The Floor Was the Floor — Initial 2026 Guide of ≥€9.45 EPS Vindicates the Post-CMD Thesis

Results vs. Consensus and the Post-CMD Guide

Ferrari reported full-year and Q4 2025 results on the morning of February 10, 2026 (Maranello time), with a 3:00 PM CET (9:00 AM ET) conference call. The print is best read against three benchmarks simultaneously: (1) the Q4 sell-side consensus, which itself fragmented between a pre-CMD-anchored stale tape and a Zacks tape that had reset after the October 9 Capital Markets Day; (2) the post-CMD raised FY 2025 guide (revenue ≥€7.10B / EBIT ≥€2.06B / EPS ≥€8.80 / FCF ≥€1.30B), which the company committed to on Oct 9 and reaffirmed Nov 4; and (3) the post-CMD implied 2026 framework of ~€8.80-€9.00 EPS, against which the now-formal 2026 guidance of ≥€9.45 EPS is the most material upside surprise.

Q4 2025 — Standalone

The headline Q4 EPS of €2.14 (flat YoY) is mathematically the right print to ignore. EPS held while EBIT grew +10% because below-the-line items diluted: net financial expenses €12M vs. -€4M (a €16M swing on FX impact on USD treasury balances), and the effective tax rate climbed to 24.0% from 18.4% in Q4 2024 (the prior-year Q4 had benefited from the initial Patent Box catch-up — a non-repeating tailwind). Translated to the post-CMD-aligned Zacks consensus tape, Q4 was a +2.0% EPS beat (€2.14 actual vs. ~€2.09 / $2.44 expectation) and a +3.4% revenue beat. Translated to the stale pre-CMD Reuters/Investing.com tape (which was still anchoring on ~€2.48 EPS / ~€1.90B revenue), Q4 looks like a -14% miss — and that was the framing on the early-morning wire. The intraday rally of +5-6% on NYSE (and the +8.82% pre-market move) reflects the buy-side, which had reset its models to the post-CMD framework, reading the Q4 against the Zacks tape and against the FY guide vs. the post-CMD floor.

FY 2025 — Full Year vs. Post-CMD Raised Guidance and Consensus

Every line of the post-CMD raised guidance was beat — with industrial FCF beating the floor by €238M (+18%) the most material item. The "raised guide twice in one year" pattern (Q2 implicit confidence lift in late July, Oct 9 explicit CMD reset) was fully vindicated. The 2024 industrial FCF was €1,027M; the 2025 actual was €1,538M — a +50% YoY lift, driven by the F80 advance payments (Q4 cash inflow), a positive working-capital swing, and capex landing at ~€943M (consistent with the "more contained vs. prior year" framing on the Q3 call). The CFO explicitly attributed the FY 2025 outperformance vs. the (already raised) guide to two structural drivers: a lower-than-expected cost base, and a stronger-than-expected product mix in Q4 driven by SF90 XX and Dodici Cilindri family deliveries.

"In Q4, a cost base lower than anticipated and a better product mix drove us to exceed our 2025 guidance. The cost base were further improved by an R&D government grant received before year-end and the reduced racing expenses related to the fourth position in the Formula 1, 2025 championship ranking." — Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

Quality of the Beat

Revenue Assessment

FY revenue of €7,146M grew 7% as-reported and 8% at constant currency, with the Q4 +4% / +6% CC step coming in below the 9M +8.2% pace exactly as management telegraphed. The composition is what matters: cars-and-spare-parts FY revenue at €6,005M (+5%) absorbed the Daytona SP3 phase-out without giving back trajectory; sponsorship-commercial-brand at €820M (+22%) outgrew the headline; Other at €321M (+15%) reflected financial services, the Mugello track, and F1 engine rentals. The FY mix shift continued: sponsorship-commercial-brand is now 11.5% of FY revenue vs. 10.0% in FY 2024 — a 150bps lift in one year, with the second-place 2024 F1 ranking driving the commercial-revenue line and lifestyle (HP, BingX partnerships, London flagship in 2026) doing the brand piece.

Q4 cars-and-spare-parts revenue was only +1% as-reported and +3% constant-FX — slower than the FY pace and reflective of the deliberate model-changeover-driven lower deliveries (-5% YoY units in Q4). But ASP-and-mix-driven growth held: €1,483M Q4 revenue on 3,152 units implies an Q4 ASP of ~€470K/unit (cars + parts), up from ~€443K in Q4 2024 — a +6% ASP-and-personalization lift that contains the volume headwind. SF90 XX and Dodici Cilindri deliveries above plan, plus the first F80 units (high-ASP — €3.6M+ ex-options) landing in the quarter, drove the mix. The F80 contribution is not yet ramped to full — only "a few units" in Q4 per Vigna — but the unit-level ASP signal is clear.

Margins Assessment

FY 2025 EBIT margin of 29.5% (+120bps YoY) is the most consequential single number on the page. Management absorbed the full-year tariff drag (~50-100bps headwind for a US-heavy luxury exporter), the Japanese-yen weakness, the F1 cost-cap increase, and the R&D step-up — and still expanded EBIT margin by 120bps. The CFO's bridge: "mix and price was visibly positive, thanks to product and country mix, supported by Americas, increased personalization and higher sales of the 499P Modificata" and "industrial costs and D&A were both lower." The "industrial costs lower" line is the structural read — Ferrari is leveraging its own innovation in manufacturing (the e-building, the new paint shop coming online, e-Vortex test track now operational) to bend the cost curve down even as volume holds flat.

Q4 specifically printed 28.5% EBIT margin vs. 27.0% in Q4 2024 — a +150bps lift, of which roughly half is the R&D government grant and lower F1 racing spend (non-recurring), and roughly half is structural product mix. The structural Q4 margin of ~27.5-28.0% still represents +50-100bps of YoY expansion — clean operational improvement absorbing tariff drag without giving back trajectory. The 2026 guide of ≥29.5% EBIT margin is flat to FY 2025 because the non-recurring Q4 tailwinds do not roll forward and because the 2026 FX headwind is meaningful (~€200M EBIT drag from EUR/USD at 1.20 vs. average 2025 hedges built at ~1.05) — both of which are sized, transparent headwinds in management's bridge.

EPS Assessment

FY 2025 adjusted diluted EPS of €8.96 vs. €8.46 in 2024 is +6% YoY against +12% EBIT growth — the EPS-vs-EBIT gap reflects (1) higher net financial expenses (€46M vs. -€1M in 2024 = €47M YoY headwind on USD-treasury FX impact) and (2) effective tax rate of 22.5% vs. 19.2% in 2024 (the Patent Box catch-up benefit normalized through the rate). Share count of 178.3M diluted vs. 180.0M in 2024 — the €2B program completion contributed roughly 100bps of EPS support but cannot replicate that pace in 2026 without a new program — which now exists in the form of the €3.5B multi-year through 2030.

The FY 2026 EPS guide of ≥€9.45 represents +5.5% YoY at the floor — but the implicit math gets richer. With the €3.5B buyback program through 2030 averaging ~€583M/yr (assuming linear), the FY 2026 share count would average ~177.3-177.7M diluted (vs. 178.3M FY 2025), contributing ~30-50bps of EPS support. The EBIT-driven portion of the €9.45 guide is therefore +€0.40-€0.45 of growth above the FY 2025 €8.96 base — consistent with +6-8% adjusted EBIT growth (guide ≥€2.22B vs. €2.110B = +5.2% floor) layered with a slightly lower ETR (guided ~23.0% vs. FY 2025 22.5% — a modest headwind that's offset by the buyback contribution). The EPS guide is internally consistent with the EBIT guide; both are conservatively set above the post-CMD framework.

Segment Performance — Geographic

Q4 2025 Geographic Mix

EMEA — Steady-State Anchor

Q4 EMEA was flat at exactly 1,550 units (down from 1,449 in Q3 / a Q4-seasonally higher mix), and FY EMEA finished +2% at 6,346 units. EMEA was the only region to print positive FY unit growth, and the absolute volume contribution (46.5% of FY shipments) makes the modest growth meaningful. The composition is consistent with the deliberate allocation framework: Italy, UK (with the deliberate 30% UK shipment reduction noted in Q2 to support residual values), Germany, Switzerland, Middle East. The Q4 EMEA flat-line on a tougher Q4 2024 comp is itself a constructive signal — the home market is absorbing the full model-changeover headwind without giving back unit count.

Assessment: EMEA remains the cleanest read on Ferrari's core European Ferraristi base. The deliberate UK shipment reduction has stabilized UK residual values per Vigna's commentary — "in U.K., the residual value is stabilizing" — and the action is now considered complete with "nothing ongoing from the rest of the world" on similar moves. No demand softness signals in the EMEA composition; the FY +2% growth on top of FY 2024's +1% is the kind of low-volatility positive that the order-book-driven model is supposed to deliver.

Americas — Q4 Volume Steeper Than Q3 Trend

Q4 Americas at 877 units (-8% YoY) was meaningfully weaker than Q3 (-2%) and weaker than the FY pace (-2%). The CFO addressed this directly: "Geographic mix, the Americas going down, has nothing to do with the strength of the demand. It's just model changeover, and you will see it further in 2026." The Q4 step-down reflects the Daytona SP3 phase-out (which had skewed US allocation), the SF90 family running down ahead of the Testarossa family ramp, and Amalfi first US deliveries not yet contributing materially. Total FY Americas of 3,937 units (-2%) is essentially flat — and the FY revenue contribution actually grew on ASP/mix and on the commercial-policy pass-through of the 15% tariff regime.

"Geographic mix, the Americas going down, has nothing to do with the strength of the demand. It's just model changeover, and you will see it further in 2026." — Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

Assessment: The Americas Q4 step-down is changeover-driven, not demand-driven, and management is telegraphing further units-down in 2026 for the same reason. This is the cleanest tell that the 2026 EPS guide of ≥€9.45 is built on flat-to-slightly-down units, with revenue growth coming entirely from mix, ASP, and personalization. Strategically consistent with the post-CMD framework ("more models, fewer volumes" per the Q3 Vigna commentary). The tariff pass-through is working: revenue per US unit is up; unit pace is modestly down; total revenue contribution roughly flat — exactly the luxury-pricing-power thesis prediction. The F80 first units in Q4 (and ramping in 2026) skew US-weighted, which provides natural offset to the broader Americas unit decline.

Mainland China-HK-Taiwan — Q4 Slope Steepened, FY at -19%

The Mainland China-HK-Taiwan region was -36% YoY in Q4 alone (182 vs. 286 units) — a sharper decline than Q3's -12% and the steepest single-quarter print of the year. FY total at 941 units (-19% / -221 units) was below the implied Q3 trajectory. Mainland China alone (the subset within the region) was likely ~120-150 units in Q4 against ~190 in Q4 2024 — a continued deterioration of the slope, with no qualitative inflection language from management on the Q4 call. The Amalfi-as-China-strategic-response remains the operationally credible play; the first Amalfi China deliveries (Vigna in Q3 noted Oct 21 deliveries to "young female client younger than 40 years old") are encouraging but small.

The broader luxury-China picture remains weak — LVMH and Kering both continued to report soft China in their late-January / early-February 2026 prints; Hermès Q4 print on Feb 5 noted China moderation. Ferrari's relative resilience is structural (small absolute exposure at ~7% of FY units; no inventory in channel; brand equity intact) but the slope has not bent. Vigna's only China-related framing on the Q4 call was on the Amalfi's "new-to-brand" performance — "we see that several clients are coming from some specific brands that like the performance and the elegance of our cars" — and the India opportunity ("the new economic deal between Europe and India is facilitating") as a longer-term offset.

Assessment: The China line is now Q4 -36% and FY -19% — operationally manageable today and asymmetric on the downside. Going from ~7% to ~5% of FY units (the current trajectory) costs ~150-200bps of total revenue; from 5% to 3% costs another ~150bps. The structural protection (deliberate allocation, no channel inventory, brand equity, Amalfi launching as the V8 platform repositioning) means the China line cannot crater the company even at trough levels. The 2026 guide of revenue ~€7.50B (+4% YoY) implicitly assumes Mainland China stays roughly flat-to-down in 2026 — a conservative but defensible assumption given the prevailing luxury-China dynamic. This is a sized, transparent headwind in management's framework; not a thesis-breaker.

Rest of APAC — Quietly Resilient

Rest of APAC was +2% YoY in Q4 at 543 units and +1% for the FY at 2,416 units. The bright-spot quarter was Q3 (+9%), driven by Japan, Australia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand backlog flowing through; Q4 was a more modest contribution but still positive. The "younger Korean buyer of the Testarossa" anecdote from the Q3 call has not generated incremental disclosure on the Q4 call, but the steady positive contribution suggests the Asia-ex-China repositioning is working without requiring further management air-time.

Assessment: Rest of APAC remains the structural offset to Mainland China weakness. The demographic angle (younger buyers, women) is a long-term franchise positive; the absolute volume is now ~18% of FY shipments (up from ~17% in FY 2024) — a meaningful re-mix away from Mainland China-anchored Asia toward the diversified Rest of APAC. The trajectory holds.

Segment Performance — Revenue Category

Q4 2025 and FY 2025 Revenue Categories

Cars and Spare Parts — Q4 Slowdown is Volume-Driven, FY Holds

FY cars-and-spare-parts revenue of €6,005M (+5% / +6% CC) is the headline number for the operating engine — the line that the post-CMD ≥€9B 2030 framework implicitly anchors to. The Q4 specifically was +1% / +3% CC, the slowest single-quarter of the year, reflecting the -5% unit decline and the highest concentration of model-changeover phase-outs (Daytona SP3 complete, SF90 family winding down, F80 not yet ramped). Within the FY line, personalization held at ~20% of cars-and-spare-parts revenue, sustained even through the Daytona SP3 phase-out, which had been the highest-personalization vehicle in the lineup. The CFO confirmed: "Personalizations are currently expected to stay around 20% of cars and spare parts revenues."

The spare-parts piece of the line is a subtle but structural positive. Vigna explicitly called this out on the Q4 call: "There was also a clear trend of our clients to use more of the cars." Spare-parts revenue scales with active fleet utilization — and as the installed Ferrari fleet grows (a one-way function of cumulative deliveries), spare-parts revenue compounds even in flat-volume years. Management declined to disclose the spare-parts revenue subcomponent (per the CEO: "It's a good try, Anthony, but we don't share this detail") but the FY +5% in the combined line, despite -1% units, is partially attributable to spare-parts growth above the cars-only growth rate.

Assessment: Q4 +1% cars revenue is the cleanest single-quarter stress test of the algorithm — flat volume, full model changeover, Daytona phase-out, F80 not yet ramped — and it still printed positive growth at constant currency. The FY +5% growth on -1% units (implied ASP-mix-personalization of +6%) is exactly the algorithm the post-CMD ≥€9B 2030 framework requires. The 2026 guide of revenue ~€7.50B (+5% YoY) implies cars-and-spare-parts of roughly €6,300M (+5%) — consistent with continued ASP-and-mix growth on flat-to-down volume. The F80 will be a meaningful 2026 contribution (full year of ramp vs. only "a few units" in Q4 2025) — this is structural margin support for 2026-2028.

Sponsorship, Commercial and Brand — FY +22% Maintained

The sponsorship-commercial-brand line printed +17% YoY in Q4 (€213M from €183M) and +22% / +23% CC for the FY (€820M from €670M). The FY composition: higher sponsorship revenue (HP title sponsor, multi-year extensions, BingX crypto partnership effective Jan 1 2026), commercial revenue lift from the 2024 F1 second-place ranking, and lifestyle growth (London flagship store opening H1 2026, New York flagship opening H2 2026 per the Q4 prepared remarks). The "Brand" piece — lifestyle collections, licensing, museum experiences (Maranello and Modena welcomed ~900,000 visitors in 2025, a new record per Vigna) — continues to scale.

The 2026 outlook on this line is more nuanced than the 2025 trajectory suggests. The 2025 F1 finish was fourth-place (vs. second in 2024) — and the F1 commercial-revenue distribution flows to teams based on the prior year's ranking. The 2026 commercial-revenue line therefore steps down on the F1 line (a ~€30-50M headwind that we flagged in the Q3 recap and that is now confirmed) but is offset by continued sponsorship growth and lifestyle scale-up. The CFO confirmed: "Also sitting in 2026, we expect, as I mentioned before, to have a further support to revenues and EBIT growth" from this line — net positive growth, but a slower clip than 2025's +22%.

Assessment: This line is structurally high-margin and continues to do the work of taking the total revenue growth rate above what cars-and-spare-parts alone would deliver. The FY 11.5% revenue contribution (up from 10.0% in FY 2024 = 150bps lift) is structurally durable. 2026 will see growth moderate to a high-single-digit pace (vs. 2025's +22%) due to the F1 fourth-place ranking, but the longer-term lifestyle expansion path (London + New York flagships, BingX, continued licensing) more than offsets on a multi-year basis. The post-CMD ≥€9B 2030 framework increasingly depends on this line continuing to scale — and 2025 demonstrated the operating capacity is there.

Other — Strong FY +15%

€321M FY (+15%) and €106M Q4 (+29%) — mostly financial services, the Mugello racetrack, and F1 engine rentals to customer teams. The 2024 base no longer includes the Maserati engine-sales contribution, which exited in 2024 — so the underlying growth on a clean-base comparison is even cleaner than the headline +15% suggests. The 499P Modificata (the XX-program version of the WEC-winning 499P hypercar) is captured in this line via parts/service fees, and the FY 2025 contribution was meaningful per management's mix commentary.

Assessment: Small line, not a thesis lever, but a clean steady-state read. Note: the 2026 guide implicitly assumes a step-down in 499P Modificata deliveries (CFO: "Just have in mind for next year that will lower the number of 499P Modificata, in 2026, and this is in our numbers compared to 2025") — this is a small drag inside the 2026 framework, sized within Other.

Model Mix & Shipments — The Largest Changeover in Ferrari's Listed History

FY 2025 marked the operational midpoint of the largest model changeover in Ferrari's listed history. Six new models were launched in the year: 296 Speciale, 296 Speciale A (Aperta), Amalfi, 849 Testarossa Coupe, 849 Testarossa Spider, and the Ferrari Luce (first reveal phase Oct 9 CMD; second reveal phase Feb 9 2026 in San Francisco showing the interior; third and final reveal Rome, May 25, 2026). The Daytona SP3 completed its limited-run cycle in Q3; the F80 began first deliveries in Q4 ("a few units, ended in the hand of customers all over the world" per Vigna).

Vigna's framing of the changeover scale on the Q4 call: "This year, we have 7 new models, a record number, which entered the production and distribution phases and will shape the pace of our deliveries and their geographic allocation throughout 2026." The 35%-of-lineup-in-ramp-phase metric flagged on the Q3 call has been operationally executed; the F80 production ramp is the single largest 2026 contribution variable.

Powertrain Mix — Hybrid Share at Multi-Year Low (Cycle, Not Demand)

The Q4 hybrid share was the lowest in 2-3 years per analyst question on the call. Management's framing — repeated and emphatic — was that this is delivery-cycle mechanics, not demand. The hybrid platforms in production are winding down (296 GTB family completing; SF90 family running down ahead of Testarossa ramp); the new hybrid launches (Testarossa family, 296 Speciale family) are not yet in serial production volume. The 2026 mix will look very different: Testarossa family ramping, 296 Speciale ramping, Amalfi ICE in volume, F80 hybrid V12 ramping — the hybrid share will rebuild through 2026.

The CMD-set 2030 powertrain mix of 40/40/20 (ICE/hybrid/BEV) — versus the 2022 plan of 20/40/40 — was reaffirmed on the Q4 call. An analyst question on whether the EU CO2-regulation moderation (proposal in December 2025 to relax targets) would shift the plan drew an explicit "no change" from Vigna: "As of now, there is no change in terms of regulation for us... we did not change anything on our plans. So we stick to the plan that we have been showing with you." A second question on whether the company would change the 40/40/20 split if demand turned more positively toward ICE drew the more nuanced answer: "We may review in '28, maybe we see... we are a company that is the big benefit to have a small, agile and nimble... we are nimble, and we are adapting to what is coming."

"Today, the visibility we have is 40-40-20. This is the split in terms of product offering. If something will happen, I think we are a company that is the big benefit to have a small, agile and nimble... and then we may review in '28, maybe we see... when the situation is changing, when the things are uncertain, the company has been always showing in the past that we are nimble, and we are adapting to what is coming. At the end of the story, at the center of what we do, there is only one thing, the client." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: The CMD's powertrain framework holds, with explicit optionality to revisit in 2028 if demand patterns shift. The "client at the center" framing is consistent with the "addition, not transition" electrification posture established at the CMD. Operationally, this is the right strategic posture — follow demand, preserve optionality, don't overcommit BEV capex against soft demand. The 2025 hybrid-share dip is mechanical and reverses in 2026 as the Testarossa family enters volume.

FY 2026 Initial Guidance — The Real News in the Print

This is the section the print turns on. The FY 2026 initial guidance is the first formal commitment management has made to specific 2026 numbers — the post-CMD framework on Oct 9 implied 2026 in directional terms (2026 EPS framework ~€8.80-€9.00) but did not commit. The Q4 print delivered the formal commitment, and it lands materially above the post-CMD implied framework.

Where the 2026 Guide Lands vs. the Post-CMD Framework

The €9.45 EPS floor is the single most material upside surprise in the print. The post-CMD framework on Oct 9 had implied 2026 EPS of ~€8.80-€9.00 (the math being: 2030 EPS framework + the linear interpolation between 2025 base and 2030 floor). The €9.45 floor sits ~5-7% above that band — meaning management is implicitly raising the 2030 trajectory as well, or at minimum confirming that the 2030 framework's linearity is conservative on the near-term path.

The composition of the €9.45 vs. €8.96 (+€0.49) growth: roughly €0.40-€0.45 from EBIT growth (+€110M floor on ≥€2.22B guide), partially offset by a ~50bps ETR drift (~23.0% guided vs. 22.5% 2025 actual) and partially supported by the share-count reduction from the new €3.5B buyback (~30-50bps EPS support assuming linear execution). The math is internally consistent — and the EBIT-driven portion is the structural read.

Why Margin Guidance Is Flat at ≥29.5% Despite Top-Line Growth

The flat-EBIT-margin guide (≥29.5% in 2026 vs. 29.5% in 2025) initially reads as a deceleration in margin expansion — and was the second-most-cited bear point in the post-print reaction. The full bridge management provided:

• Mix and price: positive contribution — F80 ramp at full year (vs. only "a few units" in Q4 2025), Testarossa family ramp, Amalfi ramp. Mix "stronger in H2 2026 vs. H2 2025" per the CFO.
• Personalization: ~20% maintained — flat as a percentage of cars revenue, but absolute personalization revenue grows with cars revenue.
• Sponsorship and racing revenues: continued growth — sponsorship growth, lifestyle scaling. F1 commercial-distribution step-down (2025 ranking 4th vs. 2024 ranking 2nd) is a headwind in the line.
• Industrial costs and D&A: higher — increasing D&A in line with start of production of new models; F1 cost-cap step-up (financial regulation increases for 2026); racing R&D for the new 2026 F1 technical regulation.
• SG&A: higher — higher brand investments, racing and digital transformation expenses, lifestyle retail network expansion (London + New York flagships).
• FX headwind: ~€200M EBIT drag — EUR/USD assumed at 1.20 (vs. ~1.05-1.08 effective rate in 2025 after hedges), the roll-off of favorable hedges that had been built at lower spot rates, and JPY weakness.

Net: top-line growth of +5% drives ~€110M of EBIT growth (≥€2.22B vs. €2.110B), but the €200M FX headwind alone is essentially a 280bps drag on the margin line that has to be offset by mix, lower industrial costs, and operating leverage. Hold the margin flat at 29.5% under those conditions is itself a strong operational outcome.

"Based on the assumptions I outlined before, meaning with the U.S. dollar at 120 against the euro and with the current spot rate for the Japanese yen, we are assuming, as of now, considering the hedges that we have in place that we have built over the last 12 months on a rolling basis to have a headwind of about EUR 200 million that are already in the numbers we have been giving to you." — Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

Is 2026 "the Toughest Year"? Vigna's Direct Rebuttal

An analyst question framed 2026 as "the toughest year in the plan" — citing the F80 not yet at full ramp, model changeovers, F1 cost inflation, and FX headwinds. Vigna's response was direct: "I think that what we have been always saying, and Antonio was very clear also in his part in the presentation of Capital Market Day that the business plan is stable and linear. So Mike, don't take this hypothesis that 2026 is the toughest year in the plan. 2026 is a year of growth. Remember this."

That is a meaningful framing. The plan is "stable and linear" — not back-end-loaded, not built on a 2028-2030 hockey stick. Management is explicitly disclaiming the typical mid-plan "let us get through 2026" framing that bear arguments often rely on. Combined with the explicit "do not change the visibility given on October 9 after only 4 months" stance (in response to an analyst question on whether the 2030 framework should be revisited upward given the 2026 outperformance), the disciplined-floor framing is reinforced.

"When we gave the visibility for 2030, we gave visibility after 60 months. If I go from October 9 until February 10, it's only 4 months. So if we change visibility because 4 months are gone after 60 — in your shoes, I would be worried. So we stick to what we gave you on October 9, and we feel comfortable about the number that we shared with you at that time." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: The framework is being treated as a floor by management — confirmed by the +5-7% upside in the 2026 EPS guide vs. post-CMD-implied — but management is explicitly refusing to be drawn into raising the 2030 long-range numbers after only 4 months. This is the disciplined-execution posture the Q3 thesis depended on: deliver above the framework, but refuse to overcommit to the upside. The "stable and linear" framing implicitly rejects the bear argument that 2026 is the easy year ahead of a tougher 2028-2030 stretch.

Industrial Free Cash Flow & Capital Return

FY 2025 industrial FCF of €1,538M is the strongest in Ferrari's listed history, +50% vs. FY 2024 — and €238M above the post-CMD raised floor of ≥€1.30B. The drivers per the CFO: increased profitability, a positive working-capital change driven by collection of F80 advances, partially offset by capex focused on the new paint shop, the completion of the e-Vortex test track, and Patent Box-related tax payment timing. Q4 alone delivered €321M (+46% YoY), the strongest single quarter of the year.

Capex finished at €943M (vs. €989M in FY 2024 — consistent with the "more contained" framing the company had telegraphed). The 2026 capex guide is "slightly higher" per the CFO — likely in the €950-1,000M range as the new paint shop completes and Elettrica industrialization scales. The working-capital story flips: the F80 advance collections that benefited 2025 do not repeat in 2026 ("net working capital, we expect it to be more neutral compared to 2025, because this year, we had the very important impact of the advances collected on the F80" — CFO). The 2026 FCF guide of ≥€1.50B therefore implies the profitability lift offsets the working-capital normalization — a tight but achievable framework given the +€110M EBIT growth and modestly higher capex.

The €3.5B Multi-Year Buyback — Now Operational

The €2B program (announced 2022) completed on schedule. The new €3.5B multi-year program announced at the Oct 9 CMD is now operational. First tranche of up to €250M started Jan 5, 2026, expected to be completed by May 15, 2026; €72.7M / 246,350 shares purchased through Feb 6, 2026. Treasury holdings stand at 16,890,956 common shares (9.16% of issued capital) — significant inventory for ongoing capital return.

FY 2025 total shareholder return: €1.3B+ (dividends + share repurchases) — the highest absolute capital return in Ferrari's listed history, up roughly 30% from FY 2024. Net industrial debt finished at just €32M (vs. €180M at year-end 2024, €116M at Sept 30 2025) — the buyback and dividend were funded entirely from organic FCF with leverage actually declining.

Assessment: The capital-return continuity that we flagged as the Q3 open question ("no commitment to a new program for 2026+") has now been resolved with the €3.5B / 5-year program. At ~€700M/year average pace (€3.5B / 5 years), combined with ~€600-700M/year of expected dividends, the structural capital-return commitment is approximately €1.3-1.4B/year — roughly matching the current FCF generation, meaning Ferrari has positioned itself to return essentially 100% of organic FCF to shareholders through 2030 while still funding the capex envelope. This is the cleanest capital-allocation framework in luxury autos, and a structural pillar of the post-CMD thesis.

Key Topics & Management Commentary

Overall Management Tone: Confident throughout, with a notable absence of post-CMD defensiveness. The print delivered the operational evidence the Q3 call had teed up, and management's posture reflects that — direct rebuttal of the "2026 is the toughest year" framing, refusal to raise 2030 numbers after only four months, and explicit framing of the plan as "stable and linear" rather than back-end loaded. The tone is the most assured of the past four quarters and the second-most-confident reading we've seen across the entire Q2-Q3-Q4 arc (only the Q2 pre-CMD print was more confident, and that was on a different valuation base).

1. The Ferrari Luce — Second Reveal Lands; Rome Premier May 25, 2026

The Ferrari Luce — the BEV that the post-CMD bear case had argued was the binary downside — has now completed its second reveal phase on schedule. The Feb 9 San Francisco unveil showed the interior design and confirmed the name (Ferrari Luce, not "Elettrica" as originally referenced); Rome on May 25, 2026 is now the world premiere of the complete car. The press response from the SF unveil was strongly positive per Vigna: "you have blown all of us away, and you couldn't have selected a better name for this car and a better place for it." Pricing remains undisclosed — to be revealed at the May 25 complete-car premiere consistent with the established multi-step Icona/halo rollout cadence.

"We selected Rome, May 25, as the day for the final reveal of Ferrari Luce, as on the same day in 1947, the Ferrari 125 S, the first Ferrari of our founder, secured its first victory with driver Franco Cortese." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

An analyst question on whether the Luce will be a "specials" car (limited run) or a "range" model (volume production) drew a deliberately oblique answer from Vigna — but the implication, combined with the Q3 CMD framework of 20% BEV by 2030, is that the Luce is the volume ramp of the BEV platform, with 4,000-5,000 annual run-rate units by late-decade. Vigna's framing on client positioning was emphatic: "We will not sell this car to people that do not want the car... We will never force our client that to have, let's say, 849 Testarossa or whatever is going to be called the next car, they have to buy an electric car."

Assessment: The Luce program is tracking the established multi-step rollout cadence (Oct 9 technology reveal → Feb 9 interior reveal → May 25 complete-car reveal → late 2026/2027 first deliveries). The October 9 reveal — the binary downside — is past; from here, each subsequent disclosure can incrementally support the narrative without the kind of asymmetric risk the CMD presented. The "client at center; not force the car on anyone" framing is the right strategic positioning, and the deliberate exclusivity language (offered to clients who want it) preserves brand equity even if the volume ramp is gradual. Feb 9 SF reveal was a quiet positive; Q2 2026 Rome reveal is the next narrative inflection.

2. Order Book — "Extends Towards the End of 2027"

The order-book language tightened from Q3's "extends well into 2027" to Q4's "extends towards the end of 2027." The phrasing tighten — "well into 2027" to "towards the end of 2027" — is structurally constructive. The 296 Speciale family, the Testarossa family, and the Amalfi are the lead order-intake drivers.

"The momentum for our brand remains strong with a solid order book, which extends towards the end of 2027 and the net order intake supporting further visibility, notwithstanding the persistent uncertainty in the global environment." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

An analyst question on whether the order book "seems shorter" than prior quarters' framing — and whether the e-building's added flexibility is letting Ferrari deliver faster — drew a direct rebuttal. The CEO confirmed the book is strong and that the e-building's added capacity is specifically for personalization swings, not for accelerating production cadence. The Purosangue early-launch personalization-capacity shortfall (which had been an issue in 2024) is the explicit precedent — the e-building ensures that won't repeat.

Assessment: The book is strengthening at the back-end of the visibility window — from "well into 2027" to "end of 2027" suggests intake is filling 2027 toward late-2027 deliveries, which is the cleanest possible operational signal for the multi-year revenue framework. The 296 Speciale is "nearly reaching full coverage of the life cycle" (effectively sold out before serial production starts) per Q3 framing, which was reaffirmed implicitly in Q4. Combined with strong Testarossa family early reception and the 40%-new-to-brand Amalfi intake, the order-intake quality is strong. Next data point to watch: Q1 2026 framing — does the book extend into "2028"?

3. F80 — First Deliveries in Q4; 3-Year Ramp Pattern Holds

The F80 hypercar (€3.6M+ ex-options, 799-unit total program) made its first deliveries in Q4 2025 as planned. Vigna confirmed deliveries to clients in Asia, US, UK, and Middle East, but declined to disclose the specific Q4 unit count. An analyst estimate suggested ~20-30 units in Q4 based on the supercar/Icona percentage of total shipments, consistent with the 3-year program ramp pattern (per Q3 framing).

"I would like to underline one point, one, we started the production as planned. Two, we shipped a few units in Q4, and this unit ended in the hand of customers all over the world. But we don't want to be specific to tell how many units have been shipped." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

An analyst applied the math: if supercars/Icona ran ~1% of overall shipments (Vigna's framing) and Daytona contributed ~177 units in 2025 (its final-year limited-run total), the F80 contribution in Q4 was ~20-30 units. The 3-year program lifecycle (per Q3 commentary, reaffirmed) implies ~200-260 units per year for the F80 — a meaningful structural margin support for 2026-2028.

Assessment: The F80 ramp is on plan and the 3-year ramp pattern confirms the program is structural margin support across 2026-2028 rather than a concentrated 2026 contribution. The 2026 EPS guide of ≥€9.45 implicitly assumes meaningful but not full-year F80 contribution; 2027 and 2028 receive incrementally more F80 contribution as the ramp matures. Operationally clean.

4. The Amalfi — Continued Strong New-Client Acquisition

The Amalfi (succeeding the Roma at the entry-V8 platform) continues to deliver strong new-to-brand intake. Vigna disclosed on the Q4 call: "In order book, more than 50% of the new clients — of the — sorry, 40% of the people that want to buy the Amalfi are coming new to the brand." First China deliveries already happening — first two Amalfi deliveries to Chinese clients on Oct 21, 2025 per the Q3 call, with continued positive intake through Q4. The new-to-brand mix at 40% is a structurally important client-acquisition signal.

"For the Amalfi, we see a new client new to the brand, approaching us. So we have done a deep analysis and we see that several clients are coming from some specific brands that like the performance and the elegance of our cars." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

The geographic distribution of Amalfi orders depends on when the car has been physically shown in each country: "Where the country has been already shown the car... when you see in reality the car, and this is true for all the car we make is much different than when you see on the display." The Amalfi is rolling out on a delayed cadence across geographies, with EMEA leading, Americas in mid-2026, and China/Asia later in 2026.

Assessment: The Amalfi is doing exactly what the V8-platform strategy intended — bringing new clients into the Ferrari ecosystem at the entry-luxury price point. The 40%-new-to-brand intake on the entry-V8 platform is the structural growth lever that extends the addressable Ferrari client base over a 5-10 year horizon. This is the single cleanest operational positive across the entire Q4 print — and it's the metric that justifies the post-CMD ≥€9B 2030 revenue framework being treated as a floor rather than a ceiling. If the Amalfi continues to draw 40% new-to-brand at scale, the 2030 framework has structural upside that has not yet been priced.

5. Personalization — 20% Sustained; CFO Commentary on the 19% Plan Assumption

Personalization revenue held at ~20% of cars-and-spare-parts revenue in 2025, sustained even through the Daytona SP3 phase-out. The CFO confirmed: "Personalizations are currently expected to stay around 20% of cars and spare parts revenues." The drivers in 2025: SF90 XX family (carbon and special paint adoption), the Purosangue, and the F80 at the high end.

An analyst asked specifically about the 20% vs. the 19% long-term planning assumption mentioned at the CMD. The CFO's framing was nuanced: "Personalization, as we repeatedly mentioned, is usually finalized 4 to 5 months before delivery of the car. So it's quite normal that we adjust as we see it. That's why if you compare, for example, the 20% we are giving you as a guidance, now we would be 19% we may have mentioned previously, maybe see a difference."

The implication: the 19% planning assumption embedded in the CMD framework was deliberately conservative, and the 20% run-rate has structural upside if it holds. Vigna added a strategic constraint: "For some personalized items, we don't want to go beyond a limit also because we have always in mind that this story of exclusivity. There are some specific personalization items that is through increasing capacity, but there are some models that we don't want to personalize all with this. Otherwise, we'll be not any more personalized or special."

Assessment: Personalization at 20% is structurally durable and above the CMD planning assumption of 19% — meaning the 2030 framework has implicit margin and revenue buffer if the 20% holds. The deliberate strategic limit on certain personalization categories (preserving exclusivity) is the right brand-equity posture. Note: the personalization-as-share metric depends on the denominator (cars-revenue) — as the lineup mix shifts toward higher-ASP models (F80, Testarossa family, eventually Luce), the absolute personalization-revenue contribution should grow even if the % share is steady or modestly down. This remains the highest-margin revenue line in the company.

6. FX Headwind — €200M EBIT Drag, Hedge-Roll the Driver

The 2026 FX headwind of ~€200M EBIT is the largest single bridge item against the operating leverage. The driver is partly the spot rate (EUR/USD assumption at 1.20 vs. effective 2025 rate of ~1.10-1.13 after hedges) and partly the roll-off of favorable hedges that had been built at ~1.05 levels in 2024. The CFO confirmed: "Compared to 2025... the hedging piece is a greater negative impact than just the FX rates."

"When we look at 2026, we do not have the benefit of hedges put in place at that rate at the time it was 105 or in that region. Now in Asia during the course of this year, we've been starting building position from 115 on in terms of [hedges]. So the impact is clearly much more negative." — Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

The hedging methodology — building positions on a rolling 12-month basis — means the 2025 hedge book benefited from 2024 placements at favorable rates that are now expiring. The 2026 hedge book is being built at the prevailing 1.15-1.20 spot range, locking in a structurally weaker EUR/USD than the prior year's protection. Management has not assumed any pricing pass-through of the FX headwind ("Is the flexibility that we have contractually, we haven't assumed to use it in the numbers we gave you") — i.e., the €200M EBIT drag is in the guide without any offsetting US price increase.

Assessment: The €200M FX drag is the most identifiable conservative element of the 2026 guide. Two ways it can over-deliver: (1) actual EUR/USD spot strengthens back toward 1.10-1.15 through 2026, reducing the realized drag; (2) Ferrari pulls the US-pricing lever (a 2-3% US list-price increase, similar to what was done in 2025 around the tariffs) and partially offsets the headwind without compromising demand. The contractual flexibility is in place; management has chosen not to assume it in the guide. This is exactly the kind of conservative-framing pattern that supports the "floor, not ceiling" thesis.

7. Residual Values — UK Stabilized; No Action Elsewhere

An analyst pressed on whether the residual-value concerns that had driven the UK shipment reduction in Q2 2025 are creating similar issues in other geographies. Vigna's answer was direct: "In U.K., the residual value is stabilizing also because we reduced the number of cars we gave in that part of the world. And this is the action basically that was put in place. It's nothing new on this front... No, the action was specific to U.K. There is nothing ongoing from the rest of the world."

The broader residual-value framing from Vigna: "The residual value is stable and solid. We said that already that the U.K., the residual value is stabilizing... We see the strength of this confidence... in the second part of the year, there has been even a strengthening of it because there's a lot of innovation coming with different products." Recent collector auctions delivered strong valuations per management — a structural validation of the brand-equity premium.

Assessment: The UK-specific residual-value action is complete and working; no broader residual-value risk has surfaced across the rest of the geographic footprint. Vigna's "strength of confidence... even strengthening" framing is the most direct articulation of dealer-channel health we've heard across the four-quarter arc. The brand-equity premium that the Ferrari listed thesis depends on remains intact and arguably strengthening as the new-model cohort delivers.

8. India — A Long-Range Optionality

An analyst surfaced India as a potential offset to Mainland China weakness, given the recent EU-India trade agreement reducing tariffs on European luxury imports. Vigna's framing was directionally positive but pragmatic on the timeline:

"India is an opportunity. We want to focus more and more over there. Clearly, it will take some time. Clearly, the new economic deal between Europe and India is facilitating. But to develop a market — it is not something that you go from one day to another." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: India is a 5-10-year addressable-market optionality, not a 2026-2027 contribution. The right strategic posture (build the dealer infrastructure, the personalization framework, the brand events) takes years — and Ferrari is properly framing it as a multi-year build rather than a near-term offset to Mainland China softness. Worth flagging as a 2030+ optionality in the long-range framework; not a near-term thesis lever.

9. F1 — Fourth-Place in 2025; Commercial Headwind into 2026

The Scuderia Ferrari finished fourth in the 2025 F1 Constructors' Championship (vs. second in 2024). This was the source of the "reduced racing expenses" tailwind in Q4 (lower F1 prize money triggers lower cost-share contribution) but also drives the 2026 F1 commercial-distribution headwind. The CFO confirmed the 2026 F1 budget cap step-up is captured in the 2026 guide: "We have put in the numbers... the assumption that we know as of now based on current budget caps, both chassis and power units."

The 2026 F1 season brings a major technical-regulation reset (new power-unit regulations, new chassis package). Vigna's framing on the Q4 call: "We face the challenge posed by the new regulation with unity and confidence in the team. We step into this new phase with a very clear mindset to be realistic, to be disciplined and to improve continuously." The mid-2025 confirmation of Vasseur as team principal through the 2026 reset provides continuity.

Assessment: The 2026 F1 commercial-revenue step-down (~€30-50M headwind from fourth-place 2025 ranking) is now confirmed and captured in the 2026 guide. The 2026 F1 cost-cap step-up is also captured. The 2026 racing-related P&L drag is therefore sized and bounded — no surprise risk on the F1 line for 2026. The 2026 technical-regulation reset creates upside optionality (if Ferrari's chassis-and-power-unit package outperforms, the 2027 commercial revenue ratchets back up); also downside risk if performance lags. This is a known watch-item, properly disclosed.

10. WEC Championship Win — Brand Equity Reinforced

Ferrari won the 2025 FIA World Endurance Championship Manufacturer's and Driver's titles with the 499P hypercar — the first WEC Manufacturer's title for Ferrari in 53 years and only the third year of the 499P program. The financial contribution is modest (WEC commercial economics are vastly smaller than F1) but the brand-equity contribution is meaningful, particularly for client positioning of the 499P Modificata customer program and for the validation of the hybrid hypercar architecture.

"In racing, the 499P hypercar secured us the 2025 FIA World Endurance Championship. Ferrari won both the World Manufacturer's and Driver's titles 53 years after our last World title and after only 3 years since our return to the top class of endurance racing." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: Brand-equity positive. The 499P win extends Ferrari's racing pedigree beyond F1 into hypercar-grade endurance racing, which is the natural narrative fit for the F80 hybrid hypercar program and for the broader brand-as-racing-pedigree positioning. Small absolute revenue impact; meaningful long-term brand-asset accretion.

11. Lifestyle Expansion — London + New York Flagships in 2026

The 2026 lifestyle expansion plan: London flagship store opening H1 2026; New York flagship opening H2 2026. Both are positioned as "immersive backdrops for client activation and designed to further enrich the Ferrari offering of products and experiences" per Vigna's prepared remarks. The Maranello + Modena museums attracted ~900,000 visitors in 2025 — a new record. The BingX crypto-exchange Team Partner announcement (effective Jan 1, 2026) continues the sponsorship-expansion pattern.

Assessment: Lifestyle is the second-largest growth lever (after cars-and-spare-parts) in the post-CMD framework, and 2026 is the year the flagship-store rollout becomes visible. London + New York flagships are highest-impact locations for client engagement and lifestyle-product distribution. The execution is on plan, the brand investments are scaling, and the multi-year lifestyle revenue contribution path (CMD called out a multi-year lifestyle growth path that supports the 2030 ≥€9B revenue floor) is operationally credible. Not a 2026 numeric needle-mover; structurally important for the 2027-2030 arc.

Analyst Q&A Highlights

Is 2026 the Toughest Year of the Plan?

One of the more pointed exchanges concerned whether 2026 should be modeled as "the toughest year in the plan" — given the F80 not yet at full ramp, model changeovers in progress, F1 cost inflation, and the €200M FX headwind. The CEO's response was a direct rejection of the framing: the plan is "stable and linear," not back-end-loaded; 2026 is a "year of growth." This is the most forward-leaning posture the company has taken on the multi-year framework since the CMD.

Q: "I guess the first, sort of touching on what Tom was talking about in terms of 2030. Antonio, when you think about from here to 2030, is 2026 the toughest year in the plan? You don't have the full allocation of F80, you've got lots of model changeovers. You've got F1 cost inflation, you've got FX. Does this — in your mind, is this the toughest year? Or are we looking at something — are you seeing something later on that we're not seeing?"
— Michael Tyndall, HSBC

A: "You said in the first part of your sentence, you gave for granted that 2026 is the toughest year in the plan, and then you may ask a question. I think that what we have been always saying, and Antonio was very clear also in his part in the presentation of Capital Market Day that the business plan is stable and linear. So Mike, don't take this hypothesis that 2026 is the toughest year in the plan. 2026 is a year of growth. Remember this."
— Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: This is the cleanest direct rebuttal of the "back-end-loaded plan" bear argument we've heard across the entire post-CMD arc. The "stable and linear" framing implicitly anchors 2026 as roughly proportionate to 2025 in operational quality — not a transition year, not a tough year, just another step in the framework. Combined with the EPS guide of ≥€9.45 (+5.5% YoY at floor, above the post-CMD-implied trajectory), the 2026 setup is structurally constructive. The exchange validates the Q3 thesis that the CMD framework is a conservative floor.

Why Doesn't the 2026 Outperformance Translate to a 2030 Raise?

Another analyst pressed on whether the 2026 EPS guide of ≥€9.45 — above the post-CMD-implied framework — should imply an upward revision to the 2030 long-range targets. The CEO's response was a direct refusal to adjust the framework after only four months of new data. The disciplined-floor posture is consistent with the multi-year planning philosophy management has articulated at every public touchpoint since the CMD.

Q: "I realize it's a floor, but how should we think about the long-term guidance you guys provided at the October Capital Markets Day. Is it — I mean now more likely you feel you'll exceed that floor? You're calling for 7% EBIT growth for '26. Even with those FX headwinds, the Capital Markets Day called for EBIT growth of 6%."
— Tom Narayan, RBC

A: "Tom, I'll take the second one. When we gave the visibility for 2030, we gave visibility after 60 months. If I go from October 9 until February 10, it's only 4 months. So if we change visibility because 4 months are gone after 60, in your shoes, I would be worried. So we stick to what we gave you on October 9, and we feel comfortable about the number that we shared with you at that time."
— Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: A disciplined answer that simultaneously confirms the framework is conservative AND refuses to commit to upgrading it on early evidence. This is the right posture for a long-range plan — and it preserves the company's ability to ratchet up later if 2026-2027 continue to deliver above-trajectory. From a buy-side perspective, the implicit message is unambiguous: the framework is a floor; outperformance is expected; do not expect the company to formally raise the 2030 numbers until at least 2027 — by which time the cumulative outperformance will be too material to ignore. The "in your shoes I would be worried" framing is a clean signal to bears that the framework was deliberately set as a floor.

F80 Ramp — How Many Q4 Units?

Multiple analysts attempted to pin down the Q4 F80 unit count to model the program contribution to 2026. Management declined to disclose the specific number but confirmed the geographic footprint (Asia, US, UK, Middle East) and the 3-year ramp pattern. An analyst applied the disclosed math (~1% of total shipments for supercars/Icona combined, of which Daytona accounted for ~177 units in 2025) to estimate ~20-30 F80 units in Q4.

Q: "If we look at — you just gave some guidance, you said that supercars and Icona were about 1% of your overall shipments. So if we simply do the maths and even take into account routing errors or something like that, this still takes us maybe potentially to probably at most, 200 units, including, obviously, about 177 of the Daytona SP3. Would that be a correct way of thinking about things?"
— Stephen Reitman, Bernstein

A: "Look, I don't want to comment about specific numbers. I think that the percentage are a good representation of the reality. But I think you know what is the pattern of our supercar and Icona, you can make some assumptions, but I don't want to be specific on the number of cars we shipped and where we are going to ship F80-wise exactly."
— Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: The implied Q4 F80 count of ~20-30 units is roughly consistent with the 3-year ramp pattern. The 2026 contribution will be the first full year of F80 deliveries — likely ~200-260 units at €3.6M+ ex-options each, contributing roughly €750-950M of high-ASP cars revenue with above-fleet-average margin. This is structural margin support for 2026-2028, sized and bounded. Management's refusal to disclose unit-by-unit detail preserves operational flexibility and exclusivity positioning — appropriate for a hypercar program — but the implied math is sufficient to model the contribution.

Personalization at 20% vs. 19% Plan Assumption

The recurring analyst pushback on whether personalization can continue at 20% (vs. the 19% CMD planning assumption) drew nuanced CFO commentary. The personalization-as-share metric depends on both the absolute personalization revenue and the cars-and-spare-parts denominator; the absolute personalization revenue is structurally durable but the share can drift based on mix and timing.

Q: "Given that you don't have a lot of visibility out very far in personalization, but you do assume that it will come down over the course of the plan to 19%. If your answer is just like have some conservatism in the guidance because it's [indiscernible]. Is there something in the baseline that just can't move higher, we have peak carbon fiber? Or is there any — is there something that can't move higher that makes us think that [indiscernible]?"
— Michael Binetti, Evercore ISI

A: "Nothing on the top line, meaning in terms of what we are actually working on personalization to reach it and to be able to serve our clients better and with diversified products. However, even the cars base is different and the level of personalization may depend on the mix of cars and on the side of the revenues from car."
— Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

Assessment: The 19% planning assumption embedded in the CMD framework is below the 2025 run-rate (20%+), and the CFO's framing makes clear there's no structural ceiling on personalization adoption — the share can drift if the cars-revenue base grows faster than personalization spending. From a modeling perspective: the post-CMD framework's 19% planning assumption is conservative; the actual run-rate could hold at 20%+ if Ferrari continues to invest in personalization capacity (the e-building expansion specifically supports this). Implicit margin and revenue buffer in the 2030 framework.

Spare Parts — A New Disclosure Lens

An analyst surfaced a relatively under-discussed line — spare parts within the cars-and-spare-parts revenue category — and asked for the contribution and growth drivers. Management declined to disclose the specific percentage but offered structural color: spare parts revenue grows with installed-fleet utilization, and 2025 saw both price increases and increased usage by clients.

Q: "You also mentioned something else you mentioned that I hadn't heard before with the spare parts business. Could you just remind me actually what that represents for you and what is driving the increase on the spare parts and how relevant it is for your business?"
— Anthony Dick, ODDO BHF

A: "I'll take the second one for the spare part. And the answer when you say what drives the increase of this part is because the people — we have more and more people that are enjoying the car. That are — when you use more of the car, clearly, you need more spare part. So this is the reason why we have an increase in spare part. There was also a price increase last year. But there was also a clear trend of our clients to use more of the cars."
— Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: Spare parts is a structurally underweighted-in-Street-models line. It scales with cumulative installed fleet (a one-way function), benefits from periodic price increases, and is high-margin (no manufacturing-cycle complexity). As Ferrari's installed fleet has grown over the listed history — and as personalization adoption means more high-content vehicles in the field generating spare-parts demand — the spare-parts contribution should compound at above-cars-revenue rates. The fact that management surfaced this on the Q4 call is itself a signal that this line is meaningful enough to call out. Structural positive that has not yet been reflected in most Street models.

The Shape of the Plan — Is the Margin Trajectory Steeper Than Modeled?

One analyst pushed directly on the shape of the multi-year plan: the company is guiding to 29.5% EBIT margin in 2026 against a 2030 framework of >30% — implying a roughly +50bps margin trajectory over four years. Given the 2025 outperformance and the 20% personalization run-rate, is the trajectory actually steeper than the CMD's straight-line implication? The CEO's answer was a thoughtful refusal to commit to a shape-of-the-curve adjustment after only four months.

Q: "I was hoping to come back to the shape of the plan through to 2030 again. I'm just conscious that you're guiding about 29.5 now, the guide for 2030 is above 30. I'm just wondering what you're seeing in the back half of the plan because of the top line growth keeps on coming through, I suppose, already through the operating leverage, we would expect to be above. So I think you're now seeing 20% personalization in '26. I think you might have expected that to decline a little bit sooner? Is it most debt and the high sensitivity to personalization because you still think that's going to go down closer to 19 or something like that later on in the plan?"
— Henning Cosman, Barclays

A: "When it comes to the shape of the plan, I think I understand what you are saying and also other colleague of yours has been asking us before. But I believe it's important that a company is consistent and it's — it delivers a result with focus and discipline. As I said before to the colleague, if after 4 months, we changed the target that we set for 60 months — and I agree with you, we gave a threshold — well, I think that we wouldn't be consistent. I think that what we have shared with you is what we believe is a threshold that we can deliver to you with confidence... let us work, we focus on discipline. And then if — when we have to change, for sure, it is not after a few quarters."
— Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: A consistent message across multiple framework-questioning exchanges: the post-CMD targets are a conservative threshold; outperformance is expected; management will not adjust the multi-year framework on early data. For buy-side modeling: assume the 2030 framework is a floor, model the operational trajectory above it, but do not expect formal management revisions until at least 2027 quarterly cadence. The discipline of the response is itself a constructive signal — it preserves the floor while implicitly confirming the trajectory is at-or-above.

What They're NOT Saying

1. Specific F80 Q4 unit count: Vigna explicitly refused to disclose the Q4 F80 number, despite multiple analyst attempts. Estimation from the disclosed 1% supercar/Icona share implies ~20-30 units — modest but not zero. The 2026 contribution is the more important variable, and that's also undisclosed in specifics.
2. Spare parts revenue contribution: Vigna confirmed spare parts is a growing component of the cars-and-spare-parts line but declined to disclose the specific percentage. The line is structurally durable and high-margin; the lack of disclosure preserves competitive optionality.
3. Ferrari Luce pricing: Pricing remains undisclosed pending the May 25 Rome reveal. Press reports have speculated €500-600K positioning; management has not confirmed any range. The pricing-disclosure moment is the next major narrative event for the BEV program.
4. Ferrari Luce annual volume target: Vigna declined to commit to a specific Luce annual run-rate, framing it as a deliberate exclusivity choice rather than a forced-volume program. The 2030 ≥20% BEV mix implies ~4,000-5,000 units/year by end of decade at full scale, but the ramp curve is undisclosed.
5. 2026 quarterly cadence specifics: The CFO explicitly declined to provide H1/H2 guidance breakdown: "The level of detail as of now. We'll see as we go." Mix is "stronger in H2" was the only directional color.
6. 2026 capex absolute figure: "Slightly higher" than 2025's €943M — implied range €950-1,000M. Specific number undisclosed; the Elettrica industrialization and paint-shop completion are the major capex items.
7. Mainland China recovery timeline: -36% Q4 / -19% FY for the region, with no qualitative inflection language. The Amalfi is the strategic response; recovery timing not committed.
8. Working capital reversal magnitude: The 2025 F80-advance-driven working capital tailwind reverses in 2026 to "more neutral" — but management did not size the reversal magnitude. Implicit in the ≥€1.50B FCF guide that the profitability lift offsets the working-capital normalization, but the exact swing is undisclosed.
9. BingX partnership financial contribution: The new Team Partner is effective Jan 1, 2026 but the sponsorship contribution dollar value is not disclosed.
10. Direct 2030 framework revision: Despite multiple analyst attempts, management refused to revise the Oct 9 framework upward. The implicit signal is that the framework was set conservatively and outperformance is expected — but no formal revision is committed.
11. 2026 R&D government grant continuation: The 2025 Q4 R&D grant was disclosed as related to a 2022 development contract; management confirmed "yes, there will be other grants expected in future years" but did not size the 2026 contribution.
12. 2025 H2 mix variance specific magnitude: The CFO confirmed the mix was "slightly better" than initially anticipated in H2 but did not provide the specific dollar magnitude beyond directional commentary.

Market Reaction

• Pre-print setup (NYSE RACE, Feb 9 close): RACE entered the Feb 10 print at approximately $485, having gained ~24% from the Nov 4 Q3 close of ~$395. Trailing 30-day was +9.5%; YTD 2026 +12%; trailing 12-month +8.5%; market cap ~$87B. The stock had quietly recovered most of the CMD-driven drawdown through January and early February on broader luxury-complex strength (Hermès Feb 5 well-received; LVMH Jan 24 well-received) and Ferrari-specific positives (Feb 9 Luce interior reveal in San Francisco). Buy-side positioning had shifted from "post-CMD overhang" to "constructive into the FY print and initial 2026 guide." Options-implied move was ~3.5-4.5%.
• Print reaction (Feb 10, 2026): Pre-market response on the press release was approximately +8.82% (per Investing.com pre-market data) on the FY beat plus the FY 2026 guide of ≥€9.45 vs. post-CMD-implied ~€8.80-€9.00. NYSE intraday open was +5-6% to ~$510-515; close was approximately +5-6% on the day. Milan-listed shares closed +6-7% on the day. NYSE volume was elevated at an estimated 4-5M shares vs. trailing 30-day average of ~2.5M — broad participation in the move.

The +5-6% NYSE close on a print framed by the early wire as "EPS missed forecasts" is the cleanest possible signal that the buy-side has finished re-rating around the post-CMD framework and is now trading the trajectory above it. The single largest contributor to the move was the FY 2026 EPS guide of ≥€9.45 — materially above the post-CMD-implied ~€8.80-€9.00 framework and approximately 5-7% above the pre-print Street consensus. Layered on: the FY 2025 industrial FCF beat (€1.538B vs. ≥€1.30B raised floor = +18%), the ≥€1.50B 2026 FCF guide, the €3.5B multi-year buyback program with the first €250M tranche underway (resolving the post-€2B-program-cliff concern), and the order book extending "towards the end of 2027" (a slight tightening from Q3's "well into 2027" framing). Compared to a flat-to-mixed European luxury complex on the day (Hermès, LVMH, Kering all roughly flat), Ferrari's +5-6% move was idiosyncratic and earnings-driven rather than sector-led.

The stock now trades at approximately $510-515 — within ~7% of the all-time-high pre-CMD level of ~$479 (Oct 8 close, before the CMD selloff). The post-CMD drawdown has been fully recovered, with the Feb 10 close marking a roughly +33% rally from the Oct 9 CMD intraday low (~$385). Combined with the +24% gain from the Nov 4 Q3 print, the buy-side has now made a full round-trip through the post-CMD reset and ended up modestly above the pre-CMD high — vindicating the Q3 thesis that the CMD framework was the floor, not the ceiling.

Street Perspective

Debate: Does the 2026 Guide Validate the Post-CMD Framework as the Floor?

Bull view: Unambiguously yes. The FY 2026 EPS guide of ≥€9.45 lands materially above the post-CMD implied framework (~€8.80-€9.00), confirming Vigna's "floor" language three times across the Q3 call was operationally correct. The framework was set conservatively at Oct 9; the company is now demonstrating the trajectory is above it. Combined with the FY 2025 outperformance (every line of the raised guide beat, FCF +18% above floor) and the €3.5B multi-year buyback that resolves the capital-return continuity question, the post-CMD selloff was a clear overshoot. The trajectory through 2027-2030 is structurally above the framework, and the multiple should re-rate accordingly.

Bear view: The 2026 guide is in line with what reasonably-modeled buy-side desks were carrying after the Q3 print; the "above framework" framing reflects the gap between the official October framework and the working-Street model, not new fundamental information. The flat EBIT margin guide (≥29.5% in 2026 vs. 29.5% 2025) shows the margin-expansion story is plateauing — Ferrari has now extracted most of the operating-leverage upside from the post-2022 paint shop, e-building, and personalization investments. The 2026 setup benefits from one-time tailwinds (lower F1 racing spend on the 4th-place finish; R&D grants) that don't roll forward. The multiple has now fully re-rated back through pre-CMD levels — and the next leg requires fundamentals to extend further, not just for the post-CMD selloff to reverse.

Our take: The bull view is operationally correct and the bear view is the right valuation discipline against the same data. The Q3 thesis (post-CMD framework is the floor) is now fully confirmed by the 2026 guide — there is no remaining ambiguity. But the stock has now moved from -20% post-CMD to +7% above the pre-CMD high in ~4 months, and the easy multiple-recovery trade is done. From here, the bull case requires the 2026 trajectory to deliver against the ≥€9.45 floor AND for the 2027-2028 setup to continue compounding above-framework. That's a more demanding bar than the Q3 setup. We side with the bull on a 12-month basis (the trajectory is favorable, the capital return is structural, the operational discipline is demonstrated) but we acknowledge the risk/reward asymmetry has narrowed.

Debate: Is the Flat 2026 EBIT Margin Guide a Plateau or a Conservative Set-Up?

Bull view: Conservative set-up. The 2026 guide holds margin flat at ≥29.5% while absorbing a €200M FX headwind that alone is ~280bps of margin drag. The implicit operational margin trajectory is therefore +200-280bps before FX, which is the continuation of the 2024-2025 +120bps annual expansion path. Mix-and-personalization-driven margin expansion is intact; the headline-flat guide reflects management's conservative-setting practice. The 2026 actual will likely beat by 30-50bps as personalization holds at 20% and the F80 ramp contributes above-average margin.

Bear view: Operational margin expansion has plateaued. The 2024 +120bps and 2025 +120bps lifts were the last clean drops of the post-2022 operational program (paint shop, e-building, personalization scaling). From here, the margin trajectory is structurally pressured by F1 cost-cap step-ups, Elettrica industrialization, BEV development overhead, and rising lifestyle SG&A (London + New York flagships). The framework's 2030 ≥30% EBIT margin target implies +50bps over 4 years (28.3% → 30%+); 2026 holding flat means 2027-2030 needs to deliver +50bps over 3 years — feasible but tight, with no buffer for further headwind surprises.

Our take: The bear case overweights the cost-side commitments and underweights the mix-and-personalization upside. The FX headwind in 2026 is sized and likely conservative (US-pricing pass-through is contractually available, not used in the guide; EUR/USD spot could strengthen). The F1 cost-cap step-up and the Elettrica industrialization are real but bounded and sized in the guide. Mix continues to shift toward higher-ASP models (Testarossa family, F80, eventually Luce) — supporting structural margin expansion. We model 29.7-29.9% 2026 actual EBIT margin (vs. ≥29.5% guide), and view the framework's 2030 ≥30% target as conservative — actual 2030 likely lands in the 30.5-31.0% range. The plateau narrative is overstated.

Debate: Is the €3.5B Buyback Material at the New Valuation?

Bull view: Yes. The €3.5B buyback running through 2030 represents approximately €700M/year at the average pace — combined with ~€600-700M/year of expected dividends, the structural capital return is roughly €1.3-1.4B/year, essentially matching the ~€1.5B FCF generation. Ferrari has positioned itself to return ~90-95% of organic FCF to shareholders through 2030 while still funding the capex envelope. At the current market cap of ~$95B, that represents a ~1.5% buyback yield + ~0.7% dividend yield = ~2.2% structural capital-return yield — competitive with high-quality consumer-discretionary names and structurally accretive to per-share metrics through the share-count reduction.

Bear view: The buyback's accretion impact is muted at the current valuation. Buying back stock at 55-60x forward EPS (current multiple) provides minimal accretion vs. holding the cash — the math works better at 40x (post-CMD trough) than at 60x. The buyback's strategic value is signaling and capital-allocation discipline, not per-share-earnings accretion. The program will execute regardless of price (per the announced structure), which is the right discipline but also means the company is essentially price-insensitive on its own stock.

Our take: The bear case has the cleaner valuation point but the bull case has the cleaner strategic point. The buyback's value is the multi-year capital-return commitment that removes the "post-€2B-program cliff" concern from the thesis — and that signaling value materially exceeds the per-share accretion math. The €3.5B is also flexibly structured (multi-year, tranche-based), allowing management to lean in opportunistically if the stock pulls back. Net positive thesis input; not the lead driver of the 12-month risk/reward but a structural support.

Model Update Needed

Valuation impact: Net of these adjustments, our DCF fair value range moves to $510-590 per share from the prior $440-485. With the Feb 10 close at ~$510-515, the midpoint of $550 sits ~7% above the current price. Our 12-month price target is raised to $550 from $460, implying ~7-10% total-return upside including the dividend. Multiple math: at $550 the stock would trade at ~60x our €9.55 FY 2026 EPS estimate (modeling ~10bps above the ≥€9.45 floor) — modestly above the pre-CMD peak multiple (~52-55x). The setup justifies the multiple expansion because the 2026 guidance has structurally raised the near-term EPS trajectory, the framework-set-as-floor is now confirmed, and the €3.5B buyback locks in capital-return continuity. The risk/reward is less attractive than the post-CMD entry point at $385 in November, but the trajectory remains positive and the operational delivery is on plan.

Thesis Scorecard Post-Earnings

Overall: Thesis is strengthened on bullish vectors (framework-as-floor confirmed via the 2026 EPS guide; capital-return continuity locked in via the €3.5B program; personalization at 20% durable; Amalfi 40%-new-to-brand intake operational; Luce reveal cadence tracking) and modestly weakened on the valuation vector as the stock has fully recovered the CMD-driven drawdown. Mainland China remains the open bear point (Q4 -36% was the steepest single-quarter decline of 2025) but is sized and bounded. The setup is structurally constructive for 2026 but the risk/reward is narrower than the post-CMD entry point in November.

Action: Maintaining Outperform from the Q3 upgrade. The Q3 thesis was "the CMD framework is the floor; buy the post-CMD overshoot; expect the trajectory above framework to drive multiple re-expansion" — and the Q4 print has delivered exactly that pattern. FY 2025 cleanly exceeded the raised guide; FY 2026 guide of ≥€9.45 EPS lands above the post-CMD implied framework; €3.5B buyback resolves capital-return continuity; Luce multi-step reveal is on plan. We extend our 12-month price target to $550 (from $460), implying ~7-10% upside including dividend from the Feb 10 close of ~$510-515. The trade has worked; we hold through the Q1 2026 Luce momentum cycle and the Q2 2026 Rome complete-car reveal — both narrative inflections that should support the multiple even as the operational trajectory delivers against the ≥€9.45 floor. The next downgrade trigger would be either (a) a material guide cut at any 2026 quarterly print, or (b) the Luce Rome reveal landing materially negatively (pricing too aggressive, market reaction adverse). Neither is the base case; both are watched.