanly because industrial costs and R&D dropped €12M YoY (model lifecycle dynamics — lower D&A on Daytona phase-out before F80 ramp). The 9M EBIT margin of 29.9% (+120bps vs. 28.7% in 9M 2024) is the trailing read; the 9M 2024 comp included the Q2 2024 racing-cost intensity that didn't repeat. The structural read: this is a 29-30% EBIT margin business absorbing 50-100bps of tariff headwind without giving back the trajectory.
EPS Assessment
€2.14 diluted EPS was up just 2.9% YoY despite EBIT +7.6% — the gap is below-the-line: (1) net financial expenses €13M vs. €1M in Q3 2024 (FX impact on USD treasury balances and lower interest income), and (2) effective tax rate of 22.0% vs. 19.5% in Q3 2024 (the Patent Box regime change is now annualizing through the rate). Share count of 178.3M diluted is lower than 179.6M in Q3 2024 — the buyback contribution is real but the FY24 weighted average is still being lapped. The September 30 share count of 16,352,507 in treasury (8.95% of issued capital) and the announcement that the buyback program will complete by December 18, 2025 (one year ahead of the original 2022 plan) front-loads the capital return into 2025 and sets up cleaner per-share math for 2026.
The bigger EPS story is the FY25 path: 9M EPS of €6.82 against the post-CMD FY guide of ≥€8.80 implies Q4 EPS of at least €1.98 — achievable given the F80 first-unit pricing premium and the historical Q4 seasonal strength in personalization revenue. This is not a stretched implied Q4; it's a conservatively-positioned floor.
Segment Performance — Geographic
| Region | Q3 2025 Units | Q3 2024 Units | YoY Δ | YoY % | 9M 2025 YoY % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EMEA | 1,449 | 1,426 | +23 | +2% | +3% |
| Americas | 1,045 | 1,070 | -25 | -2% | 0% |
| of which USA only | 918 | 941 | -23 | -2% | +1% |
| Mainland China-HK-Taiwan | 248 | 281 | -33 | -12% | -13% |
| of which Mainland China only | 153 | 190 | -37 | -19% | -20% |
| Rest of APAC | 659 | 606 | +53 | +9% | +1% |
| Total | 3,401 | 3,383 | +18 | +1% | +1% |
EMEA — Quietly Resilient
EMEA was +23 units (+2%) in Q3 and is +3% YTD — the strongest geographic line in the lineup. The composition is consistent with the deliberate allocation framework: Italy, UK, Germany, Switzerland and Middle East together account for the bulk of EMEA volume, and the new-model launches (12Cilindri, SF90 XX, eventually the Testarossa family) get European allocation priority because of the Maranello-proximity logistics and the higher concentration of long-tenure Ferraristi.
"In the quarter, EMEA was up 23 units, Americas was down 25 units, Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan decreased by 33 units and Rest of APAC increased by 53 units." — Ferrari N.V. Q3 2025 Press Release
Assessment: EMEA strength is the cleanest read on Ferrari's core European Ferraristi base — there is no evidence of demand softness, no evidence of tariff anxiety bleeding back into the home market, and the new-model order intake (Testarossa family, Amalfi) is contributing. UK residual-value pressure noted in Q2 has not surfaced as a Q3 numbers issue; the dealer-incentive actions appear to be holding.
Americas — Tariff Drag Becomes Visible
Americas was -25 units (-2%) in Q3 and effectively flat YTD. The US specifically was 918 units in Q3 (-23 / -2%) and 2,628 units 9M (+15 / +1%). Q3 is the first quarter where the tariff regime is fully reflected — the pre-tariff inventory build that had cushioned Q2 has now drawn down, and US deliveries are landing at the elevated commercial-policy price (the "up to 10% increase" implemented March 27, 2025, now stepping down to "up to 5%" with the 15% tariff agreement). Management explicitly noted "the majority of our shipments in the United States was represented by model good price were protected under the updated policy" — meaning Ferrari is preserving margin but the unit pace is now visibly running below the year-ago comp.
"In U.S., the business proceeds as usual, number one. Number two, the only difference we see in U.S. that if you compare today versus the previous call, at that time, the tariff were still at 25%. Now they are at 15%. Now it's carved out in the stone, it's 15%... And we have been — you remember last time, we told you when it will become, how can I say, blessed by papers, then we will update the commercial policy, and that's what we did." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO
Assessment: The US line is the cleanest "policy meets reality" read in the portfolio. The 2% unit decline at Q3 is the visible tariff effect on volume; the margin-preservation via the +5-10% commercial policy is the offsetting lever. Net effect: revenue per US unit is up; unit pace is modestly down; total US revenue contribution roughly flat to slightly higher. This is the textbook outcome a luxury-pricing-power thesis predicts, and it's what Q3 delivered. The Q4 setup is cleaner: 15% tariff regime, "up to 5%" commercial-policy step-down, and the F80 first units (highest-ASP delivery in the lineup) all in the US count.
Mainland China-HK-Taiwan — The Slope Did Not Improve
The region was -12% in Q3 and is -13% YTD — a marginal worsening from Q2's -14% YTD region print. Mainland China alone was 153 units in Q3 (-19% / -37 units) and 509 units YTD (-20% / -124 units). The headline-cited "12Cilindri tax disadvantage" defense from Q2 remains operative, and the Amalfi commercial launch (first deliveries H1 2026) is still the strategic response. There was no incremental color on Mainland China demand on the Q3 call beyond the deliberate allocation framing.
The broader China luxury picture has continued to weaken through Q3 — LVMH and Kering both reported soft China numbers, Hermès reported some moderation. Ferrari's relative resilience is a function of its small absolute exposure (Mainland China is now ~5% of total deliveries vs. ~7% peak) and the absence of inventory in the channel (allocation means no dealer overstock). But the YTD slope has not bent upward yet, and the absence of any qualitative inflection language on the Q3 call is itself a tell.
Assessment: The China line is operationally manageable today and asymmetric on the downside. Going from 5% to 3% of revenue costs ~150bps of total — uncomfortable, not thesis-breaking. The Amalfi launch is the operationally credible response; whether it works depends on dealer execution and Chinese ultra-wealthy spend recovery, neither of which is fully in Ferrari's control. The CMD framework explicitly de-risked the 2030 plan against weak China contribution; the bear-case scenario is already in the post-CMD numbers.
Rest of APAC — The Genuine Bright Spot
+53 units / +9% YoY is the single strongest geographic line in the quarter, and it more than offset the Mainland China decline in absolute terms (+53 vs. -33). Vigna mentioned in Q2 that Asia ex-China backlog was at a "record" — that signal materialized in Q3 deliveries. Japan, Australia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand are the principal contributors. The "young female client in Korea" Testarossa anecdote in the prepared remarks suggests new-buyer expansion in the region is meaningful.
"Last week in China, I met a young female client, younger than 40 years old, and she told me, Testarossa is the perfect harmonious blend of design and engineering, elegant and craftsmanship. I'm eager to own one and drive it." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO
Assessment: Rest of APAC strength is offsetting Mainland China weakness in real-time, and the demographic angle (younger buyers, women) is a structural positive for the long-term franchise that Ferrari has been working toward. This is the geography where the Amalfi-as-client-acquisition strategy is already working today, ahead of its first deliveries.
Segment Performance — Revenue Category
| Revenue Line (€M) | Q3 2025 | Q3 2024 | YoY % | YoY Constant-FX % | % of Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cars and spare parts | 1,479 | 1,400 | +5.6% | +7.6% | 83.7% |
| Sponsorship, commercial and brand | 211 | 174 | +21.3% | +22.0% | 11.9% |
| Other | 76 | 70 | +8.6% | +13.0% | 4.3% |
| Total net revenues | 1,766 | 1,644 | +7.4% | +9.3% | 100% |
Cars and Spare Parts — Re-Acceleration
+5.6% as-reported / +7.6% constant currency is a clean acceleration from Q2's +2.3% / +2.6% — the Q2 deceleration that had been the cleanest analyst pushback last call has reversed. The drivers: SF90 XX family in volume ramp, 12Cilindri family ramp, Purosangue sustaining, 296 GTS at peak production, and crucially, personalization holding at ~20% of cars-and-spare-parts revenue. The Daytona SP3 was lower YoY (its limited run completing in Q3), but the SF90 XX and 12Cilindri stepped up to offset.
The constant-currency growth gap of nearly 2 percentage points (+7.6% vs. +5.6%) reflects continued USD weakness against the EUR — a structural headwind to reported numbers but one that Ferrari hedges actively (FX impact in Q3: -€32M net). The constant-currency read is the cleaner operational read.
Assessment: Q3's reacceleration is precisely the signal a buy-side modeling +5-7% cars-and-spare-parts CAGR needs to see. Q2's +2.3% was always going to be the trough quarter mathematically (Daytona phase-out timing, no F80, new-launch ramp not yet contributing); Q3 confirms the trough is behind. Q4 sets up similarly: F80 first units land at €3.6M+ ex-options, the Testarossa family begins shipping, and the Amalfi order intake begins formally. Modeling +6-8% cars-and-spare-parts growth into 2026 is now defensible from a Q3 trajectory rather than aspirational.
Sponsorship, Commercial and Brand — Still Doing the Heavy Lifting
+21% YoY (€211M from €174M) is the second consecutive quarter of 20%+ growth in this line. The drivers remain the same as Q2: higher F1 commercial distribution from the 2024 ranking (Ferrari was second in Constructors'), sponsorship intake (HP title sponsor, multi-year extensions), lifestyle expansion (London store, fashion collections), and the new BingX crypto-exchange Team Partner announced October 31. Lifestyle revenue is now meaningfully larger than it was at any prior point in Ferrari's history as a public company.
The 2025 F1 Constructors' ranking is the line item that bears watching — Ferrari started 2025 below expectation but has fought for podiums in recent races. The 2026 commercial distribution will be set by the final 2025 ranking; a drop from second back to third or fourth costs €30-50M of 2026 commercial revenue. The Q3 call did not provide an updated F1-ranking color, which itself is a soft tell that the outlook is not improving versus Q2.
Assessment: This line is structurally high-margin and is doing the work of keeping the total revenue growth rate in the mid-to-high single digits even when cars-and-spare-parts is mid single-digits. The 2026 F1-ranking-driven headwind is real but bounded — the company's broader sponsorship and lifestyle expansion plans (CMD framework called out a multi-year lifestyle growth path) more than offset on a forward basis. The "Brand" piece of this line, in particular, has structural upside as lifestyle scales.
Other — Steady-State
€76M (+8.6%) is mostly financial services, the Mugello racetrack, and F1 engine rentals to customer teams. The 2024 comparison no longer includes the Maserati engine-sales contribution (that ended in 2024), so the underlying growth is cleaner than the headline number suggests. Constant-currency growth of +13% is the bullish underlying signal.
Assessment: Small line, not a thesis lever, but a clean steady-state read. The shift in revenue composition from car-heavy to a more diversified luxury-conglomerate mix continues — sponsorship/brand/lifestyle + Other together is now 16.2% of Q3 revenue vs. 14.8% in Q3 2024. That trajectory matters for the multi-year multiple-justification narrative.
Shipments & Model Mix
Q3 marked the most material model changeover in the lineup. The 296 GTS, the Purosangue, the 12Cilindri family (continued ramp), and the Roma Spider drove deliveries. The SF90 XX family stepped up its contribution. The 296 GTB approached end of life and the SF90 Spider phased out. The Daytona SP3 completed its limited run in the quarter. By year-end, 35% of the lineup will be in ramp-up phase vs. 15% in January — the largest in-flight new-model cohort in Ferrari's listed history.
Powertrain Mix
| Powertrain | Q3 2025 Share | Q2 2025 Share | Q3 2024 Share | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) | 57% | 55% | ~50% | Rising — 12Cilindri family ramp, Daytona phase-out, Amalfi pre-launch effect |
| Hybrid | 43% | 45% | ~50% | Falling — 296 GTB winding down, SF90 Spider phased out |
Six ICE models and five hybrid models shipped in the quarter (57%/43%). The hybrid share has now declined for two consecutive quarters as the in-production hybrid platforms run down ahead of the 296 Speciale (hybrid) and Testarossa family (hybrid plug-in V8) ramping into deliveries. The CMD's revised 2030 powertrain mix target of 40% ICE / 40% hybrid / 20% BEV — versus the 2022 plan of 20% ICE / 40% hybrid / 40% BEV — is the strategic recalibration that explains the Q3 mix print and the forward trajectory.
"In 2022, we told you that the 2030 breakdown of powertrain offering would have been 20% ICE, 40% hybrid and 40% electric. Our plans were based on the environment in 2022 and our expectation about its evolution. Today, in 2025, we have deliberately recalibrated our powertrain offer to be 40% ICE, 40% hybrid and 20% electric. Why did we decide this? Two are the main reasons. One, market dynamics. We have always believed in electrification as an addition, not as a transition. Overall market adoption of electric technology has been more gradual than anticipated in 2022. At the same time, demand for thermal and hybrid models has been more sustained. Two, client centricity." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO
Assessment: The hybrid-share decline is mechanical, not demand-driven — the question was directly raised on the Q3 call and management's framing was explicit ("It's a consequence of the way we launched the car. There is no... extrapolation any trend over there"). The bigger question — the 2030 powertrain recalibration to 20% BEV from 40% — is the strategic statement that mattered, and it was made at the CMD, not at the Q3 print. The Q3 call simply reaffirmed it.
Industrial Free Cash Flow & Balance Sheet
| Item (€M) | Q3 2025 | Q3 2024 | 9M 2025 | 9M 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash flow from operations | 557 | 587 | 1,833 | 1,433 |
| Capex (PP&E + intangibles) | (230) | (249) | (693) | (712) |
| Free cash flow | 327 | 338 | 1,140 | 721 |
| Less: FS activities FCF | (38) | (26) | (77) | (85) |
| Industrial FCF | 365 | 364 | 1,217 | 806 |
Q3 industrial FCF of €365M is essentially flat YoY (€364M in Q3 2024), but the composition is different and arguably stronger: capex was down €19M (€230M vs. €249M, consistent with the "more contained vs. prior year" framing from Q2), and the working-capital line was a -€55M headwind from the reversal of advance collections (the inverse of the H1 working-capital tailwind). On a clean operating-cash basis, the underlying generation is consistent with — perhaps slightly ahead of — the pace required to clear the raised FY ≥€1.30B floor.
The 9M industrial FCF of €1,217M is already 94% of the raised FY guide of ≥€1.30B. The remaining €83M needed in Q4 is a low bar given that historical Q4s have generated €200-400M of industrial FCF; comfortable beat of the FY floor is almost mathematical at this point. Total available liquidity of €1,968M at September 30 (vs. €2,068M at June 30) reflects €132M of share repurchases during the quarter under the eighth tranche of the multi-year buyback program. Net industrial debt fell to €116M from €338M at June 30 — the buyback completion (announced for December 18, 2025) is being funded out of organic FCF generation, not balance-sheet leverage.
Assessment: The cash-flow story is unambiguously strong and ahead of pace. The capital-return commitments are real and well-funded: €536M dividend already paid (May 2025), €126M+ in additional October buyback purchases under the eighth tranche, completion of the €2B multi-year program a year ahead of plan. The structural FCF profile — €1.30B+ FY25, scaling to the CMD's implied ~€2.0-2.5B by 2030 — is the single strongest piece of the post-CMD narrative that the market is under-weighting. At the post-CMD valuation (~$70B market cap), an FCF yield approaching 2% and rising, combined with a clear multi-year capital-return story, finally reads as competitive with other category-of-one luxury and consumer-discretionary names.
The October 9 Capital Markets Day — The Load-Bearing Context
The Q3 print cannot be read independently of the October 9 Capital Markets Day. The CMD reset the company's medium-term financial framework, the long-term powertrain mix, the 2026 EPS trajectory, and the buy-side multiple on the stock. The Q3 print is the first operational data point against that new framework — and it is the framework, not the print, that determines the stock's risk/reward from here.
What the CMD said
| 2030 Target | 2025 CMD (Oct 9) | 2022 CMD | Implied Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net revenue | ≥€9.0B | ~€8.0B (Y2026 floor) | +€1B over 4 extra years — ~5% CAGR |
| Adj. EBITDA | ≥€3.6B (40% margin floor) | ~€3.0B (38-40%) | +€0.6B; margin floor maintained |
| Adj. EBIT margin | ≥30% | ~28-30% | Marginal step up |
| 2026 Adj. diluted EPS | ~€8.80-€9.00 (implied) | 2026 target ~€8.60 | Down from prior Street model of ~€9.45 |
| BEV % of lineup by 2030 | 20% | 40% | Halved |
| Hybrid % by 2030 | 40% | 40% | Unchanged |
| ICE % by 2030 | 40% | 20% | Doubled |
| New models 2026-2030 | ~4 per year (incl. all 3 powertrains) | ~3-4 per year | Modestly higher cadence |
Why the market sold off -15%
The October 9 selloff was a -15% single-day move on the NYSE — Ferrari's largest single-day decline since the 2015 IPO. The five drivers, in order of impact:
- 2030 revenue target ~€9B vs. ~€10B+ consensus — implied 4.9% CAGR vs. the prior ~10% trajectory. The most-cited single complaint.
- BEV mix cut to 20% from 40% — bear-camp interpretation: Ferrari has lost confidence in BEV demand at the ultra-luxury tier, with implications for the broader luxury-EV thesis (Porsche Taycan, Audi e-tron GT, Maserati Folgore have all underperformed). Bull-camp interpretation: Ferrari is being pragmatic and protecting the ICE/hybrid franchise where the demand is.
- Elettrica reveal was technical only — no pricing, no client-facing reveal, no demand signal. The buy-side that had been pricing in a "wow" moment was disappointed by the deliberate slow-rollout posture.
- 2026 EPS framework implied ~€8.80-€9.00 vs. Street modeling ~€9.45 — a 5-7% forward-EPS cut for buy-side desks that had been ahead of the now-disclosed framework.
- No upside surprises — buy-side positioning was crowded long, and the CMD did not deliver a higher-than-expected capital-return commitment, a strategic acquisition, or a new revenue category. The "missing positive" was itself the bearish signal.
What the Q3 print tells us about the CMD framework
The first operational test of the CMD framework is the Q3 print — and it passed. EBIT margin held flat YoY at 28.4% (vs. CMD-implied 2025 floor of ≥29.0%); 9M EBIT margin of 29.9% is +120bps on track to clear; FCF generation is ahead of the raised FY floor; cars-and-spare-parts growth reaccelerated to +5.6% (consistent with the implied 5-7% trajectory needed to hit the €9B 2030 revenue floor). Every line item that was supposed to demonstrate the framework was achievable did exactly that.
The interpretation gap: The CMD was framed by management as a "floor for the end of this decade" — Vigna explicitly used "floor" terminology three times on the call. The Street, after October 9, was interpreting it as a "ceiling." Q3 is the first data point that ought to recalibrate that interpretation, and the November 4 +2-3% rally on a "headline EPS miss" suggests the buy-side is starting to come around.
Tariff Dynamics — Now Quantifiable
Q3 was the first quarter in which the US tariff regime was visibly present in the P&L. The chronology of where we stand:
- April 3, 2025: US auto tariffs at 27.5% on EU vehicles. Ferrari pre-positioned via the March 27 commercial policy adjustment (price increases up to 10%).
- Q2 2025: Tariff effectively shielded by pre-tariff inventory.
- Late July 2025: US-EU framework agreement at 15%. Ferrari pulled the 50bps margin risk buffer from FY guidance.
- Q3 2025: Pre-tariff inventory drawn down; US deliveries at full 27.5% tariff rate (the 15% rate is the political agreement but "carved out in stone" only later in Q3). Commercial policy adjusted downward to "up to 5%" with the 15% rate now in force. Tariff drag now visible in mix-and-price variance: +€25M Q3 (vs. +€47M Q2) reflects the partial pass-through.
- FY guidance at Oct 9 CMD: Raised to ≥€7.1B revenue, ≥€2.06B EBIT, ≥€8.80 EPS, ≥€1.30B FCF — the tariff impact is fully absorbed inside the upward revision.
Guidance & Outlook
FY 2025 guidance — already raised at the October 9 CMD — was reaffirmed on the Q3 call. No incremental change to numbers, but the qualitative commentary on Q4 sharpens the implied path.
| FY 2025 Metric | Initial Guide (Feb 2025) | Q2 Reaffirmation (Jul 31, 2025) | Post-CMD Guide (Oct 9, 2025) | 2024 Actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net revenues (€B) | ≥7.0 | ≥7.0 (stronger confidence) | ≥7.1 | 6.7 |
| Adjusted EBITDA (€B) | ≥2.68, ≥38.3% | ≥2.68, ≥38.3% (risk removed) | ≥2.72, ≥38.3% | 2.56, 38.3% |
| Adjusted EBIT (€B) | ≥2.03, ≥29.0% | ≥2.03, ≥29.0% | ≥2.06, ≥29.0% | 1.89, 28.3% |
| Adj. diluted EPS (€) | ≥8.60 | ≥8.60 | ≥8.80 | 8.46 |
| Industrial FCF (€B) | ≥1.20 | ≥1.20 | ≥1.30 | 1.03 |
Implied Q4 cadence
9M figures against the raised FY floors imply Q4 must hit:
- Revenue: ≥€1,756M (consistent with shipments down YoY as flagged, but offset by F80 first-unit pricing and the Testarossa family ramp)
- EBIT: ≥€463M (a 26.3% margin floor — the lowest quarterly margin in 2025 but still above FY2024's 28.3%)
- EPS: ≥€1.98 (consistent with Q4 typically being seasonally strong on personalization)
- FCF: ≥€83M (easily clears; historical Q4s run €200-400M)
Management has explicitly telegraphed all four drivers of the implied Q4 step-down: (1) lower deliveries YoY (changeover-driven, well-flagged); (2) a positive but "sequentially lighter" product mix in line with the Daytona phase-out and the F80's first few units; (3) higher SG&A from new-model start-of-production; and (4) a seasonal step-up in racing R&D as F1 development for 2026 ramps. None of these is a surprise; all four are consistent with the prior calls.
"For Q4, we project lower deliveries year-over-year, as we already told you in the second quarter call, and this is in connection with the changeover of models, as I mentioned earlier on, a positive product mix, although sequentially tighter, in line with the phaseout of Daytona and the first unit of F80, higher SG&A and a seasonal step-up in racing R&D expenses as well as higher SG&A dictated by the start of production of new models." — Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO
Implied 2026 framing: Management acknowledged the 2026 setup will be "more back-end loaded" due to the F80 gradual ramp (3-year lifecycle on the program), the Testarossa family ramp, and the Elettrica unveil sequence (look-and-feel in Q1 2026; complete car in Q2 2026; first deliveries shortly thereafter). The implied 2026 EPS framework of ~€8.80-€9.00 is therefore a back-end-loaded year — a setup that favors the second half of 2026.
Guidance style: Conservative throughout 2025. Ferrari has now raised the FY guide twice (Q2 implicit via "stronger confidence," October 9 explicit via the CMD reset). The Q3 print delivers cleanly against the raised guide without compromising either the 9M trajectory or the Q4 implied math. This is textbook Ferrari guidance discipline: under-promise, deliver, then revise upward at the appropriate strategic moment.
Key Topics & Management Commentary
Overall management tone: Confident throughout, with the deliberateness of a team that has just spent two full days defending their long-range plan at the CMD and is now executing against it. The Q3 call had less strategic-defer-to-CMD tension than Q2 (which had been almost entirely deferred). Substantive answers were given on tariff dynamics, Q4 cadence, F1 budget, US client behavior, and 2026 setup — areas that Q2 had pushed off. The Elettrica positioning remained guarded but the visible incremental disclosure (the e-Vortex test track completion, the Q1 2026 interior reveal cadence, the Q2 2026 complete-car reveal) gave the buy-side something to model.
1. The Post-CMD Street Reaction and Management's Framing
The Q3 call was the first management public address since the CMD selloff. Vigna led with a recap of the CMD pillars — the "floor for the end of this decade" framing, the "unique company combining three dimensions: heritage, technology and racing," and the "additive, not transitional" electrification posture. The framing was deliberately confident but not defensive — management did not directly address the stock-price reaction, did not apologize for the 2030 framework, and did not adjust any numbers.
"At our Capital Markets Day, we have defined a clear trajectory in the long-term interests of our brand, setting the floor for sustainable growth toward 2030... We continue to deliver on our promises." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO
The deliberate use of "floor" terminology three separate times in the prepared remarks is a direct signal: management views the CMD targets as the conservative case, not the central case. The Q3 print, with margins holding and FCF tracking ahead of the raised guide, validates that framing operationally. The interpretation gap between management ("floor") and Street ("ceiling") is the central debate, and Q3 is the first data point in management's favor.
Assessment: The CMD's framing as a floor — and the Q3 print's consistency with that framing — is the most important strategic signal from the November 4 call. If subsequent quarters continue to deliver ahead of the framework, the multiple should re-rate higher from current post-CMD levels. The recovery path is now operationally defined, not narratively dependent.
2. The Ferrari Elettrica — Multi-Step Reveal Now Clearly Mapped
The CMD revealed the production-ready chassis and components of the Elettrica on October 9, 2025 — the technology layer. The full reveal sequence as now disclosed:
- October 9, 2025: Chassis, motors, technology — done.
- Q1 2026: Interior design and look-and-feel reveal.
- Q2 2026: Complete car reveal (presumably with pricing).
- Late 2026 / 2027: First client deliveries.
"After the Capital Market Day, I met several clients in U.S.A., in Korea, in China and in Italy. And all of them appreciated the way we present the model. This is what they told me. The electric cars are generally heavy as elephants and not fun to drive. You did well to invest in active electronic system to transform the elephant in a horse and to engage the drivers with pedro shift like in all Ferrari." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO
The "elephant to horse" metaphor — repeated client framing — is the marketing positioning that emerged in the post-CMD client tour. The active electronic system that Vigna emphasized is the technical differentiator: making a heavy BEV (battery weight is unavoidable) feel light and driver-engaging through chassis dynamics. The Q1 and Q2 2026 reveals will progressively de-risk the product narrative.
Assessment: The Elettrica reveal cadence is now operationally clear and the rollout structure favors a steady accretion of news flow through 2026 rather than a single make-or-break moment. The October 9 reveal was the riskiest single event; from here, each subsequent layer of disclosure (interior, complete car, pricing, deliveries) can incrementally add to the narrative without the kind of binary downside the CMD presented. This is structurally good for the stock through 2026.
3. Order Book — "Extends Well Into 2027," Reaffirmed
The order book commentary was reaffirmed verbatim from Q2: "the order book extends well into 2027." The Testarossa family and Amalfi are contributing to the order intake. In-production lineup remains substantially sold out. The 296 Speciale program "nearly reaching full coverage of the life cycle" — i.e., effectively sold out before serial production starts.
"In the past few months, almost all range model in production were substantially sold out. The launches of the Testarossa family and Amalfi and the great traction in clients are initially contributing to the order intake. Indeed, the order book extends well into 2027." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO
The order-book extension dynamic — book filling out within the visibility window rather than the window itself extending — that we flagged at Q2 has not changed. "Extends well into 2027" is the same framing used last quarter. The 296 Speciale being already sold out is the strongest demand signal in the disclosure.
Assessment: A multi-year sold-out backlog is the structural moat the Ferrari thesis rests on, and it is intact. The next two data points to watch: Q4 2025 backlog framing (does it extend to "2028"?), and the Elettrica order intake when client-facing pricing is revealed in Q2 2026. Until those data points arrive, the order-book signal remains a constructive constant.
4. Amalfi — 40% New-to-Brand, Strong Early Reception
Vigna disclosed two specific Amalfi data points: (1) "Amalfi is proceeding better than the previous model" (the Roma); (2) "in order book, more than 50% of the new clients — of the — sorry, 40% of the people that want to buy the Amalfi are coming new to the brand." A 40% new-to-brand mix on the entry-V8 platform is materially higher than what the Roma achieved at launch (~25-30% new-to-brand by historical disclosure), and validates the explicit Amalfi strategy as a client-acquisition tool.
"How it's going Amalfi? I think Amalfi is proceeding better than the previous model. So this is very encouraging. The second point I can tell you is that I saw — I was in China the 21st of October, and I saw the first 2 Amalfi sold over there to new client younger than 40 years old. I can also share with you that in order book, more than 50% of the new clients — of the — sorry, 40% of the people that want to buy the Amalfi are coming new to the brand." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO
The first Chinese Amalfi deliveries already happening (October 21, 2025) is structurally important — it confirms that the China-market positioning of the V8 platform has traction even before formal serial deliveries begin. The young-client demographic (sub-40) is the long-term Ferrari client acquisition pipeline.
Assessment: The Amalfi is performing as designed — both as a client-acquisition tool (40% new-to-brand) and as a China-market repositioning vehicle. This is one of the cleanest operational positives from the Q3 call and has implications well beyond 2025: the entry-V8 platform is the gateway product that defines Ferrari's long-term addressable base. If the Amalfi continues to draw new-to-brand at this rate, the 5-year addressable Ferraristi cohort expands faster than the lineup count alone implies. This is the most concrete piece of evidence that the CMD's growth framework is operationally credible.
5. Pricing Power — "Not at All an End"
A direct question on whether Ferrari's pricing power is exhausted drew an emphatic rejection from the CEO. The framing — Ferrari raises prices by adding innovation and content, not by re-listing the same product higher — is the consistent strategic statement that anchors the multi-year ASP growth story.
"It's not at all an end. Actually, we feel confident that with all the innovation that we have to delight our clients, we do not see any weakening in our pricing power. We will continue to offer... car with a different positioning. All of them will benefit of the pricing power because this pricing power, just to be clear, is not coming because we will just increase the price for the same, let me say, product as it is. No, we will make richer and richer innovative, more and more innovative with the product so that by delighting the client, we are confident that we will keep our pricing power." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO
The mechanic is innovation-driven price ladder: each new model incorporates more advanced technology (vehicle dynamics, user interface, materials, powertrain), and the price is justified by the incremental content. This is structurally how Ferrari has compounded ASP over the listed history, and management explicitly rejects the alternative — flat-product, list-price-only increases.
Assessment: The pricing-power statement is a load-bearing pillar of the thesis. The CMD's 2030 revenue framework — implied ~5% CAGR on flat-to-slightly-up volume — requires sustained ASP growth in the low-to-mid single digits. The Q3 print delivered that arithmetic (cars revenue +5.6% on units +0.5%, implying ASP-and-mix +5.1%). Management's commitment to the innovation-driven price ladder is the operational mechanism behind the framework — and Q3 confirms it.
6. The 849 Testarossa Family — Sold-Out Order Book Coverage Into 2027
The Testarossa coupe and Spider — replacing the SF90 Stradale and SF90 Spider — were unveiled September 9, 2025. Vigna's color: "I met many clients in Europe, in the U.S.A. and in China, who are in love with Testarossa." The platform is hybrid plug-in V8 with three electric motors, 1050 cv total output (50 cv more than the SF90 family it replaces). The launch is contributing to the order book extension into 2027.
"Last week in China, I met a young female client, younger than 40 years old, and she told me, Testarossa is the perfect harmonious blend of design and engineering, elegant and craftsmanship. I'm eager to own one and drive it." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO
Assessment: The Testarossa is the volume hybrid platform that takes Ferrari's most-successful SF90 architecture forward another product generation. Strong early reception across geographies suggests the order intake will extend the backlog through 2026-2027 and into 2028 once deliveries begin in earnest. Combined with the 296 Speciale (also hybrid, sold out before launch), the hybrid platform demand is robust — and the Q3 hybrid-share decline (43% from ~50%) is purely a delivery-cycle artifact, not a demand statement.
7. The F80 — First Units Shipping in Q4 2025, 3-Year Program Lifecycle
The F80 hypercar (€3.6M+ ex-options, 799-unit total program) starts deliveries in Q4 2025 with only "the first units" — a deliberately gradual ramp. Management confirmed the lifecycle is "around 3 years" — longer than the typical Icona-class program. A specific question on whether the 3-year lifecycle is unusually stretched drew an answer that this is consistent with the recent Icona-class playbook ("in line with what we've been doing on the ICONA as recently, considering the overall number of cars involved and the start-up phase").
"Looking at 2026 and beyond, let me remind you that the introduction of the F80 will be gradual. As usual, it will take a couple of quarters to ramp up the production and the life cycle is expected to be around 3 years. The guidance of the F80 and the model changeover will imply a more back-end loaded 2026 and will shape the product and country mix throughout the year." — Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO
Assessment: The F80 program is structural margin support for 2026-2028 — at €3.6M+ list pricing with high personalization adoption, each F80 contributes meaningfully more to EBIT than any other vehicle in the lineup. The 3-year program duration spreads the contribution evenly rather than front-loading 2026, which is why the CFO's framing of 2026 as "back-end loaded" — F80 ramping through the year — is operationally important to understand for 2026 modeling. Q4 2025 will show only the "first units" — likely 10-30 deliveries — but the contribution scales meaningfully in 2026-2027.
8. US Tariffs — 15% Now "Carved Out in Stone"
The 15% tariff rate is now formally agreed and Ferrari has adjusted its commercial policy in response: the price increase has been ratcheted down to "up to 5%" from the prior "up to 10%" that applied under the 27.5% regime. Vigna's framing on US client behavior: "the business proceeds as usual." No order cancellations observed; no unusual demand pattern; the only operational change is the commercial-policy step-down.
"In U.S., the business proceeds as usual, number one. Number two, the only difference we see in U.S. that if you compare today versus the previous call, at that time, the tariff were still at 25%. Now they are at 15%. Now it's carved out in the stone, it's 15%." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO
A separate question on whether residual-value concerns or tariff-implementation anxiety had created order cancellations was answered directly: no pickup in cancellations, business proceeding normally.
Assessment: The tariff narrative is now de-risked operationally — the 15% rate is in force, the commercial policy has been step-downed, and US demand has not visibly cracked. The remaining open question is whether the formal 15% rate creates pricing-pass-back pressure (i.e., does Ferrari need to roll back the 5% surcharge?). Management's framing is "wait and see," but the underlying message is that pricing power has held through the tariff transition. This is exactly what the bull case predicted; Q3 confirms it.
9. F1 Budget Increase and Operating Cost Impact
A specific question on the F1 2026 budget increase (headline: ~$215M from ~$135M) drew a substantive answer: the increase reflects the underlying cost cap rising, and "this flows into our cost, and this is to be taken as a cost increase." This is the cleanest acknowledgment to date that the F1 cost-cap increase is a real P&L headwind for 2026 — though absorbed within the overall guidance framework.
"Thanks, Michael. The first one really the fuel cost increase. That's an element we need to take into account. So if the F1 budget grows, this flows into our cost, and this is to be taken as a cost increase." — Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO
Assessment: The F1 cost-cap increase is a known headwind that's been incorporated into the CMD framework. The Vasseur extension in late July confirmed continuity through the 2026 regulatory reset; the cost-cap step-up is now confirmed as a real P&L number. Net: F1 is a permanent OpEx commitment that bounces around modestly with cost-cap changes but is structurally absorbed within the operating cost envelope.
10. Personalization — 20% Sustained Through the Model Changeover
Personalization revenue continues at ~20% of cars-and-spare-parts revenue, sustained despite the Daytona SP3 phase-out (which had been the highest-personalization vehicle). The drivers in Q3: SF90 XX family, Purosangue, and carbon-and-paint adoption broadly across the lineup. Tailor-made centers (Western US, Japan) are positioned as proximity tools to support continued personalization adoption.
"With respect to your second... question, we said we have prepared the plan on the basis of a 19% longer-term penetration of personalization. In this respect, the contribution of tailor-made and in particularly the tailor-made center, bear in mind that have been taken into consideration mostly to come closer to our clients. So the overall consideration on the penetration of personalization takes that into account with a view to be close to our clients also in countries where such tailor-made personalization are particularly relevant, such as Japan and the Western Coast of U.S.A." — Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO
The disclosed longer-term planning assumption of 19% is below the current 20% run-rate — suggesting management is being conservative in the framework. If 20% holds (and the personalization-revenue arithmetic is roughly +€300M+ per year above the 19% baseline), the FY guidance has additional running room.
Assessment: Personalization at 20% appears structurally durable — it has now held above 19% for six consecutive quarters and survived the Daytona phase-out. The 19% planning assumption embedded in the CMD framework is below the trailing run-rate, which means the framework has implicit margin buffer. This is the highest-margin revenue line in the company and the most underweighted by Street modeling.
11. Lifestyle, Brand and the BingX Crypto Partnership
The October 31, 2025 announcement of BingX as a Scuderia Ferrari HP Team Partner (effective January 1, 2026) is the latest sponsorship-and-brand extension. The crypto-exchange partnership is a directional signal — Ferrari is willing to engage with adjacent-luxury-spend categories (crypto wealth, fintech) for brand-extension purposes. Lifestyle activities (London store, fashion collections, licensing) continue to scale within the sponsorship-commercial-brand line.
Assessment: Brand-and-lifestyle is structurally compounding outside autos. The 11.9% revenue contribution from sponsorship-commercial-brand in Q3 is up from ~10.6% in Q3 2024 — a 130bps lift in one year. The CMD framework called out a multi-year lifestyle growth path that supports the 2030 ≥€9B revenue floor without requiring excessive volume growth. The BingX partnership is small-money brand-positioning that adds optionality.
Analyst Q&A Highlights
Q3 Originally Was Supposed to Be the Weakest Quarter — Why Wasn't It?
A recurring line of questioning concerned whether Q3 had outperformed the originally-flagged "weakest quarter in the year" framing — and what that means for the Q4 setup. The CFO's response disaggregated the upside into two drivers: personalization came in higher than planned, and the cost base ended up lower than initially expected. Both are structural positives that carry into the H2 trajectory.
Q: "Just maybe starting with the Q3. Like I think we are expecting that it's going to be the weakest quarter in the year. So obviously, something went better and maybe we heard that it was personalization. But maybe if you could talk specifically about the U.S. Back in Q2, you mentioned that there is some change in consumer behavior because of the tariffs. Have you seen it normalizing right now after we have more clarity on tariffs?"
— Robert Krankowski, UBS
A: "With respect to Q3 being originally thought as the weakest quarter in the year, I think the reason is simple. We were — the level of personalization was higher than we were expecting. So that has on the top line. And in terms of the cost basis, a point that I highlighted when we revised the guidance upward, the cost base actually ended up being lower compared to our initial expectations."
— Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO
Assessment: This is a directly bullish answer. Q3 outperformance was not a one-time mix accident — it was personalization running ahead of plan AND lower industrial costs than expected. Both are structural drivers, not timing artifacts. The implication for Q4 and 2026: the CMD framework's cost assumptions are arguably conservative, and the personalization assumption (19% baseline) is below the actual run-rate (20%+). This is the kind of "framework conservative, execution ahead" pattern that supports a multiple re-rating from here.
Mix Variance — Better in H2 Than Originally Flagged
A direct question on whether H2 mix had improved from the "neutral" framing offered at Q2 drew confirmation: H2 mix is slightly better than initially expected, again driven by personalization rather than model mix. The Q4 mix question, however, was answered as "sequentially tighter" than Q3 because of the Daytona phase-out and F80 only at "first units" — i.e., the highest-margin contributors are transitioning.
Q: "I think you're saying that the mix impact in the second half will be a little bit better than what you anticipated. I saw that mix added about EUR 25 million in the quarter. I think last call, you said mix would be neutral for the second half. So can you just help us think what's driving a little bit of that upside? And maybe how much we can think about in fourth quarter from mix relative to the third quarter?"
— Michael Binetti, Evercore ISI
A: "Yes, the mix impact in the second half of the year has been slightly better than anticipated. So I remember I answered you in the second quarter call that we would have expected the mix more neutral in the second half. Now this is a slightly improved at least based on the third quarter results. And this is mainly due to personalization that remains very, very strong."
— Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO
Assessment: H2 mix is better than Q2 framing; Q4 mix will be sequentially lighter than Q3 (Daytona done, F80 not yet at scale). Both are consistent with the broader Ferrari pattern: personalization is the swing variable, and it's running ahead of plan. The Q4 setup is the cleanest stress test of whether the personalization run-rate holds even when the highest-personalization vehicles (Daytona, SF90 family running down) are absent from the volume mix.
F80 Lifecycle and Why Three Years
A direct question on whether the F80's 3-year lifecycle is unusually stretched — given prior Icona-class programs ran 8-10 quarters — drew confirmation that the 3-year framing is consistent with recent Icona-class playbook. The implicit logic: spreading 799 units across 3 years preserves exclusivity and contribution-per-quarter rather than front-loading deliveries.
Q: "And can I just ask you one clarifying comment. You said the F80 will roll out over 3 years. Is that — am I wrong or is that a little longer than the normal cadence for one of the strictly limited or supercar models like this? Is that — and is there a strategy behind stretching that out a little longer? I would think normally would — you'd see the bulk of those shipments in maybe 8 or 10 quarters?"
— Michael Binetti, Evercore ISI
A: "[indiscernible] line with what we've been doing on the ICONA as recently, considering the overall number of cars involved and the start-up phase that is entailed by in order to get to run rate of production."
— Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO
Assessment: A clean operational answer that has 2026-2028 modeling implications. The F80 is structural margin support across three years rather than a concentrated 2026-2027 contribution. This makes the 2026 guidance framework less front-loaded in F80 contribution than some Street modeling had assumed — but it also means the F80 contribution extends meaningfully into 2027-2028, supporting the back-half of the CMD framework. Operationally bullish for the long-tail, modestly bearish for 2026 P&L acceleration vs. some buy-side models.
Hybrid Share Decline — Is It Demand or Cycle?
A direct question on whether the Q3 hybrid-share drop to 43% reflects demand softness or model-cycle mechanics drew an unambiguous answer from the CEO: it is cycle, not demand. The hybrid platforms in production are winding down (296 GTB, SF90 Spider) while the new launches (Amalfi V8, Testarossa hybrid) are not yet in serial production.
Q: "First, on hybrids, I think the share was lowest in a couple of years. Is it linked with the changeover of product? Or is it driven by willingness to reduce overall hybrid share to eventually address excess deliveries in certain markets and residual values?"
— Thomas Besson, Kepler Cheuvreux
A: "So the first one, Thomas, is just depends on the offer that we have on the lineup we are offering to our clients. The number of hybrid cars that we are offering is reducing because there is a change in the model. So there is no if you want, there is no surprise over there. It's a consequence of the way we launched the car. No, that's it. There is — don't extrapolate any trend over there, okay? And it's not related to the propulsion."
— Benedetto Vigna, CEO
Assessment: A categorical answer that closes one of the ambiguity-driven bear narratives. The hybrid-share decline is mechanical and will reverse as the Testarossa family (hybrid) and 296 Speciale (hybrid) ramp into volume in 2026. The post-2026 mix will look very different from the 2025 mix; the 2030 framework of 40/40/20 ICE/hybrid/BEV is the operationally-credible end state, not a directional warning.
The Pricing-Power Ceiling Question
One of the most thoughtful exchanges concerned whether Ferrari is approaching the natural ceiling on pricing power, given the multi-year ASP growth and the CMD framework implying continued pricing-driven revenue growth. The CEO's framing — pricing power is innovation-driven, not list-price-driven — is the consistent strategic statement, but the follow-up question ("So aligned to more models, fewer volumes?") drew a one-word "Yes."
Q: "My question is, I'm taking you back to the Capital Markets Day and your projections of top line growth to 2030. So a very simple question, volume price mix, volume, you got control it, mix to a point. And I was just wondering on price, your pricing power, given all that's been done and the great results that we've seen in recent years, Benedetto, where do you think you stand on this? Do you think you're coming to an end here? Or do you think there's more to come?"
— Flavio Cereda, GAM
A: "It's not at all an end. Actually, we feel confident that with all the innovation that we have to delight our clients, we do not see any weakening in our pricing power. We will continue to offer Flavio, car with a different positioning. All of them will benefit of the pricing power because this pricing power, just to be clear, is not coming because we will just increase the price for the same, let me say, product as it is. No, we will make richer and richer innovative, more and more innovative with the product..."
— Benedetto Vigna, CEO
Assessment: The "more models, fewer volumes" framing is the explicit acknowledgment that the CMD's 2030 framework is a price-and-mix story, not a volume-and-share story. This is exactly the structural set-up that justifies a premium luxury multiple — but it also requires belief that the innovation pipeline can continue to delight clients at the rate needed to justify the pricing. Q3's +5.6% cars-revenue growth on +0.5% units (implied ASP-and-mix +5.1%) is the data point that supports the belief.
Margin Stability Through the Investment Cycle
A philosophical question on whether margin stability is achievable through the heavy investment cycle of the next 3-5 years (paint shop, e-building, Elettrica development, F80 ramp, racing investment) drew a confident but high-level answer. The framework: invest in uniqueness because that protects pricing power, which in turn protects margins.
Q: "I guess frequently asked the question after the Capital Markets Day with regards to, I think, very exciting future, I think right products that you're launching into the market, but they also require some investments such as the launch of Elettrica. I think some lesser investments like the paint shop and I think all the credit facilities we saw during the Capital Markets Day. The question is to create a stability of margins in the business model, how can we think about the offsetting elements, the positive contributions you're going to have in the medium term to create that margin stability?"
— Jose Asumendi, JPMorgan
A: "The only way — first of all, we are living in uncertain time. Yes... Now the only things we can do is to make sure that we keep innovating so to offer something that is unique to our clients, unique in the performance in engineering, unique in the design, unique in the way we do it because why are we doing the paint shop? Why are we doing — why did we do the e-building? Because we want to be unique in the way we manufacture our cars... only if you are unique, we can do something that guarantees the long-term sustainability. That's the reason why we gave you a floor for the end of this decade, and we feel confident about that because of the uniqueness of what we do."
— Benedetto Vigna, CEO
Assessment: A non-numerical answer to a numerical question — but consistent with the company's framing throughout the call. The "floor for the end of this decade" language is repeated three times across the prepared remarks and Q&A, which is itself a meta-signal: management is repeatedly anchoring the CMD targets as the conservative case. The investment cycle is real (paint shop, e-Vortex test track, e-building, Elettrica development), but the implication is that the investments enable the long-term margin floor rather than threatening it.
What They're NOT Saying
- Specific Q4 unit guidance: Continuing the pattern from prior quarters, management explicitly stated Q4 deliveries will be "lower year-over-year" but provided no specific magnitude. With model changeover dynamics and F80 first units, the Q4 unit print could range from -5% to -15% YoY — a wide spread for a company with multi-year order visibility.
- Elettrica pricing — still deferred: Vigna explicitly asked Tom Narayan to "be patient a little bit" on pricing positioning relative to other halo programs. The Q2 2026 complete-car reveal is now the implied pricing-disclosure moment. Until then, modeling Elettrica volume × ASP requires assumption ranges.
- 2025 F1 Constructors' final ranking: Mentioned in passing but not framed forward. Ferrari's 2024 second-place finish drove the 2025 commercial revenue uplift; if 2025 falls back to third or fourth, the 2026 commercial line decelerates ~€30-50M. Management did not address.
- Mainland China recovery timeline: -19% Q3 / -20% 9M for the Mainland-China-only line, with no qualitative inflection language. The Amalfi-as-China-response is the strategic response, but no implied recovery timing.
- Capex absolute envelope for 2026: "More contained vs. prior year" framing for FY25 capex (~€900M-€950M implied) but no 2026 capex commitment. The Elettrica industrialization and paint-shop completion are major 2026 capex items.
- Specific 2026 EPS framework: Despite the CMD framework implying ~€8.80-€9.00, management did not directly confirm or refute this on the call. The "more back-end loaded 2026" framing is the only specific 2026 guidance.
- Order book duration extension: "Extends well into 2027" was reaffirmed verbatim from Q2 — the book is filling out within the visibility window rather than the window itself extending. The Amalfi and Elettrica order intake will be the determinants of whether the book extends to "2028" by mid-2026.
- Specific tariff dollar-impact quantification: Acknowledged as "particularly visible in the third quarter" but not numerically quantified. Implied range from the mix-variance gap (€25M Q3 vs. €47M Q2) is ~€20-25M of incremental tariff drag absorbed in Q3.
- Buyback continuation past 2025: The current €2B program completes by December 18, 2025. No commitment to a new program for 2026+. Management implicitly suggested continuity ("confidence we have in the future") but did not commit.
- Personalization ceiling: Run-rate at ~20%; planning assumption at 19%; no commentary on whether the 20% level is sustainable or has further room. The asymmetric upside in the framework is here.
- Elettrica BEV unit volume target: The CMD 20% 2030 BEV mix implies meaningful volume — but the specific Elettrica program size (initial annual run-rate) was not disclosed.
Market Reaction
- Pre-print setup (NYSE RACE): RACE entered the November 4 print at approximately $385 — having declined ~20% from the pre-CMD October 8 close of $479. YTD return entering the print was just +5.7%, down from ~+70% YTD at the late-July high. The October 9 CMD drove the largest single-day decline (-15.1%) in Ferrari's listed history. Implied 1-year return was +15.6%. Market cap was ~$71-72B vs. ~$93B pre-CMD. Options-implied move was ~3.5%, with put/call skew slightly defensive.
- Print reaction (November 4, 2025): Pre-market response was modestly positive on the press release release (~+2.7% to ~$395.70 in pre-market trading) as the wire-service framing pivoted from "EPS missed €2.41 consensus" to "FY25 guidance reaffirmed at the post-CMD floor." Intraday trading held the gains as the FCF beat, EBIT margin stability, and Amalfi early-order intake commentary supported the narrative that the post-CMD framework is the conservative case. NYSE close was approximately +2.5% to +3.5% on the day at ~$395-400; Milan-listed shares closed +2-3%.
The +2-3% rally on a headline "EPS miss" is the most important market signal from the print. With the stock having already absorbed the CMD reset (-20% drawdown from the pre-CMD high), the November 4 print confirmed that the new framework is achievable without further negative surprises. The buy-side has finished re-rating; from here, operational delivery against the conservatively-framed CMD targets is the lever for multiple re-expansion. Volume on the NYSE was ~3-4M shares vs. trailing 30-day average ~2.5M — elevated but not extreme; some of the rally was attributable to modest short-covering on the in-line print. European luxury complex (LVMH, Hermès, Aston Martin) traded flat on the day; Ferrari's outperformance was idiosyncratic.
Street Perspective
Debate: Is the Post-CMD Re-Rate Justified, or an Overshoot?
Bull view: The October 9 -15% drawdown overshot. Ferrari's CMD-framed ≥€9B 2030 revenue floor with ≥40% EBITDA margin still describes a category-of-one luxury franchise compounding at high single digits with industry-leading margins and ~€2.0-2.5B FCF generation. The 50x pre-CMD multiple was excessive; the now ~37-40x forward multiple is closer to where a quality-luxury-compounder should trade, and a typical "framework underestimates the true trajectory" pattern (which Q3 supports) implies multiple re-expansion from here. Buying the post-CMD selloff is buying the same business at a more reasonable multiple.
Bear view: The CMD reset the long-term growth trajectory from ~10% to ~5% CAGR. That is a structural change in the investment proposition — Ferrari is no longer the high-growth luxury name; it is the slow-growth, high-margin, capital-return luxury name. Slow-growth-with-margin businesses trade at 20-30x earnings, not 40x. The post-CMD multiple is still expensive; further compression to ~30x is plausible if the slower-growth narrative cements. The Mainland China line continues to deteriorate, the Elettrica is unproven, and the 2026 EPS step-down is real.
Our take: The bull has the better near-term argument and the bear has the more rigorous long-term valuation framework — but the near-term setup is materially asymmetric. The CMD drawdown destroyed ~$20B of market cap in three days; the framework underlying the new targets is conservative (Vigna's "floor" repetition, personalization at 20% vs. 19% planning assumption, costs running below initial assumption). If Q4 2025 and Q1 2026 deliver against the framework, the multiple can re-expand toward 42-45x — implying ~10-15% upside from the post-CMD level. The bear scenario (multiple compresses to 30x) requires the framework to break, which Q3 evidence runs against. We side with the bull on a 12-month basis, while acknowledging the bear's longer-term valuation discipline is the constraint on how high the stock can re-rate.
Debate: Is the Powertrain Mix Recalibration a Strategic Win or a Capitulation?
Bull view: Recalibrating to 40/40/20 ICE/hybrid/BEV from 20/40/40 is the right strategic call. The luxury BEV thesis has been visibly broken across multiple OEMs (Porsche Taycan, Audi e-tron GT, Maserati Folgore, Bentley Mulliner Batur EV concept all underperformed). Ferrari is being pragmatic and protecting the franchise where the demand actually is — ICE V12 and hybrid V8 platforms. The "additive, not transitional" framing is intellectually honest; pushing a heavy BEV portfolio against soft demand would have been the destruction-of-shareholder-value path.
Bear view: Ferrari is making a long-term bet that the luxury BEV market never materializes — which is plausible but not certain. If the broader luxury-BEV adoption curve turns up in 2028-2030 (driven by improving battery technology, charging infrastructure, or regulatory pull-through), Ferrari will be relatively behind. The 20% mix means roughly 4,000-5,000 BEV deliveries by 2030 — far below the original 8,000-10,000 implied at the 2022 plan. If competitors expand BEV share faster, the brand's electrification credibility takes a long-term hit.
Our take: The bull case is operationally correct for the next 5 years. Ferrari is right to follow demand rather than push against it, and the visible market evidence supports the recalibration. The bear case has a 7-10 year horizon — and if the broader luxury-BEV market does turn up, Ferrari has the engineering, brand, and capital to accelerate the BEV mix at that point. The "additive, not transitional" framing preserves optionality without overcommitting capital. This is the right strategic posture, and it's the kind of disciplined capital allocation that compounds shareholder value over a decade.
Debate: Mainland China — Bottoming or Still Declining?
Bull view: Mainland China at ~5% of total deliveries is small enough that the deterioration is contained. The Amalfi (first deliveries H1 2026) is the strategic response — V8 not 12-cylinder (which is tax-disadvantaged), positioned for the Chinese market, and already drawing new-to-brand interest in the first sales. The broader luxury-China dynamic will eventually stabilize; Ferrari's allocation discipline means no inventory overhang to clear before the recovery.
Bear view: Mainland China was -20% YTD heading into Q3 and stayed there. The slope has not bent. Hermès, LVMH and Kering are all reporting soft China numbers with no clear inflection. Ferrari's ultra-wealthy Chinese client base is correlated with broader Chinese wealth-display dynamics, which are under sustained pressure. Mainland China going from 5% to 3% of revenue costs ~150bps; from 5% to 2% costs ~210bps.
Our take: The bear has the better short-term argument on the data. Mainland China deliveries declined -19% in Q3 alone with no visible inflection. The Amalfi is the right operational response but it takes time to ramp, and the broader luxury-China dynamic is outside Ferrari's control. That said, the absolute size of the headwind is bounded — Mainland China can decline another 30-40% and still only cost ~150-200bps of total revenue. The structural protection (deliberate allocation, no inventory in the channel, brand equity intact) means the China line cannot crater the way it can for higher-volume luxury players. We treat this as a known, sized headwind in the model — not a thesis-breaker.
Model Update Needed
| Item | Pre-Q3 Model | Suggested Change | Reason |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY25 Revenue | ~€7.10B | €7.10-7.15B (slight raise) | Q3 cars-and-spare-parts reacceleration; personalization at 20% holding |
| FY25 EBIT margin | ~29.5% | 29.7-29.9% | 9M margin at 29.9%; tariff drag absorbed; cost base lower than initial assumption |
| FY25 Adj. diluted EPS | €8.85 | €8.80-8.95 | Q3 lift offset by ETR drift and Q4 step-down telegraphed |
| FY25 Industrial FCF | ~€1.35B | €1.40-1.50B | 9M €1,217M already at 94% of raised guide; Q4 historically strong |
| FY26 Revenue | ~€7.70B | €7.60-7.80B (back-end loaded) | F80 ramp gradual; Testarossa ramp; CMD-implied trajectory |
| FY26 EBIT margin | ~29.5-30.0% | 29.3-29.8% | F1 cost-cap up; Elettrica development; SG&A start-up |
| FY26 Adj. diluted EPS | ~€9.45 | €8.85-9.10 (CMD reset) | Post-CMD framework: implied 2026 EPS ~€8.80-€9.00 |
| FY30 Revenue (long-range) | ~€10.0B | €9.0-9.5B | CMD floor of ≥€9B; some chance of overdelivery |
| FY30 EBITDA margin | 40-41% | ≥40% | Maintained at CMD framework floor |
| Powertrain mix 2030 | 20/40/40 ICE/hybrid/BEV | 40/40/20 | CMD recalibration; reflects realistic demand |
| Capex FY25 | ~€950M | €900-950M | 9M capex of €693M consistent with "more contained" |
| Mainland China 2026 | 0% / flat | -5% / down | Slope hasn't bent; broader China softness |
| Buyback past 2025 | Not modeled | Optional: ~€800M-€1.0B/yr | Capital allocation framework continuity; not committed |
Valuation impact: Net of these adjustments, our DCF fair value range moves to $440-$485 per share. With recent close at ~$385-400 (post-CMD level), this implies ~10-22% upside on a fundamental basis — for the first time in our coverage of the name, the operational valuation exceeds the trading price meaningfully. Our 12-month price target sits at the midpoint of the range at ~$460, implying ~15-20% total return potential including the dividend. Multiple math: at ~$460 the stock would trade at ~52x our €8.85 FY25 EPS estimate and ~50x our €9.10 FY26 estimate — a return to roughly the pre-CMD multiple but on a more conservatively-framed long-term trajectory. The post-CMD trough at ~37-40x is the entry point; trajectory back toward 45-50x is the path to our target.
Thesis Scorecard Post-Earnings
| Thesis Point | Status (Q3 Update) | Notes vs. Q2 |
|---|---|---|
| Bull #1: Multi-year order book provides revenue visibility unique in autos | Confirmed | Order book "extends well into 2027" reaffirmed; 296 Speciale sold out; Testarossa family contributing. |
| Bull #2: Personalization drives structural ASP and margin uplift | Confirmed (Strengthened) | 20% sustained through Daytona phase-out; CMD planning assumption of 19% is below run-rate — framework has buffer. |
| Bull #3: Margin expansion runway from mix and operating leverage | Confirmed | EBIT margin flat YoY at 28.4% despite full tariff drag; 9M margin +120bps to 29.9%. Pricing power demonstrated. |
| Bull #4: Brand/lifestyle optionality compounds outside autos | Confirmed | Sponsorship-commercial-brand +21% in Q3; 11.9% of revenue (vs. 10.6% Q3 2024). BingX partnership extends framework. |
| Bull #5: Capital return story — €2B buyback + dividend | Confirmed (Strengthened) | Program completing Dec 18, 2025 — one year ahead. FY25 FCF guide raised to ≥€1.30B. |
| Bear #1: Valuation premium pre-prices substantial upside | Challenged (Reversed) | Post-CMD -20% drawdown reset the multiple from ~50x to ~37-40x. Valuation is no longer the binding constraint. |
| Bear #2: Mainland China structural weakness | Confirmed | -19% Q3 / -20% YTD; slope unchanged. Bounded by small absolute exposure. |
| Bear #3: Electrification timing/positioning risk | Partially Resolved | CMD revealed 20% BEV by 2030 (down from 40%); strategy of "addition, not transition" is operationally defensible. |
| Bear #4: Cars-and-spare-parts growth deceleration | Challenged (Reversed) | Q3 +5.6% / +7.6% constant currency reverses the Q2 +2.3% trough; growth algorithm working again. |
| Bear #5: Tariff-implementation uncertainty | Resolved | 15% rate "carved out in stone"; commercial policy step-downed; absorbed within raised FY guide. |
| Bear #6 (new): 2030 framework decel to ~5% CAGR vs. ~10% prior expectation | Confirmed (Sized) | This is the CMD's central reset. Stock has already absorbed via multiple compression. |
Overall: Thesis is strengthened on the bull side and de-risked on the bear side. Bear #1 (valuation) is the single biggest change — the post-CMD selloff has reset the multiple to a level where the stock can be owned without requiring the 50x multiple to expand further. Bear #4 (cars-revenue deceleration) is reversed by Q3's reacceleration. The CMD's lower 2030 framework (new Bear #6) is the real long-term reset, but it is sized: ~5% CAGR vs. ~10% prior, with ≥40% EBITDA margin floor maintained. The trade is now: pay 37-40x forward for a low-double-digit-EPS-growth, ≥40% margin, multi-billion-FCF luxury franchise with a multi-year sold-out backlog. That is finally an attractive trade.
Action: Upgrading to Outperform from Hold. We initiated coverage at Hold in August on the view that the Q2 print was clean but the ~50x multiple required a successful CMD to be justified, and the CMD was the asymmetric event. The CMD delivered a worse outcome than buy-side hopes (lower 2030 framework, halved BEV target, no upside surprises) — and the stock responded with the largest single-day decline in its listed history. That selloff reset the multiple to a level where the underlying business is finally cheap enough to own. The Q3 print confirms the new framework is achievable (margins held YoY through full tariff exposure, FCF on track for the raised floor, cars revenue re-accelerated). At ~$385-400 entering the print and ~$395-400 exiting, RACE now offers ~15-20% total-return upside to our $460 12-month price target, against a downside floor of ~$350 (the CMD-low support level). That is the kind of asymmetric setup we were looking for at the Q2 initiation — it has finally arrived, and the rating action reflects that.