Mix Does All the Work: ASP Up 12% on Units Down 3.7%, Guide Raised, and the Multiple Has Caught Up

Results vs. Consensus

Ferrari reported Q2 2026 results before the European open on July 30, 2026, with the analyst call at 3:30 p.m. CEST (9:30 a.m. ET). The print beat on every headline metric against the euro-denominated tape, and the full-year guide was raised for the first time this year. As in Q1, two incompatible consensus tapes circulated on the day: the euro tape that European desks actually model against, and a dollar-translated retail tape. Both showed beats. At least one automated wire headline nevertheless set the reported euro EPS against the dollar consensus and called the quarter a miss, which is a currency error rather than a result, and which the intraday reversal in the shares corrected within a few hours.

Q2 2026 — Standalone Scorecard

Three notes on the table. Consensus figures are drawn from different providers by line, so the implied margins are derived rather than published: the EBITDA-margin consensus of roughly 38.8% is the €729M poll figure over the €1.88B revenue forecast, and the EBIT-margin consensus of roughly 30.6% follows from the reported 31.2% and the sell-side characterization of the beat as around 60bps. Second, the EBITDA margin beat consensus by about 20bps while still falling 70bps year over year, which is a comparison problem rather than a cost problem and traces to the higher Formula 1 in-season ranking accrual discussed below. Third, the ASP line is our calculation from the primary filing rather than a company disclosure: €1,629M of cars-and-spare-parts revenue divided by 3,366 units, against €1,507M over 3,494 units a year ago.

Year-over-Year Comparison

Constant-currency growth rates are as disclosed by the company. Ferrari defines constant currency to eliminate both transaction and translation effects and the impact of currency hedges, so these figures are not reproducible from the reported euro columns and should not be recalculated. The Q2 2025 industrial free cash flow of €198M is the re-presented figure: the company restated the prior-year quarter to exclude €34M mainly relating to withholding taxes paid in subsequent quarters, and now excludes withholding taxes from the measure going forward.

First-Half Roll-Up and the Q-Sum Check

Every line reconciles: the two reported quarters sum exactly to the reported first half on shipments, revenue, EBITDA, EBIT, net profit, EPS and industrial free cash flow. That matters for what follows, because the H2 implied figures in the guidance section are derived by subtracting this reported half from the full-year guide, and a half that did not foot would make those derivations meaningless.

Sequential Context — Q2 2026 vs. Q1 2026

Quality of the Beat

Revenue Assessment

Revenue of €1,938M grew 8.4% as reported and 11% at constant currency, and the composition is more interesting than the headline. Cars and spare parts contributed €122M of the €151M increase, sponsorship-commercial-brand only €4M, and Other €25M. That last line, which covers financial services, the Mugello racetrack and engine rentals, grew 31% and is now 5.1% of revenue, up from 4.3%: the second Formula 1 customer team is fully in the run-rate, and this is the first quarter where the two-customer engine-rental business shows its full contribution.

Inside cars and spare parts, the arithmetic is the story of the quarter. Revenue rose 8.1% while deliveries fell 3.7%, which means revenue per delivered car rose 12.2%, from €431K to €484K. The company attributes that to "the richer sports car mix, supported by the F80 and higher personalizations," and the Street had modeled roughly €452K, so the ASP line beat by about 7%. This is a much larger per-unit step-up than the +8-9% we observed in Q1 and is running well ahead of anything the post-Capital Markets Day framework requires. It is also, mechanically, the reason a quarter with 128 fewer cars produced €53M more operating profit.

The sponsorship, commercial and brand line at €209M (+2.2%) is the one soft spot and the only revenue line that decelerated meaningfully from Q1's +14%. The company's explanation is that higher sponsorships were "partially offset by lower Formula 1 commercial revenues," which is the 2025 fourth-place championship finish flowing through the 2026 commercial distribution exactly as this desk flagged two quarters ago. That headwind is known, quantified in direction if not in size, and laps in 2027 on the strength of the current season.

Margins Assessment

The EBIT margin of 31.2% (+30bps YoY) is the highest quarterly EBIT margin Ferrari has printed in the period this desk covers, and it was achieved while absorbing a €32M currency headwind and, for the first time named explicitly in the filing, higher United States import tariffs inside cost of sales. Cost of sales held at exactly 47.4% of revenue in both years, which is the cleanest possible demonstration that the mix uplift is flowing through rather than being consumed by the cost of building more complex cars.

The EBITDA margin fell 70bps to 39.0%, and the gap between the two margin directions is entirely depreciation. D&A was €150M against €157M a year ago, which the CFO characterized as "temporarily lower, in line with the ongoing model changeover," because the amortization rolling off phased-out models (the 296 GTS and Roma Spider specifically) is only partly replaced by the models now entering production. That is a timing benefit to EBIT, not a structural one, and management said plainly it reverses: D&A is guided above €700M for the full year against €324M in the first half, implying a step-up of roughly €376M in H2 versus €324M in H1.

SG&A at €188M (+17.6%) deserves a flag. It grew more than twice as fast as revenue and moved from 8.9% to 9.7% of sales, on communication and marketing activity plus, notably, "higher costs due to the better 2026 Formula 1 in-season ranking assumptions." Ferrari accrues racing costs against where it expects to finish the championship, and the company confirmed on the call that it is "maintaining the assumption of ranking first in the Formula One championship." A first-place accrual is a cost today and a revenue tailwind in 2027. It is also a reversible assumption, and the single most overlooked swing factor in the H2 cost base.

EPS Assessment

Diluted EPS of €2.62 rose €0.24 or 10%, against net profit growth of 8.9%. The bridge from EBIT to EPS is unusually clean: net financial expenses fell to €4M from €7M, the effective tax rate rose 100bps to 23.0% (which the company attributes to the estimated benefit of the new Patent Box regime), and the weighted average diluted share count fell 1.1% to 176,429 thousand from 178,427 thousand. Gross financial income and expenses both collapsed by roughly three quarters year over year, from €75M and €82M to €17M and €21M, which is a currency-driven gross-up unwinding rather than anything economic; the net line is what matters and it moved €3M in Ferrari's favor.

Against the raised full-year floor of ≥€9.68, the first half delivered €4.95, leaving an implied H2 floor of ≥€4.73. That is slightly below the first half in absolute terms, which is consistent with the H2 cost build management described and inconsistent with the notion that Ferrari has become a back-loaded story. It is worth being precise about what the EPS guide raise actually contains: the prior ≥€9.45 floor was calculated on 178,321 thousand shares and the new ≥€9.68 floor on 176,804 thousand. Holding the share count constant, the new floor is worth roughly €9.60, so about €0.15 of the €0.23 raise is earnings and about €0.08 is the buyback shrinking the denominator. That is a real return of capital and it belongs in the EPS line, but it is not the same thing as the business earning more.

Segment Performance — Geographic

Q2 2026 Shipments by Region

The revenue consequence of that unit table is the part worth internalizing. Cars-and-spare-parts revenue by region moved as follows: EMEA up €157M, Americas up €18M, Rest of APAC down €28M, and Mainland China-HK-Taiwan down €25M. The Americas line lost a fifth of its units and still grew revenue. That is either a spectacular vindication of the mix strategy or a warning that the region's volume base is eroding under an ASP mask, and this desk's view is that it is currently the former and will become the latter if it persists past 2027.

EMEA — Everything Went Right at Once

EMEA at 1,856 units (+210 / +12.8%) is the strongest regional print in the period this desk has covered and moves the region to 55.1% of total shipments from 47.1% a year ago, an eight-point mix shift in twelve months. The CFO's explanation is Ferrari's standard launch cadence, and it is credible: "Consistent with our usual cadence, closer markets are observed first, while deliveries of the new models to the other geographies will ramp up progressively in the coming months." Italy, the UK, France, Switzerland and Other EMEA all grew double digits or better. Germany was the lone decliner at -68 units.

Assessment: The eight-point EMEA mix shift is the mechanical counterpart of the Americas and China declines, and it is explicitly a phasing statement rather than a demand statement. If the cadence explanation is right, the Americas and Asia lines should recover as the Amalfi, 849 Testarossa and 296 Speciale ramps reach those markets over the coming two to three quarters, and EMEA's share should revert toward the high forties. That is the specific, falsifiable prediction the Q3 print will test. If EMEA is still above 53% of shipments in Q3 with the Americas still down double digits, the phasing explanation stops being sufficient.

Middle East — Fully Normalized, and the Pull-Forward Question Answered

Middle East deliveries of 232 units (+69 / +42.3%) are the cleanest resolution of a question this desk carried out of Q1. Three months ago Ferrari held the region flat through active conflict by rerouting sea freight, air-freighting selected cars and bringing forward deliveries to other markets. The bear reading was that the disruption would leave a hole. Instead the region grew 42% and now represents 6.9% of total shipments against 4.7% a year ago, its highest share in the period covered.

"Number 2, there has been not any, let's say, pull order between one quarter, between one region and others. The story of Middle East lasted, if you remember well, we told you 2 weeks. Thanks to the dealers' support and thanks also to our logistic partners, we've been able easily to avoid any problem." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: The operational resilience thesis is confirmed twice over: Ferrari held the region flat during the disruption and then grew it 42% immediately after. The pull-forward denial is harder to take entirely at face value, because the interim report's own first-half commentary attributes part of the H1 country mix to "the geographic allocation flexibility implemented during the first quarter in response to the escalation of hostilities in the Middle East," and the Americas swung from +8 units in Q1 to -206 in Q2. Both statements can be true if the Q1 reallocation was small relative to the Q2 model-changeover effect, which is the most likely reading, but the tension is real and is listed below among the things the company is not addressing directly.

Americas — Down a Fifth on Units, Up on Revenue

The Americas at 787 units (-206 / -20.7%) and the United States at 695 (-154 / -18.1%) is the number that drew the most Q&A attention and the one where management's explanation is least verifiable from the outside. There are two components on offer. The first is model changeover: the 296 GTS, Roma Spider and SF90 XX family are phasing out, and the models replacing them reach distant markets later in the cycle. The second is new and more interesting: management argued that more heavily personalized cars simply take longer to build.

"The reason you are referring to, we don't have, 1, no issue of supply chain. 2, we have a significant model changeover as we have been highlighting in the chart number four, I think. The other point is that when you have cars with high degree of innovation and high personalization degree, this is having clearly an impact on the number of cars that you deliver." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Against that, the region's cars-and-parts revenue rose €18M. The mix effect inside the Americas is therefore even more extreme than the group average: fewer cars, more revenue, and by implication a materially richer specification per car. The first-half MD&A also identifies the Americas as the source of the positive country-mix contribution to the H1 EBIT bridge, so on a half-year view the region is contributing profit growth even as it sheds volume.

Assessment: On the numbers management's explanation holds for now. A demand problem would show up as weaker specification and discounting pressure, and the Americas revenue line shows the exact opposite. The United States also now carries a named import-tariff cost inside cost of sales, which the company has still never sized. The honest position is that a 20% unit decline in Ferrari's second-largest region is a datapoint that requires a second quarter of evidence before it can be filed as phasing. We are treating Q3 Americas deliveries as the most important single number in the next print.

Mainland China-HK-Taiwan — The Q1 Inflection Did Not Hold

Mainland China-HK-Taiwan at 185 units (-89 / -32.5%), with Mainland China alone at 112 (-64 / -36.4%), is where this desk was wrong. Three months ago the region printed +7.6% after a -36% fourth quarter, and our Q1 note called that "a meaningful slope-bend back upward, not just stabilization" and downgraded the China bear point to Challenged. One quarter of growth bracketed by two quarters of roughly one-third declines is not a slope-bend. It is noise around a declining trend, and the Q1 read was over-fitted to a single small-base quarter.

The region is now 5.5% of shipments, down from 7.8% a year ago and from 7.4% in Q1. On a first-half basis it is 440 units against 511, or -13.9%. Management offered no China-specific commentary in the prepared remarks and was not asked about the region directly in Q&A. The only adjacent disclosure came in response to a question about whether Ferrari Luce might attract disproportionate Chinese demand, where the CEO said allocation would follow order intake rather than a pre-set regional weighting.

Assessment: Restoring this to a live bear point. The absolute exposure remains small at 5.5% of units, and the structural argument that Ferrari's order-book model insulates it from point-of-sale luxury cyclicality in China is intact. But the region has now declined in three of the last four quarters, the H1 trend is -13.9%, and the company has stopped volunteering commentary on it. Small and shrinking is tolerable; small, shrinking and undiscussed is a pattern worth naming.

Rest of APAC — First Decline in the Covered Period

Rest of APAC at 538 units (-43 / -7.4%) breaks a run of consistent growth that had made the region the quiet structural offset to Chinese weakness. On a first-half basis the region is still up, 1,231 units against 1,214, so the Q2 decline is a single-quarter event rather than a trend break. Cars-and-parts revenue for the region fell €28M, which is the only region where both units and revenue declined.

Assessment: Consistent with the launch-cadence explanation and not yet concerning. Rest of APAC is the most distant market set from Maranello and would be expected to see new-model allocations last. The first-half figure being positive is the relevant read; a second consecutive decline in Q3 would move this into the same bucket as the Americas.

Segment Performance — Revenue Category

Cars and Spare Parts — The Personalization Step-Up

Personalization ran above 20% of cars-and-spare-parts revenue and, critically, above what the company itself had assumed. This is the disclosure that drove the guidance raise, and it is the first time in the period this desk has covered that Ferrari has described personalization as running ahead of plan rather than merely holding at 20%.

"Personalizations were higher than expected, above 20% of total revenues from cars and spare parts, and were particularly relevant for the 296 Speciale family. The adoption of carbon and paint continued to drive revenues growth." — Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

Asked what specifically was driving the step-up, the CEO's answer was notable for what it ruled out: no single option, no single geography, no single model.

"I would like to say that the average value of the personalization for the car that we have in the production increased because the option that the client are selecting is higher. They have been personalizing more, the painting, the use of carbon, the use also of rim, the use of special leathers. There is not a specific item that is driving the increase of personalization content, as well as there is not a specific pattern in terms of client from different geography." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: A broad-based, option-agnostic uplift is a better quality of signal than a concentrated one, because it is harder to explain away as a single high-personalization model's contribution. It also has capacity behind it: the Tailor Made facilities in Tokyo and Los Angeles announced at the Capital Markets Day, plus expanded Atelier and Tailor Made capability in Maranello. That said, "above 20%" is not a number, Ferrari has never disclosed the precise rate, and a step-up whose magnitude the company will not quantify is a step-up whose durability cannot be independently tracked. The 2027 comparison against this base is the central quantitative risk in the story.

Sponsorship, Commercial and Brand — Racing Cost Is Rising Ahead of Racing Revenue

At €209M (+2.2%) this line grew barely above inflation, and the deceleration from Q1's +14% is entirely the Formula 1 commercial distribution, which reflects the prior season's fourth-place finish. Sponsorships themselves grew. The line is now 10.8% of revenue, down from 11.4%.

Assessment: The important asymmetry here is that Ferrari is accruing costs against a first-place 2026 finish while still collecting revenue based on a fourth-place 2025 finish. Both the SG&A increase and the EBITDA-margin compression trace partly to that accrual. If the season delivers, 2027 gets the revenue with the cost already in the base, which is a genuine and under-modeled 2027 tailwind. If it does not, the accrual reverses and H2 costs come in lighter than guided. Either outcome is acceptable; the asymmetry favors the shareholder.

Other — The Two-Customer Engine Business Arrives

Other revenue of €100M (+€25M / +31.0%) is the fastest-growing line in the business and reached €100M for only the second time in the covered period, after Q4 2025's €106M. The company attributes the increase mainly to the rental of engines to other Formula 1 racing teams, which is now a two-customer business following the addition of the second team alongside the long-standing arrangement.

Assessment: Small in absolute terms but structurally attractive: engine rental is a high-margin, contracted, multi-year revenue stream with no unit-volume exposure and no personalization dependency, which makes it the only meaningful part of Ferrari's revenue base that is uncorrelated with the model-changeover cycle. At 5.1% of revenue it is not yet a thesis driver. At its current growth rate it will be a visible one by 2028.

Product and Powertrain Mix

Q2 shipments comprised six internal combustion engine models and seven hybrid models, representing 69.8% and 30.2% of deliveries respectively. The hybrid share has now run near 30% for two consecutive quarters, materially below the level of the prior two years, and an analyst pressed directly on whether that reflects a strategic choice.

"It's just a matter of changeover. Consider that there are two hybrid models that are out of production. It's the 296 GTB and F, and also the SF90 XX. These are two hybrid. We are ramping up the others. It's not related to any choice to slow down one model or another." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Within the quarter, deliveries of the 12Cilindri, 12Cilindri Spider, Purosangue and 296 Speciale family increased; the Amalfi and 849 Testarossa continued their ramp-up; the 296 GTS, Roma Spider and SF90 XX family declined in line with phase-out; and F80 shipments increased, though the CFO characterized the F80 increase as only "really modestly higher compared to Q1" and declined to quantify it.

Assessment: The hybrid-share decline is credibly a phasing artifact given that the two models leaving production are both hybrids and the 296 Speciale replacing one of them is also a hybrid. The more consequential disclosure is the F80 one. The company's own EBIT bridge names F80 deliveries as the primary driver of the €122M product-mix contribution, while simultaneously declining to say how many F80s shipped. That combination means the single largest identified driver of the quarter's profit beat is unquantified by design, and the Street's ability to model the H2 mix depends on an estimate the company will not confirm.

Key Topics & Management Commentary

Overall Management Tone: Confident and noticeably less defensive than at Q1, with the posture of a team that has just been vindicated on a contested framing. Where the prior call spent its energy walking back an unintended cadence signal, this one led with product and let the guidance raise carry the financial message. The consistent tell was a hardening refusal to discuss volumes at all, delivered not as a dodge but as a strategic position, and management was least convincing on regional demand, where the explanation for a 20% Americas decline rested on qualitative build-complexity reasoning that cannot be checked from outside.

1. Scarcity as an Explicit Answer to the Volume Question

The most strategically significant thing management said this quarter was not a number. Asked twice, from different angles, to discuss the volume trajectory, both executives declined and reframed the question as a category error. This is a shift. In prior quarters Ferrari discussed unit cadence in phasing terms while declining to guide it; this quarter it declined to accept that units are a relevant metric.

"2026 is a year where we have a significant changeover model. We have a lot of new models. We have the ramp-up of a very innovative model for which we have a very high degree of personalization. We always keep one thing in mind, Henning, is scarcity and exclusivity. For us, what is important is that we deliver unique products to our clients. Our North Star has been, it is and will always be scarcity and exclusivity." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

The CFO was more blunt when pressed on whether flat units for the year still held: "As Benedetto commented before, we don't want to go into that discussion on volumes." and, after an interjection, completed the thought: "the manufacturing for the year, considering the complex changeover and increased level of personalizations, and doesn't make a big difference, very honestly."

Assessment: "Doesn't make a big difference" is the whole thesis in five words, and it is defensible arithmetic when revenue per car is compounding at 12%. It is also a position that only works in one direction. As long as ASP growth outruns unit decline, volumes genuinely do not matter. The moment ASP growth normalizes toward the low single digits while units keep falling, the same framing becomes an evasion. Management has now spent its credibility on a metric it has decided is irrelevant, which raises the cost of ever having to discuss it again.

2. The Guidance Raise and Its Drop-Through Gap

The revenue guide rose €100M but the EBIT floor rose only €40M, and the gap was the most-asked modeling question of the call. A 40% incremental margin on the raise sits well below Ferrari's ~31% reported margin only if incremental costs are absorbing the difference, which is exactly what management said.

"First of all, in terms of margin from personalization, this is absolutely unchanged in line with the first half. The entire difference is related to our forecast of cost increase in the second half, across the three lines of G&A, R&D, and most of all, D&A. Do not forget that we are maintaining the assumption of ranking first in the Formula One championship." — Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

Assessment: The answer is complete and checkable. Personalization drop-through is unchanged, so the guide raise reflects more revenue at the same incremental margin, offset by a cost step-up that was already flagged. Two of the three cost lines are genuinely discretionary in timing (G&A, R&D) and the third (D&A) is mechanical and unavoidable. The Formula 1 first-place accrual is the item most likely to be revisited. Net: the raise is real, its conversion is conservative, and the conservatism is located in items that could release rather than in items that could deteriorate.

3. The Implied H2 Margin Step-Down That Management Disowned

Working the raised guide against the reported first half produces an uncomfortable implication. Full-year revenue of approximately €7.60B less H1's €3,786M leaves roughly €3.81B for H2. Full-year adjusted EBIT of at least €2.26B less H1's €1,153M leaves at least €1,107M, an implied H2 EBIT margin near 29.0% against 30.5% delivered in the first half and 31.2% in Q2 alone. An analyst put the resulting full-year figure to management directly, and the answer was a concession.

Q: "Technically, if I calculate your guidance, it means you do 29.7% margin, but I think it's just rounding error, right?"
— Horst Schneider, Bank of America

A: "No. It depends. If you take the lower end of the guidance, you're right, that is just the rounding."
— Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

Separately, the CFO described the H2 mix-price variance against the prior year as "expected to be not lower, I would say higher compared to the first half." and characterized the guidance language on margins as "not lower than."

Assessment: Read together, these say the implied 29.0% H2 margin is an artifact of a floor rather than a forecast. Ferrari's guidance convention has always been a floor that it beats; three consecutive quarters of running above the guide framework support that reading. Our modeling therefore treats the H2 margin as roughly 30.0-30.5% rather than the 29.0% the floor implies, which is what carries our FY EBIT above the guided minimum. Investors who model the floor literally will be modeling a deceleration management has effectively told them not to expect.

4. Ferrari Luce, Two Months After the Reveal

The Luce was fully presented in Rome on May 25, 2026, the event this desk flagged last quarter as the dominant pending catalyst. Two months on, management provided three qualitative points and zero numbers, having promised at Q1 that this would be the call where detail flowed. The car carries more than 60 new patents across electric propulsion, vehicle dynamics and system integration, retains a paddle-shift interface for torque-shift engagement, and is a five-seater, which is a genuine first for the range.

"Two months after the world premiere in Rome, we can state three clear points. One, we are very much satisfied with orders that are coming in line with our plans. Two, initial orders are currently coming from repeaters and new clients. Three, we are engaging those who are genuinely interested in Ferrari Luce according to our commercial and marketing plan." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

The most substantive incremental disclosure came in Q&A, where the CEO confirmed genuinely new-to-brand buyers and described the allocation methodology as first-in-first-out with no priority for existing clients. He also confirmed that allocation by region will follow order intake rather than a pre-set weighting, which is a departure from Ferrari's usual practice of managing regional mix for exclusivity.

Assessment: "In line with our plans" is the weakest formulation available for a demand statement, and the promise made at Q1 that this call would carry detail was not kept. Against that, the qualitative content is constructive: new-to-brand buyers, no allocation priority for repeat clients, and a willingness to let order intake drive geography. The absence of numbers is consistent with Ferrari's practice for every individual model, so it is not a Luce-specific silence. This point stays neutral in the scorecard, and the first genuinely informative Luce datapoint will be the 2027 order-book coverage disclosed at the Q4 print.

5. The 12Cilindri Manuale — Sold Out Before Entering the Order Book

Presented on July 3, 2026 at the Cavalcade event, the 12Cilindri Manuale is a limited series of 1,499 units, already fully allocated, reintroducing a manual transmission for the first time since the 599 GTB Fiorano in 2006 by way of an in-house-designed, patented manual-by-wire system derived from the winch-by-wire system built for the Hypersail project.

"After the 599 GTB Fiorano 2006, we've reintroduced the manual transmission, bringing back an even more direct interaction between the driver and the car. This was made possible thanks to the new manual-by-wire system, designed in-house, patented, and inspired by the winch-by-wire system developed in our Hypersail racing project." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

The commercially material fact, disclosed only in response to an order-book question, is that the Manuale is not yet in the reported order book: "here, in this order book, we don't have yet the numbers of the Manuale is something that belongs, let me say, in Q3."

Assessment: This is the most underappreciated disclosure on the call. A 1,499-unit special series priced, per the questioning on the call, at a substantial premium to the base range, fully allocated, sits entirely outside the order book that management says already covers all of 2027. That is incremental coverage on top of a book that is already full, and it lands in Q3. It also validates a strategic point management would not state directly: demand for the most analogue, least technologically forward product in the range was strong enough to sell out immediately, in the same quarter Ferrari launched its first electric car.

6. Pricing Power on Heritage Products, and What Management Would Not Infer From It

The opening question of the call asked whether Ferrari enjoys more pricing power on traditional-format cars, and whether that would change what it chooses to launch. The CEO declined the framing and redirected to the innovation process.

"I would like to say this, that our clients understand fully what does it mean, emotion-driven innovation. I think that when in one quarter, our company unveiled two products, very innovative, one more in the future, one reading the past with the eyes of the future, I think it is a demonstration that one, we listen to them. Two, we are also able to delight and surprise them." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Asked separately whether the Manuale formula would be extended across the range, the answer was a flat refusal: "We don't disclose what we're going to do in the future. We do not even disclose what will happen in the remaining of the year, when I said the 2 other models will be unveiled."

Assessment: The refusal to let a successful product dictate the roadmap is the right discipline and is consistent with the strategic posture this desk noted at Q1, when the CEO refused to let a Formula 1 regulation debate pull the road-car powertrain plan. Ferrari's product cycle is planned years ahead and the value of that planning depends on not chasing the last thing that sold well. The disclosure that two further models will be unveiled before year-end, with no further detail, is the fourth and fifth launches of a year already carrying the largest changeover in the company's listed history.

7. The 2030 Framework Is Being Beaten, and Management Explained Why

Ferrari's Capital Markets Day set an EPS compound annual growth rate of approximately 6% to 2030. The raised 2026 guide implies roughly 8% growth this year, and an analyst asked directly what is running ahead of plan. The answer decomposed the outperformance into three parts, only one of which is operational.

"You touched the point. Actually, personalization is doing better than we had assumed for the rest of the plan. The second element, you should not disregard the assumption with respect to the currency. That adds in terms of the nominal development of the EPS compared to what the CAGR implied in the guidance." — Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

After a brief clarifying exchange confirming that the currency assumption had improved, the CFO added the third driver: "The last point I should mention is obviously the buyback program that is proceeding at pace and is reducing the number of shares over which we divide the net profit." On the margin trajectory to 2030, the answer was that the Capital Markets Day targets are "unchanged, as a way they were presented and based on the assumption we outlined at that time." with development described as "smooth and linear."

Assessment: This is a usefully honest decomposition and it deflates the outperformance somewhat. Of the roughly two points of EPS growth above the plan CAGR, one component is a genuine operating improvement (personalization), one is a currency assumption that can reverse (the dollar strengthening against the euro relative to prior expectations), and one is financial engineering that is real but not compounding at the business level. The refusal to raise the 2030 framework on the strength of two good quarters is appropriate conservatism, and it also means the multiple cannot be justified by an upgraded long-term algorithm.

8. Foreign Exchange — Better in 2026, Largely Unhedged for 2027

The currency assumption embedded in the raised guide is a US dollar to euro rate of approximately 1.16, improved from prior expectations, and the CFO noted in prepared remarks that "the recent strengthening of the US dollar mitigated the negative currency impact compared to our previous expectations." Currency still cost €32M of EBIT in the quarter and €68M across the first half.

"Impact of FX for H2 is based on the assumption I just outlined, and the fact that in addition to that, we have hedging in place already for approximately 8% of the exposure. On 2027, it is far less covered by hedging and will very much depend on where the spot exchange rate will stay." — Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

Assessment: An 8% hedge ratio on H2 exposure is thin, and "far less covered" for 2027 is thinner still. Ferrari is effectively running an unhedged long-euro position against dollar and yen revenue, which is a deliberate choice and a defensible one for a company with pricing power, but it means a portion of the guidance raise is a currency call rather than an operating result. It also means the 2027 EPS bridge carries a currency term with no floor under it. This is a named, quantified risk that receives less attention than it deserves relative to the volume debate.

9. Order Book Covers All of 2027, With Models Sold Out Individually

The order-book language changed this quarter, and the change is a tightening rather than an extension. Where prior quarters used the formulation "extends towards the end of 2027," the current disclosure is that the book "entirely covers 2027" and "covers the entire 2027," with individual models called out as sold out for their full production runs.

"We continue to experience a healthy demand across all geographies with an order book that covers the entire 2027. Across the portfolio, several models, including the 296 Speciale and the 12Cilindri families, are already sold out for their production run, underscoring the strength of demand." — Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: The shift from "extends towards" to "entirely covers" is a real strengthening of a claim that had been reaffirmed on each of the prior two calls, and the model-level sold-out disclosures are new. Layer on the Manuale's 1,499 fully allocated units that have not yet entered the book, and forward coverage is better than the headline sentence conveys. This remains the single most load-bearing element of the investment case, because it is what separates Ferrari from point-of-sale luxury: roughly six quarters of committed demand means the 2027 revenue line is largely a manufacturing question rather than a demand question.

10. Depreciation Turns From Tailwind to Headwind

D&A of €150M in Q2 was €7M below the prior year, and the R&D line fell 3.3% principally because amortization of capitalized development costs dropped €6M as the 296 GTS and Roma Spider reach end of life. That is a benefit that management explicitly labelled temporary in the same breath as disclosing it.

"In the quarter, D&A was temporarily lower, in line with the ongoing model changeover, since the decrease implied by the phasing out of certain models is only partially offset by the gradual additions from the models that are entering the start of production. In H2, we expect D&A to grow progressively." — Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

Assessment: Full-year D&A guided above €700M against €324M booked in the first half implies roughly €376M in the second, a step-up of about 16% half over half. Capitalized development costs of €122M in the quarter and €234M in the half are running ahead of the prior year, so the amortization base keeps building into 2027 as well. This is the most mechanical and least escapable of the H2 headwinds, it is fully disclosed, and it is the main reason the implied H2 EBIT margin sits below the H1 result. It is also why the EBITDA-to-EBIT gap should widen from here, and why EBITDA rather than EBIT is the cleaner sequential margin comparison for the next two quarters.

11. United States Import Tariffs Now Sit Inside Cost of Sales

For the first time in the covered period, the filing names US import tariffs as a component of the cost-of-sales increase, in both the quarterly and the half-year commentary: the increase was "primarily attributable to a change in product mix and higher import tariffs in the United States, as well as higher industrial costs." The tariff was not mentioned in the prepared remarks and was not raised in Q&A.

Assessment: This closes out the "we are ready" posture from Q1 with the least dramatic possible outcome. The tariff is now a real, recurring line item inside cost of sales, and cost of sales as a percentage of revenue was nevertheless identical to the prior year at 47.4%. Ferrari absorbed it inside the mix uplift without a visible commercial-policy action and without a margin consequence. The company has still never sized the tariff, which is the outstanding disclosure gap, but the operational answer is now on the record: at current rates and current mix, it does not move the margin.

12. Capital Returns — Over €800M in a Single Quarter

Shareholder remuneration in the quarter exceeded €800M, comprising a €599M dividend payment (of a €640M total approved at the April Annual General Meeting) and €209M of share repurchases. That swung net industrial cash of €388M at March 31 to net industrial debt of €131M at June 30. Separately, on July 16 the company cancelled 16,644,606 common shares and 6,686,115 special voting shares held in treasury, and purchased a further 139,732 shares for €45.5M between July 1 and July 24 under the second tranche of the approximately €3.5B multi-year buyback running to 2030.

Assessment: The net-debt swing looks dramatic and is not: it is a single dividend payment plus buyback against a business that generated €929M of industrial free cash flow in the half. Total debt of €3,166M is almost entirely financial-services related, with net financial-services debt of €1,549M against total net debt of €1,680M. The share cancellation is the more meaningful structural item, permanently retiring the treasury block rather than parking it, and the diluted count is down 1.1% year over year with the buyback running through 2030. Ferrari's capital returns are large, funded from cash generation, and now contributing a measurable slice of EPS growth.

Guidance & Outlook

The stated basis for the raise is two updated assumptions: stronger personalizations than initially expected, and lower than anticipated currency headwinds net of hedges. Four assumptions were confirmed unchanged: a significant model changeover shaping the year with positive product mix, higher racing and lifestyle revenues, increased brand investments alongside racing and digital expenses, and higher D&A in line with the start of production of new models. The guide remains explicitly based on current visibility on Middle East crisis effects.

Implied second-half math: Against the reported first half, the raised guide implies H2 revenue of approximately €3.81B (+0.7% versus H1's €3,786M, and roughly +6.8% against H2 2025's implied €3.57B), H2 adjusted EBIT of at least €1,107M for an implied margin near 29.0%, and H2 adjusted EPS of at least €4.73 against €4.95 delivered in H1. Industrial free cash flow of at least €1.55B against €929M booked leaves at least €621M for the second half, comfortably below the H1 run rate and consistent with the seasonal working-capital pattern.

Where the guide sits versus its own first half: a floor implying margin compression of roughly 150bps half over half, in a year where the company has just told the market that mix-price variance in H2 will be higher than in H1, is not a forecast. Management said as much when it conceded the low end is rounding. The realistic reading is an H2 EBIT margin around 30.0-30.5% and a full-year figure closer to 30.3%, which would put FY EBIT near €2.30B and adjusted EPS near €9.85 rather than the €9.68 floor.

Guidance style: unchanged and characteristically conservative. Ferrari has now set a floor and raised it mid-year in the pattern the market expects, and the composition of the raise (revenue up more than profit, with the difference sitting in cost lines that are partly discretionary and partly a reversible racing accrual) leaves room to beat the raised numbers without requiring anything new to go right.

Analyst Q&A Highlights

1. Whether Volume Growth Is Even the Right Question

The dominant line of questioning across the call was an attempt to get management to characterize the unit trajectory, approached from at least three directions: whether flat full-year volumes still held, whether the second half implies growth, and whether the product cycle or something structural governs the path. Management refused all three framings and substituted a strategic principle for a numerical answer. The refusal was consistent and, unusually, was offered as a positive statement of policy rather than as a deferral.

Q: "If you could just, I know you don't like to talk about volume, if you could just conceptually discuss, if I'm not mistaken, we were expecting broadly stable volumes for this year. That now implies a bit of growth in the second half. Perhaps you could confirm if you share that. Is that a function of just the product cycle?"
— Henning Cosman, Barclays

A: "2026 is a year where we have a significant changeover model. We have a lot of new models. We have the ramp-up of a very innovative model for which we have a very high degree of personalization. We always keep one thing in mind, Henning, is scarcity and exclusivity. For us, what is important is that we deliver unique products to our clients. Our North Star has been, it is and will always be scarcity and exclusivity."
— Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: Management did not answer, and the non-answer is the information. Ferrari has decided that unit volume is not a metric it will be held to, and it is making that argument from a position of strength while ASP compounds at 12%. For modeling purposes this means the second half should be built from revenue and margin rather than from a unit forecast, and any model anchored on a delivery count is now working with a variable the company has explicitly disclaimed. The risk this creates is asymmetric and slow-acting: it costs nothing while mix is strong and becomes expensive the first quarter mix normalizes.

2. The Americas Decline — Demand Problem or Build-Complexity Problem

A 20.7% year-over-year decline in Ferrari's second-largest region was described in Q&A as larger than the market had modeled, and the questioning sought to separate a demand explanation from a supply one. Management rejected the supply-chain framing outright and offered two causes: the model changeover, and a newer argument that heavily personalized cars take longer to build and therefore reduce deliverable units.

Q: "Number two, in terms of the Americas and the U.S., shipments were down year-over-year quite a bit. Obviously, Antonio, you explained why in terms of the rollout of newness and all of that, but I think still that was down more than expected by the market. Is there any issue with demand in the U.S. or is it really exclusively a supply issue in the U.S. and shipment should normalize pretty soon?"
— Edouard Aubin, Morgan Stanley

A: "The reason you are referring to, we don't have, 1, no issue of supply chain. 2, we have a significant model changeover as we have been highlighting in the chart number four, I think. The other point is that when you have cars with high degree of innovation and high personalization degree, this is having clearly an impact on the number of cars that you deliver, because there are some cars. As we have said at the beginning, the personalization content of our cars keeps increasing, and this has clearly some effect on what is the number of cars you deliver."
— Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: The build-complexity argument is new this quarter and is internally consistent with the personalization step-up, which is the strongest thing in its favor. It is also unfalsifiable from outside the company. What supports it independently is that Americas cars-and-parts revenue rose €18M despite the unit decline, which is not what a demand problem looks like. What argues against filing it away is that the same explanation would justify any level of unit decline indefinitely. Q3 Americas deliveries are the test.

3. The ASP Acceleration Outside the Supercar

A precise line of questioning established that the average selling price improvement was not merely a supercar artifact. The questioner backed out currency and the limited F80 contribution and concluded that the ASP of the core fleet had accelerated on its own, which management confirmed, and further confirmed that the current fleet is personalizing at higher rates than prior generations of the same models.

Q: "It seems like the average selling price for the fleet, excluding the supercar, improved quite a bit. That's with the SF90 XX declining, as you told us. Could you talk a little bit more about what some of the biggest drivers were of the underlying acceleration in the fleet and maybe connect that to your comment last quarter that profitability would be the same in second half as first half?"
— Michael Binetti, Evercore ISI

A: "Michael, in terms of the ASP, it is still true that H2 is similar to H1, just maybe slightly better and better than we have previously anticipated, considering the penetration of personalizations. That also explains why the ASP for the fleet, excluding the supercar, has improved. Actually, we see the trend of personalization improving across the board, better than improving, staying high across the board, even higher than we expected."
— Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

Assessment: The most important confirmation of the call for the durability question. If the ASP lift were confined to F80 and special series, it would be a two-year phenomenon that reverses when those runs complete. Confirmation that the base fleet is personalizing at higher rates, and that the same models are doing so more than prior generations, makes the uplift structural rather than cyclical. It also sets a materially harder 2027 comparison, since the base against which 2027 personalization will be measured is now stepping up rather than holding flat.

4. Why the Revenue Raise Was Bigger Than the Profit Raise

The most useful modeling question of the call addressed the €100M revenue raise against the €40M EBIT raise, on the reasonable premise that incremental personalization revenue should carry a high drop-through. Management's answer was specific enough to be checked and located the entire gap in second-half costs rather than in any change to personalization economics.

Q: "I guess the revenue floor was raised by EUR 100 million, but the EBIT floor was raised by EUR 40 million. I guess I would have thought personalization would have a bigger drop-through to EBIT. I know FX has some hedging, so maybe that didn't drop down as much, but maybe some just commentary on the drop-through of the revenue guide to EBIT."
— Tom Narayan, RBC

A: "First of all, in terms of margin from personalization, this is absolutely unchanged in line with the first half. The entire difference is related to our forecast of cost increase in the second half, across the three lines of G&A, R&D, and most of all, D&A. Do not forget that we are maintaining the assumption of ranking first in the Formula One championship."
— Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

Assessment: A complete answer with no dodge, and it changes how the raise should be read. Personalization economics are unchanged, so the incremental revenue converts at the normal rate and is simply being offset. Two of the three offsetting lines are timing or assumption-driven, and the championship-ranking accrual in particular is a cost booked against an outcome that has not occurred. The guidance raise is therefore better than its own headline arithmetic suggests.

5. Running Above the 2030 EPS Algorithm

The questioning established that the raised 2026 guide implies roughly 8% EPS growth against the Capital Markets Day framework's approximately 6% compound annual rate to 2030, and asked what specifically is running better than plan. The answer was a three-part decomposition that separated the operating contribution from the non-operating ones, which is a more candid response than the question required. The first two parts appear below; the third, delivered after a brief clarifying exchange, was the buyback shrinking the share count.

Q: "With your upgraded guidance, you're now talking to us at an 8% growth in EPS. If I go back to last year, the CAGR was 6% to 2030. We are moving above that line. ... where are we on that roadmap to 2030? I wonder if you could talk about what's going as planned, what's going better, what's going worse, because it certainly feels as if personalization's going better."
— Mike Tyndall, HSBC

A: "You touched the point. Actually, personalization is doing better than we had assumed for the rest of the plan. The second element, you should not disregard the assumption with respect to the currency. That adds in terms of the nominal development of the EPS compared to what the CAGR implied in the guidance."
— Antonio Picca Piccon, CFO

Assessment: The candour is worth something and the content deflates the outperformance appropriately. Only one of the three drivers is a business improvement; one is a currency assumption that can reverse and one is a denominator effect. That the 2030 targets were left unchanged despite two quarters of running ahead is the correct call and also removes the easiest justification for paying a higher multiple. Anyone underwriting a re-rating on the strength of an implied long-term upgrade should note that management explicitly declined to provide one.

6. Luce Order Composition and Regional Allocation

Two separate questioners pressed on the composition of the Luce order book, seeking a ratio between repeat clients and new customers and asking whether regional allocation might be adjusted if demand skews to a particular market. Management confirmed genuinely new-to-brand buyers, declined the ratio, and made a notable commitment on allocation methodology that departs from Ferrari's usual practice of managing regional mix directly.

Q: "Ultimately, let's assume that Luce could attract new customers more in China. Would you be willing to increase the weight of shipments in China, maybe above the usual levels?"
— Monica Bosio, Intesa Sanpaolo

A: "We said also that for this model, we will move ourselves in a FIFO mode, where either new client or repeater will have the same priority. This comes back to your question, would you increase penetration depending on the region or? We will follow the order intake, because for us, it's an opportunity to show, once again, that we respect, on one side, the people, the client willingness to drive a new kind of car."
— Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: The first-in-first-out commitment with no priority for existing clients is a genuine break from how Ferrari allocates scarce models, and it signals confidence that demand is deep enough not to require curation. Letting order intake drive regional weighting is the same signal from a different angle. Both are constructive. What remains absent is any quantity: two months after the reveal, with a promise made at the prior call that this one would carry detail, the disclosure is still qualitative.

7. Whether the Manual Formula Extends Across the Range

The immediate sell-out of a 1,499-unit special series at a substantial premium raised the obvious follow-on question of whether the same formula could be applied more broadly. Management refused to be drawn, and the refusal extended even to the two further models already committed for unveiling before year-end.

Q: "Manuale, given the success of that model, would it make sense to do similar across the rest of the range, or is there a particular reason why it wouldn't make sense?"
— Mike Tyndall, HSBC

A: "The question number 1 is simple. We don't disclose what we're going to do in the future. We do not even disclose what will happen in the remaining of the year, when I said the 2 other models will be unveiled… We'll discover all together at the due time, what is the future of this important technology."
— Benedetto Vigna, CEO

Assessment: Standard Ferrari product secrecy rather than a meaningful signal, but the phrase "the future of this important technology" is a deliberate one for a system the company designed in-house and patented. Businesses do not patent a manual-by-wire architecture for a single 1,499-unit run. The reasonable inference is that the technology has a longer roadmap than the special series it debuted in, which would be incrementally positive for the mix story in 2028 and beyond.

What They're NOT Saying

1. Any Luce number at all: two months after the world premiere, and after an explicit commitment at the prior call that this would be the quarter where Luce questions were answered in detail, the disclosure remains "in line with our plans," "repeaters and new clients," and nothing quantitative. No units, no price, no order-book coverage, no production capacity, no market-launch schedule. Consistent with Ferrari's practice for every individual model, but the promise was made and not kept.
2. Volume, on principle rather than on timing: management declined the unit question three times and, unlike prior quarters, did not frame the refusal as a deferral. The implication is that no unit guidance is coming, and that models built on a delivery forecast are working with a variable the company has disclaimed.
3. F80 shipment quantity, while naming F80 as the primary profit driver: the EBIT bridge attributes the €122M product-mix contribution principally to F80 deliveries, and the CFO in the same call characterized the quarter's F80 volume only as "really modestly higher compared to Q1." The largest identified driver of the beat is deliberately unquantified.
4. The size of the United States tariff: named for the first time as a cost-of-sales driver in both the quarterly and half-year commentary, and never sized in either. Cost of sales held flat as a percentage of revenue, so the operational answer is visible, but the absolute exposure is not, which makes a rate change impossible to model.
5. The Americas and the Q1 reallocation, reconciled: management stated flatly that there was "there has been not any… pull order between one quarter, between one region and others," while the interim report attributes part of the H1 country mix to "the geographic allocation flexibility implemented during the first quarter in response to the escalation of hostilities in the Middle East." Both can be true, but nobody asked management to reconcile them and management did not volunteer it.
6. Mainland China, entirely: a 32.5% regional decline received no mention in prepared remarks and no direct question in Q&A. Three months ago, when the same region grew 7.6%, it also received no prepared-remarks mention. The silence is at least consistent, but a region declining in three of four quarters warrants a sentence.
7. The personalization rate, precisely: "above 20%" and "higher than expected" are the only formulations offered. The step-up is the single stated reason for the guidance raise, and its magnitude is undisclosed, which makes the durability question untrackable quarter to quarter.
8. The 2027 currency exposure, in size: "far less covered by hedging" against 8% coverage for H2 2026 is a directional statement about a risk that management itself named as one of three reasons EPS is running above the 2030 algorithm. A currency tailwind that is explicitly credited when it helps should be sized when it could hurt.
9. The 12Cilindri Manuale life cycle: asked directly whether the 1,499 units could be modeled across two or three years, the CEO declined with a joke about the questioner's spreadsheet. The phasing of a fully allocated special series is exactly the kind of detail that determines which year the revenue lands in.

Market Reaction

• Pre-print setup: RACE closed at $385.69 on July 29, up 4.4% year to date against the S&P 500's 6.9%, up 3.6% over the trailing thirty days, and down 22.7% over the trailing twelve months. The 52-week closing range entering the print was $314.63 to $507.31, placing the stock in the lower half of that band and roughly 16% above where our Q1 note was written.
• Print-day session (July 30, before the open): opened at $390.00 (+1.1%), traded a range of $381.44 to $403.00, and closed at $397.73, up 3.1% or $12.04. The S&P 500 rose 1.7% the same session, so roughly 1.4 points of the move was stock-specific.
• Volume: 1.2 million shares against a 30-day average of 0.5 million, or 2.5 times normal turnover.
• Post-print drift: the stock closed higher than the pre-print close in every subsequent session, reaching $412.26 on August 7. That is +3.7% from the reaction-day close and +6.9% from the pre-print close over six sessions.

The intraday shape of the print day is more informative than the close. The stock traded down early, on automated coverage that compared Ferrari's reported euro EPS against a dollar-denominated consensus and reported a miss, before reversing as the guidance raise was digested. The low of $381.44 sits below the pre-print close; the high of $403.00 sits above where the stock opened. A 21-dollar intraday range on a quarter with no genuine surprise in it is a positioning artifact rather than a fundamental one.

The steady six-session drift higher is the part that matters for the rating. This was not a one-day reaction that faded. Each session after the print closed above the pre-print level, on declining but still healthy volume, which is the signature of institutional accumulation working through a position rather than a fast-money trade. It also means the stock has now done a meaningful part of the work our prior target was waiting for, which is the central input into the target revision below.

Street Perspective

Debate: Is the Personalization and Mix Uplift Structural or a Changeover Artifact?

Bull view: The uplift is broad-based rather than concentrated: management confirmed the base fleet excluding the supercar is personalizing at higher rates than prior generations of the same models, across paint, carbon, wheels and leather, with no single option or geography driving it. Capacity is being built behind it in Tokyo, Los Angeles and Maranello. A structural increase in what customers spend per car is the highest-quality growth available to a volume-constrained business.

Bear view: A 12% ASP step-up in a year with the largest model changeover in the company's listed history, with a supercar in the mix and a fully allocated special series in the wings, is close to the definition of a cyclically flattered number. Every one of those contributors laps. The bear framing on the Street is that the earnings beat leans on high-margin supercar deliveries against a shrinking delivery base, and that investors should ask how long that can persist.

Our take: The bulls have the better of the evidence and the bears have the better of the timing. The confirmation that the core fleet, not just the halo cars, is personalizing more is the single most important disclosure of the quarter and makes a meaningful portion of the uplift genuinely structural. But structural does not mean it compounds at 12%. The right expectation is that the level holds and the growth rate normalizes toward mid single digits, which still supports the plan but not the current rate of upgrade. The 2027 comparison is the moment this resolves, and it is close enough that it should be in the multiple today.

Debate: Does the Volume Decline Matter?

Bull view: It is the strategy. Ferrari has said explicitly that scarcity and exclusivity are the objective, that it manages manufacturing rather than targeting deliveries, and that the unit count "doesn't make a big difference." Revenue grew 8% on 3.7% fewer cars and operating profit grew 9.5%. A luxury franchise that can raise price and specification faster than it loses volume is doing precisely what its pricing power exists for, and the order book covering all of 2027 means the constraint is production, not demand.

Bear view: The declines are not evenly distributed. The Americas fell 20.7% and Mainland China 32.5%, both in a single quarter, and the explanations offered (launch cadence, longer build times for personalized cars) cannot be verified externally and would justify any magnitude of decline. A company that has decided its principal volume metric is not worth discussing has removed the market's ability to distinguish deliberate scarcity from demand erosion until it shows up in revenue, by which point it is a downgrade rather than a datapoint.

Our take: Volume does not matter yet and the bulls are right about the current quarter, because Americas revenue rose while Americas units fell by a fifth, which is dispositive on the demand question for that region this quarter. What concerns us is the erosion of the market's ability to check the claim. Ferrari has moved from declining to guide units to declining to discuss them, and simultaneously stopped commenting on its weakest region. That combination is what turns a strategy into an opacity discount. The specific thing to watch in Q3 is whether Americas deliveries recover as the launch-cadence explanation predicts. If they do, this debate closes in the bulls' favour. If they do not, the framing that units are irrelevant will start costing the multiple.

Debate: Has the Multiple Re-Rated Too Far, Too Fast?

Bull view: The stock is still 22.7% below its level twelve months ago and well below the post-Capital Markets Day highs, so the re-rating is a recovery rather than an expansion. Order-book visibility through all of 2027, plus a fully allocated special series not yet in that book, gives Ferrari revenue certainty that no comparable luxury franchise can match, and that visibility is worth a premium to point-of-sale luxury houses exposed to quarterly consumer spending. The buyback runs to 2030 and shrinks the count every quarter.

Bear view: At $412.26 against a full-year adjusted EPS floor of €9.68, translated at the company's own approximately 1.16 assumption, the stock trades near 37 times this year's guided floor for a business management has explicitly declined to upgrade beyond an approximately 6% long-term EPS algorithm. Two of the three reasons EPS is running above that algorithm are a currency assumption and a share count, neither of which is a business improvement. Sell-side targets that moved after the print clustered in the $460 to $500 range, which brackets the current price closely enough that the consensus itself is not underwriting much further upside.

Our take: The bears have the better of this one, and it is the reason we are cutting our target while raising our estimates. A 37 times multiple on a guided floor is not expensive for this franchise, and our own numbers put the realistic full-year figure closer to €9.85, which brings the multiple nearer 36 times. But the case for owning Ferrari at $330 in May was that a high-quality compounder had de-rated to a level that assumed execution failure. At $412 that argument is substantially spent, and what remains is a good business at a fair price with a hard comparison approaching. That is still worth owning against the index. It is not worth the target we set in a different regime.

Model Update Needed

Valuation impact: lowering the 12-month price target to $490 from $550. The reduction is entirely a multiple decision. Our FY 2026 adjusted EPS estimate rises to approximately €9.85 from €9.55-9.70, and we introduce FY 2027 at approximately €10.70. Translated at the company's own approximately 1.16 dollar-euro assumption, FY 2027 is roughly $12.40. The $490 target applies approximately 39.5 times to that figure, against the roughly 37 times the stock trades at on this year's number and the roughly 33 times it carries on our 2027 estimate. The prior $550 target, set at the Q4 2025 print when the shares were near $510, implied approximately 44 times our 2027 estimate, a multiple last supported before the Capital Markets Day reset. Raising estimates and cutting the target is the honest consequence of a stock that has re-rated 24% while the long-term earnings algorithm has been explicitly left unchanged by management. At $490 the implied upside from the August 7 close of $412.26 is approximately 19%.

Thesis Scorecard Post-Earnings

Overall: Thesis strengthened on the business and weakened on the stock. Five of six bull pillars are confirmed and two of them (order book, personalization) were upgraded outright; the sixth remains neutral on an information deficit rather than a bad result. On the bear side, the picture has genuinely deteriorated: the cadence point escalated, the China point reverted after we upgraded it a quarter early, the unit-cadence point hardened into a disclosure posture, the valuation point has become the binding constraint on the rating, and a new Americas volume point opens. Only the tariff bear point improved. The net is a better business than we underwrote in May, at a price that has already paid for most of that improvement.

Action: Maintaining Outperform. Lowering the 12-month price target to $490 from $550. Hold the position; do not add at $412. The quarter was a genuine beat with high-quality composition, the guidance raise is conservative in a way that leaves room to beat again, and the order book covering all of 2027 with a fully allocated 1,499-unit special series still to enter it gives Ferrari revenue visibility no comparable luxury franchise can match. But the stock has captured roughly 24% since our last note, management explicitly declined to upgrade the long-term earnings algorithm on the strength of two good quarters, and one third of the EPS-floor raise is a share count rather than earnings. The three things that would change this view in either direction are all testable at the Q3 print: whether Americas deliveries recover as the launch-cadence explanation predicts, whether the personalization step-up holds as the 2027 comparison comes into view, and whether the Manuale's entry into the order book extends coverage beyond 2027. Until then the risk/reward supports owning the shares against the index without adding to them.